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ABSTRACT 
AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF ENVIRONMENTAL UNCERTAINTY, REAL 
OPTIONS DECISION PATTERNS AND FIRM PERFORMANCE  
 
September 2009 
 
ALFRED M. BOCCIA, JR, B.A., FORDHAM COLLEGE 
 
M.B.A., HARVARD UNIVERSITY 
 
Ph.d., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
 
Directed by: Associate Professor Bruce C. Skaggs 
 
 
Real options theory has become an influential explanatory and normative 
framework for making resource allocation decisions.  Despite a growing body of strategy 
research regarding real options, however, there is as of yet little empirical confirmation 
(1) that firm resource allocation behavior conforms with real options theory, or (2) that 
employing real options principles has a positive impact on firm performance.  
 This research examines these questions.  Using a survey instrument designed to 
measure a range of real options-theoretic decision patterns, data has been collected from a 
sample of 173 U.S. manufacturing firms.  This data set has been used to test two central 
premises.  
 The first is that, in contrast to much of the real options literature, there is no 
inherently superior real options decision pattern.  Instead, real options-optimal investment 
decisions depend on the magnitude and source of the uncertainties that firms encounter in 
their task environments.  This premise is tested by measuring two important sources of 
uncertainty in the external environment: uncertainty regarding the level and composition 
 vi
of demand (market uncertainty) and uncertainty regarding the intentions and actions of 
competitors (competitive uncertainty).  I develop the theoretical foundation for expecting 
that patterns of real options behavior vary with these two sources of uncertainty, and that 
different sources of uncertainty frequently promote competing real options-theoretic 
decision behavior.  The research tests these hypothesized relationships empirically.  The 
principal contribution of this analysis has been to develop a more fine-grained 
appreciation of the relationship between real options theory and a multidimensional 
conceptualization of uncertainty.  
 The second premise of the research is that making investment decisions based on 
real options principles has a positive effect on firm performance.  There is ample 
theoretical foundation for the superiority of real options theory as a framework for 
making resource commitment decisions.  The research examines this expectation 
empirically by testing whether the fit or congruence between real options decision 
patterns and environmental uncertainty is positively related to firm profitability, market 
value and growth. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 Real options theory is a relatively new explanatory and prescriptive conceptual 
framework for firm-level resource allocation decision-making.  Though initially 
developed as an asset pricing and project evaluation methodology, principally in the 
realm of finance, real options theory has, in the last two decades, become influential in 
the study of strategy.  It has been applied to explain a range of strategic behavior, 
including joint ventures (Chi, 2000; Chi & McGuire, 1996; Kogut, 1991), research and 
development (Faulkner, 1996; McGrath, 1997; Miller & Arikan, 2004; Mitchell & 
Hamilton, 1988), the multinational corporation (Kogut, 1985; Kogut and Kulatilaka, 
1994a), investment in capabilities and competencies (Kogut & Kulatilaka, 2001), 
entrepreneurship (McGrath, 1999), venture capital (Hackett & Dilts, 2004; Hurry, Miller 
& Bowman, 1992), innovation (Reiss, 1998; Wu, 2005), market entry and exit (Dixit, 
1989; Folta & O’Brien, 2004; Miller & Folta, 2002; O’Brien, Folta & Johnson, 2003), 
acquisitions (Smith & Triantis, 1994), and restructuring (Hurry, 1993).  Real options 
theory has been used to shed light on long-standing issues in the field – including 
governance (Leiblein, 2003; Santoro & McGill, 2005), vertical integration (Leiblein & 
Miller, 2003; Sutcliffe & Zaheer, 1998), and diversification (Kogut & Kulatilaka, 2001) – 
and has been examined in relation to other important theoretical traditions such as the 
resource-based and knowledge-based views (Bowman & Hurry, 1993; Coff & Laverty, 
2001; Kogut & Kulatilaka, 1994b and 2001; Miller, 2002; Vassolo, Anand & Folta, 
2004), transaction cost economics (Leiblein, 2003; Sanchez, 2003) and game theory 
(Grenadier, 2002; Smit & Ankum, 1993).   
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Not least, real options theory has provided an alternate explanatory framework for 
the real asset investment behavior of firms.  Pindyck (1991) observed that neoclassical 
investment theory has failed to provide a good empirical model of capital investment 
behavior.  Companies demonstrably do not allocate resources in accordance with its 
precepts (Bower, 1972).  In establishing a conceptual foundation for investment behavior 
that deviates from strict adherence to the expected net present value (ENPV) decision 
rubrics of neoclassical finance, real options theory better explains how managers actually 
think and act (Teach, 2003).  It also ameliorates a long standing divide between strategy 
and finance by providing a formal economic foundation for long-term strategic resource 
allocation decisions that have often proved difficult to justify using conventional 
financial decision standards (Allessandri et al., 2004; Chen, Kensington & Conover, 
1998; Kester, 1984; Lander & Pinches, 1998; McGrath & Nerkar, 2004; Miller & Waller, 
2003; Nichols, 1994; Triantis & Borison, 2001).    
Finally, real options theory has been advanced as an overarching, integrating lens 
for strategy as a whole.  Bowman & Hurry (1993) view real options as the choice 
mechanism that underlies the temporal unfolding of strategy, and conceptualize 
organizations as generators and repositories of real options for strategic choice.  
McGrath, Ferrier & Mendelow (2004) see real options as “poised to occupy a central 
conceptual position in the development of theory that offers guidance for strategic 
decision-making under uncertainty” (86). 
 In summary, considerable progress has been made in establishing real options as a 
prominent strategic construct.  Despite these advances, however, several important 
dimensions of real options as strategic theory warrant additional work.  A review of the 
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growing real options literature suggests three deficiencies in particular that merit further 
attention and that have motivated the present research.   
 First, the base of empirical study supporting the role of real options in strategic 
management remains relatively small.  Theoretical and modeling research greatly 
outweighs empirical studies.  Such empirical research as has been conducted does not 
provide definitive support for real options theory.  Many of the specific strategic 
phenomena that have been examined from a real options perspective can also be 
explained by other theoretical frames.  Joint ventures, for example, have been examined 
from the perspective of the knowledge-based view, which interprets them as mechanisms 
for acquiring knowledge (Hamel, 1991) and from a transaction cost perspective, which 
explains joint ventures as a hybrid form of economic organization combining selective 
advantages of market and hierarchy (Hennart, 1988; Mowrey, Oxley & Silverman, 1996).  
Similarly, management behavior that departs from neoclassical investment standards has 
been explained as a reflection of the agency problems of public corporations (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976).  
In addition, real options-theoretic studies of specific strategic phenomena do not 
demonstrate that real options principles inform decision-making more broadly within 
firms.  Folta & Miller (2002) and Trigeorgis (1993), among others, emphasize the 
importance of empirical studies that examine the extent to which managerial behavior 
actually conforms to real options principles.  Yet I know of no published studies that 
examine the extent of real options decision-making at the firm level.1 
                                            
1
 There has been some empirical study of investment decisions and real options principles at the industry or 
sector level.  Harchaoui & Lasserre (1996), for example, examined capacity additions in the Canadian 
copper mining sector in relation to “trigger” copper prices calculated under a real options model, and found 
a significant relationship between them.  Similarly, Moel & Tufano (2002) examined the pattern of North 
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A second notable characteristic of the real options literature is that the relationship 
between uncertainty and real options decision-making has been only modestly examined.  
Nuanced managerial response to uncertainty is at the heart of the real options perspective.  
Real options theory maintains that resource allocation decisions are shaped in response to 
the uncertainty surrounding those decisions, rather than solely in response to the expected 
cash flow value of decisions as measured by traditional financial decision rubrics.  The 
theory suggests that firms will act rationally to maximize the total value of resource 
commitments, taking into account both the expected cash flow value and the option value 
of those commitments.  Option value is a complex function with respect to uncertainty, 
such that it is not possible to specify optimal action without an explicit recognition of the 
magnitude, source and type of uncertainty.  Despite the importance of the uncertainty 
construct in real options theory, there has been very limited research, either empirical or 
theoretical, into the relationship between either the magnitude or source of uncertainty 
and real options resource allocation behavior.  Most of the real options literature treats 
uncertainty as omnipresent and unitary.  
Finally, there has been virtually no empirical study of real options in relation to 
performance.  As described in detail in Chapter 3, real options-based decision-making has 
been widely advanced as superior to the conventional financial decision-making 
standards used by most firms.  Implicit in this view is that firms employing real options 
principles (either formally, using real options-based evaluation tools, or informally, as a 
judgmental heuristic), will achieve superior sustained performance relative to firms that 
do not employ those principles.  The absence of empirical confirmation that real options 
                                                                                                                                  
American gold mine openings and closings over a 20-year period and found them to be consistent with real 
options principles.  These studies, however, are economic rather than strategic in their orientation and do 
not focus on the behavior of individual firms.  
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decision-making has a positive impact on performance is an important research 
opportunity (Triantis & Borison, 2001). 
 The present research makes an empirical contribution to the growing literature 
regarding real options and strategy along each of these three dimensions.  First, it 
measures and analyzes real options behavior at the level of the firm for a large multi-
industry sample, encompassing multiple real options decision patterns.  Second, in place 
of a uni-dimensional conceptualization of uncertainty, it explores theoretically the 
relationships between different kinds of uncertainty and different patterns of real options 
decision-making, and tests those relationships empirically.  In this regard, the study 
represents an initial effort to derive a more fine-grained specification of real options 
theory in relation to uncertainty, in the hope that further efforts along these lines will 
receive future research attention.  Finally, the research breaks new ground in exploring 
whether application of real options decision-making is reflected in differential 
performance at the level of the firm.  
 The remainder of this thesis consists of five chapters.  Chapter 2 reviews the 
conceptual foundations of real options theory as a strategic decision framework and 
identifies the principal resource allocation decision patterns consistent with the theory.  It 
also lays the conceptual foundation regarding uncertainty as it relates to real options 
decision-making.  Chapter 3 develops the theoretical basis for the research and presents a 
suite of hypotheses derived from that theoretical analysis.  Chapter 4 describes the data 
sources and methodology employed in the study, both as regards the survey instrument 
and its administration, and the analytical techniques used in hypothesis testing.  Chapter 5 
describes the results of the analysis and provides an interpretive discussion of those 
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results.  Chapter 6 explores the implications of the research for both academics and 
practitioners, describes the limitations of the study and concludes by suggesting priorities 
for future research.  
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 This chapter establishes the conceptual foundations regarding real options and 
uncertainty on which the research rests.  This is accomplished under three broad 
headings.  First is a summary of the real options theoretical framework, identifying its 
principal features and its differences from conventional decision-making standards.  The 
second section describes specific decision patterns that have been discussed in the real 
options literature, and that formed the basis for measuring real options behavior, as 
discussed in Chapter 4.  The third section briefly summarizes the relevant literature on 
uncertainty, establishing the conceptual framework for incorporating environmental 
uncertainty into the research.  
2.1  Summary of Real Options Theory 
Real options theory rests on the insight that real (that is, non-financial) assets are 
in many ways analogous to financial options (Myers, 1977).  Like puts and calls in the 
financial markets – which, at a cost, confer the right but not the obligation to sell or buy 
respectively an underlying security in the future – investments in real assets similarly 
represent the acquisition of non-obligatory rights to future choices and opportunities 
(Dixit & Pindyck, 1995; Kester, 1984).  All assets and resource commitments contain 
such choice possibilities.  A manufacturing facility, for example, is a nexus of options, 
including the right to produce, to expand the plant, to shut it down temporarily if at any 
point market conditions make it desirable to do so, to alter its inputs and outputs, or to 
abandon it entirely (Kulatilaka, 1995; McDonald & Siegel, 1985).  A wide variety of 
assets have been interpreted within the real options perspective, including inventory, 
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organizational slack (Bowman & Hurry, 1993), unused debt capacity (Trigeorgis, 1993), 
and cash reserves (Cossin & Hricko, 2004). 
Were firms endowed with perfect foreknowledge of future events affecting their 
activities, such possibilities to make future choices would be of no value, since firms 
could value and make optimal decisions for the future a priori.  Similarly, if all 
investments were perfectly and costlessly reversible, real options would have no value, 
since firms could easily undo any investment that proved unwise.  Capital investment 
decisions are, however, inherently uncertain and hard to undo (Carruth, Dickerson & 
Henley, 2000; Pindyck, 1991).2  In the presence of uncertainty and irreversibility, future 
choice possibilities – real options – have economic value, since they permit firms to act 
on or “exercise” choice possibilities under favorable future conditions (“in the money” 
options) but to delay or forego action under unfavorable conditions (“out of the money” 
options) (Dixit & Pindyck, 1995).  
 Underlying real options theory, therefore, are two central concepts.  The first is 
asymmetrical response to uncertainty.  The distinctive characteristic of the options 
approach lies in making limited cost, incremental investments that confer or preserve the 
ability to make more substantial commitments only if outcomes are favorable (Kogut, 
1991; Kogut & Kulatilaka, 2001; McGrath et al., 2004; Trigeorgis & Mason, 1987).  This 
asymmetry can be achieved only to the extent that firms can avoid or delay making large 
irreversible commitments (McGrath, 1999).  The second core concept is the value of 
management flexibility.  Real options theory incorporates into resource decisions ex ante 
                                            
2
 Some non-company-specific investments may be partially reversible by liquidation or sale. Even in such 
cases, however, reversibility is typically limited. Salvage values rarely recover full investment. Further, 
market values are likely to be well below original outlays for investments which have fallen short of 
expectations. In other words, investments are likely to be least reversible in those circumstances when firms 
are most interested to reverse them (Dixit & Pindyck, 1995; Pindyck, 1991).  
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the discretion that informed management has to adapt to future developments ex post 
(Trigeorgis, 1993).  The theory anticipates that firms will act to maximize the value of 
assets as uncertain events unfold, and the latitude for such action has economic value.  In 
the illustrative manufacturing facility, management will make the appropriate decisions 
to operate, expand, switch inputs and products, or abandon the facility, as warranted by 
market conditions.  Real options theory reflects therefore a very activist managerial 
approach in which uncertainty is partially endogenized through agency.  
 Implicit in real options theory is a conceptualization of firm response to 
uncertainty that is different from that embodied in much strategic and organizational 
theory, in which uncertainty is viewed as an undesirable source of variance that firms 
attempt to reduce or eliminate (Thompson, 1967).  Real options theory, by contrast, 
encourages firms to exploit rather than avoid uncertainty (Coy, 1999; Garud, 
Kumaraswamy & Nayyar, 1998; Kogut, 1991; Kogut & Kulatilaka, 1994b & 2001; 
McGrath, 1999; McGrath et al., 2004; Morris, Teisberg & Kolbe, 1991; Sanchez, 1991).  
As long as exposure to downside risk can be limited by the prudent use of options, 
uncertainty is a source of opportunity and can be beneficial to the firm.  
2.2  Real Options Decision Patterns 
 
 The real options literature identifies a number of decision patterns that are 
consistent with the real options principles described above.  I here summarize these 
patterns of action, in effect constructing from the literature a taxonomy of real options-
theoretic decision behaviors.  Table 2.1 identifies five core dimensions of the real options 
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construct and the decision patterns associated with each.  I describe below the foundation 
for each pattern from the perspective of real options theory.3 
2.2.1  Timing 
 A central element of the real options construct is its implications for the optimal 
timing of resource commitments.  Real options theory puts when to invest, as much as 
whether to invest, at the center of attention in capital budgeting (Dixit & Pindyck, 1995).  
Further, the theory provides economic justification for timing decisions that deviate from 
the standard financial metrics for project valuation specified by neoclassical financial 
theory and embodied in the discounted cash flow investment evaluation processes used 
by most companies in capital budgeting.4  Under neoclassical investment theory, 
investments should be undertaken when they demonstrate an expected net present value 
(ENPV) equal to or greater than zero.5   Real options theory, by contrast, dictates that 
optimal timing may deviate from the ENPV standard under conditions of uncertainty if 
there are substantial option values associated with the deviation decision.6   
                                            
3
 The boundaries of real options theory as a strategic construct are not clearly defined, as witnessed by the 
exchange of views in the Academy of Management Review, 29 (1): 2004.  Adner & Levinthal (2004a and b) 
maintain that a clear abandonment test is an essential element of the construct, limiting the applicability of 
real options in strategy to investments aimed at specific, definable opportunities and characterized by clear 
abandonment criteria.  Other authors argue instead for a broader conceptualization of real options as a 
guiding managerial heuristic that incorporates resource commitments for which neither specific target 
opportunities nor clear abandonment conditions can be specified ex ante (Kogut & Kulatilaka, 2004; 
McGrath et al., 2004a and b; Pandza et al., 2003; Zardkoohi, 2004).  In the interests of comprehensiveness, 
this research will adopt the broader of these two framings, thus including real options decision patterns 
which would not meet more restrictive specifications of the construct’s boundaries. 
4
 A number of surveys and studies have shown that net present value and related standards are by the far the 
most widely used capital budgeting methods (Busby & Pitts, 1997; Graham & Harvey, 2001; Teach, 2003). 
5
 Within this broad theoretical frame there are a number of alternate formulations.  For example, various 
specific metrics are used, including net present value (NPV), internal rate of return (IRR) and net present 
value index (NPVI).  Some formulations substitute the broader concept of “utility” for cash flow, thus 
allowing for varying risk preferences.  There are also various bases for determining appropriate discount 
rates.  From the perspective of this research, however, all these variations represent second order 
differences within the ENPV standard. 
6
 Properly speaking, there is no fundamental conceptual incompatibility between discounted cash flow net 
present value and real options approaches to investment evaluation.  If option values and project 
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Table 2.1 
Real Options-Theoretic Decision Patterns 
 
Construct Dimension                  Associated Decision Patterns 
Timing   Deviation from the neoclassical investment theory timing 
    rubric (invest when ENPV ≥ 0): 
     
- Deferral 
- Early action/acceleration 
 
Staging Breaking real asset investment into components and 
making incremental decisions at each stage 
 
          
Operating Flexibility Making real asset investments specifically designed to 
create or preserve operational flexibility: 
 
-    Incremental versus large-scale capacity additions 
-    Flexible producing assets versus highly specific assets 
     
Partial Commitment Making initial investments, short of full commitment, 
which can later be expanded or discontinued/reversed 
based on subsequent developments: 
  
- Joint ventures 
- Minority equity positions 
- Small acquisitions 
- “Toehold” positions 
     
Platform Investments Making non-revenue generating investments to create 
preferential access to future opportunities that cannot be 
currently defined in detail 
 
- Technology positioning  
- Capabilities and competencies  
- Knowledge 
                                                                                                                                  
interrelationships were incorporated in NPV calculations, the results would be consistent with real options 
principles (Kester, 1984; Luehrman, 1998b).  ENPV, however, promotes investment decision-making 
based on expected values, and does not, as typically employed, either consider or value real options. As 
described in Section 3.3 of this proposal, the omission of real options considerations leads to systematic 
distortions in investment decisions.  
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By far the most studied of these timing deviations is deferral or delay.  Deferral 
represents a deliberate decision to postpone undertaking an investment even when the 
ENPV standard would justify immediate pursuit, in the interest of waiting for total or 
partial uncertainty resolution (McDonald & Siegel, 1986).7  It is a central tenet of real 
options theory that there can often be considerable option value in delaying resource 
commitments.  All investment projects have a deferral value.  Real option theory 
specifies that every resource commitment made forgoes an option to take the same action 
at a later time, when key uncertainties may be partially or fully resolved, thus reducing 
downside risk or clarifying the best basis on which to proceed (McDonald & Siegel, 
1986).  In effect, every project competes with itself over time (Ingersoll & Ross, 1992).  
Conceptually, real options theory recognizes that the option of waiting always has a value 
where uncertainty is present, and if that value is greater than the foregone benefits of 
acting now (for example, through the loss or postponement of dividends), then deferral is 
the economically maximizing course of action.  McDonald & Siegel (1986) demonstrate 
that the present value loss from suboptimal timing can be substantial, easily on the order 
of 10-20% (See also Teisberg, 1994).  Kester (1984) maintains that companies routinely 
commit before they need to.   
Although deferral is the most widely discussed real options timing pattern, real 
options theory also supports timing decisions to accelerate investment.  It may, for 
example, be optimal from a real options perspective to invest even when stand-alone 
project economics do not meet ENPV standards.  Such early action may be justified when 
there is potential to gain valuable information, to capture future growth opportunities or 
                                            
7
 The real options concept of deferral is independent of capital availability issues, that is, it does not 
encompass postponing investments due to capital constraints. 
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to achieve first mover advantage (Dixit & Pindyck, 1995; Kester, 1984; Kulatilaka, 
1995).  Under such circumstances, firms may also justifiably take action to accelerate the 
implementation of investments by minimizing “time to build,” even when there is an 
incremental cost to doing so (Kulatilaka, 1995). 
 In summary, real options theory provides a theoretical foundation for 
systematically making investment timing decisions that deviate from conventional 
financial standards.  Further, such deviations are not unidirectional.  In the presence of 
uncertainty, both delay and acceleration have option value and either may, in the specific 
instance, represent optimal investment timing.  
2.2.2  Staging 
The second broad real options-theoretic pattern of action entails the time ordering 
of resource commitments.  The principal options-theoretic decision pattern applicable to 
temporal ordering is staging (Majd & Pindyck, 1987; Trigeorgis & Mason, 1987).  Real 
options theory conceptualizes resource commitments within an overall project as a series 
of sequential options, such that it is both possible and desirable to decompose projects 
into their component parts and to make decisions regarding continuation, discontinuation 
or revision after each step has been taken (Majd & Pindyck, 1987).  Hence, as an 
example, a plant construction project may, from a decision-making perspective, be 
decomposed into distinct design/engineering, site development and construction phases, 
with “go-no go” decisions made at each stage on an incremental or “money forward” 
basis.  In real options terms, pursuit of each stage represents an option to continue to the 
next stage, and the entire project consists of a series of compound options (Trigeorgis & 
Mason, 1987).  Staging also permits revision of the scope and scale of the commitment at 
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each decision point in response to experience gained or information received to that 
point. 
Many authors maintain that encouraging management to frame projects in this 
way is the single most important benefit of real options theory to management practice 
(Alessandri et al., 2004; Faulkner, 1996; Kemna, 1993; Kogut & Kulatilaka, 1994a; 
Luehrman, 1998b; Miller & Park, 2002; Triantis & Borison, 2001).  Smith & McArdle 
(1999) point out that the compound-option character of investments is often overlooked 
in the formulation and evaluation of project decisions.  Bowman & Moscowitz (2001) 
maintain that the real options perspective is more important in project design than 
evaluation, encouraging firms to identify the hidden options structure in their projects.  
As in the case of timing, however, real options prescriptions regarding project 
staging are not unidirectional.  Concurrent or parallel pursuit of project elements rather 
than staged or sequenced ordering may also be justified in real options terms.  I explain 
the conditions under which this is so in Chapter 3. 
2.2.3  Operating Flexibility 
As described earlier, real options theory recognizes and ascribes value to 
management’s scope to adjust future action in response to future events.  All assets 
contain flexibility options to the extent that there is latitude for making such adjustments.  
Further, firms can and do make investments in producing assets in such a way as to 
maximize management’s future scope of action in the face of uncertainty (Dixit & 
Pindyck, 1995).  Considerations of operating flexibility influence both the decision to add 
producing assets and decisions regarding the character of those additions.  Capacity 
expansion decisions frequently entail a tradeoff between adding capacity in modest 
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increments so as to preserve future flexibility and committing to large capacity 
increments so as to achieve the maximum benefits of efficiency and scale economies 
(Dixit & Pindyck, 1995).8  Furthermore, firms may make deliberate investments in 
flexible producing assets – assets that can be redeployed or adapted to a range of 
operating conditions.  Flexible assets include, for example, manufacturing facilities 
designed to allow for easy changes in production levels, product mix, or feedstock 
qualities (Kulatilaka, 1988 & 1995; Sanchez, 2003) and cross-training of employees 
(Leiblein & Miller, 2003).  Investments in regional diversification also constitute flexible 
operating assets.  Kogut & Kulatilaka (1994a) interpret the multinational enterprise as in 
part a complex network of operating flexibility options that allow for continuing 
optimization of exchange rates and input costs across countries. 
Investing in operational flexibility usually entails an incremental cost relative to 
more specialized, inflexible assets.  Adding capacity in modest increments forgoes the 
scale economies of large-scale additions, in effect incurring as an opportunity cost the 
lost efficiencies of size (Dixit & Pindyck, 1995).  Similarly, flexible manufacturing 
facilities typically require higher capital outlays per unit of production than dedicated, 
inflexible plant (Triantias & Hodder, 1990).  Employee cross-training incurs an explicit 
additional training cost relative to specialized training.  The multinational enterprise 
requires incremental management and coordination costs relative to regionally focused 
firms.  In each case, such incremental costs represent the cost of acquiring and 
                                            
8
 It is important to distinguish decisions to add capacity incrementally from the concept of project staging 
as described earlier.  Project staging refers to the steps within a single investment project, each of which 
must be undertaken before the project can generate revenue.  Incremental capacity decisions, by contrast, 
relate to how capacity expansion projects are defined.  Each increment represents an investment which is 
expected to generate revenue in and of itself, and is not a necessary precondition to making later capacity 
additions.  
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maintaining the operating flexibility option.  Real options theory maintains that the 
higher cost of flexible assets is justified when the option value of the operating flexibility 
thereby created exceeds the associated incremental cost.  
2.2.4  Partial Commitment 
The three real options decision patterns discussed above relate to two central 
elements of real options theory: timing and flexibility.  Other decision patterns focus on a 
third core dimension of the theory: growth.  Real options theory maintains that virtually 
all resource commitments create a “right” or preferential access to future growth 
opportunities that would not otherwise exist (Kester, 1984).  Existing assets are typically 
rich in opportunities for future growth, and most companies are endowed with extensive 
growth options (Kasanen, 1993). The difference between market value and book value 
has been interpreted as reflecting the unrealized value of these embedded growth options 
(Bowman & Hurry, 1993; Herath & Park, 1999; Kester, 1984; Pindyck, 1991).  
Investments in new assets also create future growth options.  New plant 
investment, for example, typically creates an option on future incremental low-cost 
capacity additions (Myers, 1977; Trigeorgis & Mason, 1987).  Entry into a new market 
brings with it the option of future expansion in that or related markets (Kogut & 
Kulatilaka, 1994a).  Similarly, investment in brand creates future growth opportunities in 
new products and markets (Dias & Ryals, 2002).  
Several real options decision patterns are designed to capture growth options.  
The first of these is partial commitment.  Consistent with the real options principle of 
asymmetric response to uncertainty, firms using real options decision principles seek 
continuously to reduce their exposure to the downside risks of uncertainty while 
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maintaining access to its upside potential.  Partial commitment constitutes one broad 
pattern of action that serves this objective.  Such investments represent a subset of 
commitment in which the focal firm makes an investment at a level below optimal or 
ultimate target scale as an initial step toward a market position of strategic interest.  
“Toehold” and “foothold” diversification investments are one common form of partial 
commitment (Zardkoohi, 2004).  Joint ventures and minority equity positions are others.  
Kogut’s (1991) interpretation of joint ventures as real options characterizes them as 
partial commitments, designed to test the waters of a new product or market at less than 
full commitment.  In this reading, joint ventures provide a vehicle for expansion in the 
target market through acquisition of the joint venture, while delaying the cost of full entry 
until uncertainties are clarified and providing reversibility through pre-contemplated sale 
to the joint venture partner if future market developments are unfavorable.   
 A defining characteristic of partial commitments is that they are temporizing 
investments, an intermediate position on the road to larger, more permanent investments 
rather than goals in themselves.  Hence, as reported by Kogut (1991), most joint ventures 
are ultimately terminated through buyout by one of the partners and structured from 
inception with ultimate termination in mind.  Similarly, minority equity investments are 
often preludes to full acquisition.  
 Based on these characteristics, partial commitment constitutes a decision pattern 
distinct from those described earlier.  Since it entails current investment, it is different 
from deferral, the essence of which is to forego current action.  It is also different from 
project staging, in that partial commitments are not inherently necessary steps to the 
conclusion of a revenue-generating project, but intermediate actions undertaken to reach 
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a larger strategic objective.  Though they often lead to further subsequent commitments, 
they are undertaken as investments expected to generate revenues in and of themselves.  
2.2.5  Platform Investments 
The second growth capture decision pattern is platform or positioning investment.  
Several types of platform investments have been examined at the conceptual level from a 
real options perspective.  Kogut & Kulatilaka (1994b & 2001) define the platform 
concept as any investment in physical or human assets that provides the opportunity to 
respond to future contingent events and enter into a wide range of future possibilities.9  
Where flexible producing assets provide operational flexibility, platform investments 
create strategic flexibility.  An important distinguishing characteristic of such 
investments is that they are often pure options, that is, they generate no dividends, as, for 
example, investments in knowledge, capabilities and basic research.  
Platform investments may be technical or organizational.  McGrath (1997) and 
others explicitly interpret technology positioning investments as platform investments 
that enable the firm to reduce technology-related uncertainty for itself idiosyncratically, 
without reducing it for others.  Kogut & Kulatilaka (1994b & 2001) maintain that the 
most important platform investments are the distinctive competencies of the firm.  Such 
competencies represent the choice of capabilities that permit the firm to make the best 
response to future market opportunities.  Since they apply over a broad range of possible 
opportunities, capabilities and competencies are especially rich in growth option 
potential.  Kogut & Kulatilaka point out that capabilities are explicitly convergent with 
                                            
9
 As used here, platform investments denote investments made principally or exclusively to confer access 
to future opportunities, as distinct from dividend-generating investments which have the additional effect of 
doing so.  
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three aspects of real options: asymmetric response to uncertainty, managerial discretion 
and irreversibility.  Other classes of platform investments include brand (Dias & Ryals, 
2002) and knowledge acquisition (Bowman & Hurry, 1993). 
It is notable that the deviation of real options decision-making from that 
prescribed by expected net present value may be especially marked for platform 
investments, which, if they have a directly associated revenue stream at all, often do not 
meet traditional investment standards on a stand-alone basis.  In this connection, Kogut & 
Kulatilaka (1994a) cite the “iron law” that initial entry moves into overseas markets 
invariably fail to make money, but do create growth options.  Kemna (1993) reports, 
based on her work with Shell Oil on several real options evaluation pilot projects, that it 
is often economically justifiable in real options terms to extend options on projects that 
are not currently economic (such as oil leases), and that pursuit of projects with poor 
stand-alone economics may similarly be warranted if there are substantial growth options 
to be gained. 
The central contention of this research is that each of the real options-theoretic 
decision patterns described above constitutes a differentiated response to both the extent 
and nature of the uncertainties in the task environment.  Before reviewing the literature 
that examines their relationship to uncertainty, I first briefly review the substantial 
literature on uncertainty in order to establish the conceptual foundation regarding 
uncertainty that has been used in this research.   
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2.3  Uncertainty 
This section addresses three aspects of uncertainty as it relates to the present 
research.  First, I review the importance of the uncertainty construct in organization and 
strategy research generally and its central role in real options theory.  Second, I identify 
the varying conceptualizations of uncertainty that have been employed in previous 
organizational and strategy research, and relate these conceptualizations to real options 
theory.  Finally, I lay the foundation for disaggregating uncertainty into component 
sources, and for focusing in this research on two sources of uncertainty – market-related 
and competition-related – as particularly relevant for the study of real options. 
2.3.1  Importance of the Uncertainty Construct in Real Options Theory 
Uncertainty is a central concept in both strategic and organizational studies, and a 
large literature has developed on the subject.  In organizational research, uncertainty 
figures prominently in the structural adaptation or “fit” model of contingency theory.  In 
this theoretical tradition, uncertainty is the key construct that explains the relationship 
between organizations and their environments (Downey, Hellriegal & Slocum, 1975; 
Milliken, 1987).  Thompson (1967), for example, viewed uncertainty as the central 
organizational and managerial problem and interpreted organization structure principally 
as a mechanism for buffering the firm from its effects.  In contingency theory, uncertainty 
became the driving consideration in organizational design (Burns & Stalker, 1961; 
Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967; Woodward, 1965). 
Uncertainty has been prominent in other theoretical traditions as well.  The 
transaction cost framework for explaining economic organization is based in part on 
uncertainty as a contributing element in making market versus hierarchy decisions 
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(Williamson, 1975 & 1985).  Uncertainty is also prominent in evolutionary perspectives 
on organization, which emphasize complexity, rapid change, and environmental 
turbulence (Emery & Trist, 1965; Loasby, 2002; Terreberry, 1968). 
The uncertainty construct is also fundamental in the field of strategy.  It is central 
to choice theory, which maintains that the firm’s response to environment has a 
significant impact on performance (Aldrich, 1979; Child, 1972).  This theme is extended 
in the work of Miles & Snow (1978), whose prospector-defender-analyzer-reactor 
strategic types are based in part on firms’ differential responses to uncertainty.  In 
addition, a number of studies have suggested that uncertainty is or should be influential in 
the selection of strategic processes and practices (Boulton et al., 1982; Courtney, 
Kirkland & Vigurie, 1997; Javidan, 1984; Lindsay & Rue, 1980).  Finally, uncertainty is 
fundamental in those schools of strategic thought that emphasize the incremental and 
emergent nature of the strategy task (Helmer, 2003; Lindblom, 1959; Mintzberg, 1987 & 
1990; Quinn, 1980). 
That uncertainty is a central construct in the real options approach to resource 
allocation and asset management is well established in the literature.  Uncertainty is 
fundamental to both the theory and practice of capital budgeting (Carruth et al., 2000; 
Dixit, 1989; Pindyck, 1991).  The essence of capital budgeting is making optimal 
resource dedication decisions in the face of unknown future outcomes.  As described 
earlier, managerial response to uncertainty is at the core of real options theory, which is 
defined by asymmetrical response to uncertainty and management flexibility to respond 
to uncertain future conditions. 
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2.3.2  Definition of Uncertainty 
 Despite the importance of uncertainty in strategy research, there are substantial 
issues in both the conceptualization and measurement of the uncertainty construct that 
affect the present research (Milliken, 1987).  In this section, I review the principal 
conceptual issues, reserving discussion of measurement questions for Chapter 4.  On the 
conceptual level, a number of authors have expressed concern about the clarity and 
consistency of the uncertainty construct (Boyd, Dess & Rasheed, 1993; Downey & 
Slocum, 1975; Downey et al., 1975; Duncan, 1972; Milliken, 1987; Tosi, Aldag & 
Storey, 1973).  They note in particular the lack of agreement regarding the definition of 
the uncertainty construct.  What is meant by uncertainty has varied among authors.  
Information theorists, for example, have generally conceptualized uncertainty as the 
difference between the amount of information required to perform a task and the amount 
of information that has already been obtained (Daft, Sormunen & Parks, 1988; Galbraith, 
1977).  Decision theorists, by contrast, have tended to define uncertainty as the inability 
to confidently assign probabilities to events (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).  Implicit in this 
conceptualization is that the set of future possibilities can be identified, but the 
probability distribution across that set is unknown (Conrath, 1967; Knight, 1921; Loasby, 
2002).  
Other authors have by contrast placed the broader concept of unpredictability at 
the heart of environmental uncertainty (Buchko, 1994; Downey & Slocum, 1975; Miles 
& Snow, 1978; Milliken, 1987; Tosi, Aldag & Storey, 1973; Wholey & Brittain, 1989).  
In this view, decision-makers may not know the boundaries of possible future events 
(Conrath, 1967).  Firms are affected by events from outside their historical set 
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(Terreberry, 1968) and thus the potential for surprise is ever-present (Loasby, 2002).  
This broader framing of uncertainty as boundary-less unpredictability has the advantage 
of encompassing highly unstable, discontinuous and turbulent environments.  In such 
environments, uncertainty is less a matter of acquiring information or assigning 
probabilities than one of irresolvable unpredictability resulting from the dynamic 
interaction of multiple variables (Kogut & Kulatilaka, 2001). 
Real options theory implicitly defines uncertainty in the broadest of these 
conceptualizations, placing primary emphasis on the unpredictability of the future as the 
source of option values and the economic rationale for real options decision-making.  The 
theory does not require a choice among the uncertainty dimensions described above, but 
encompasses them all.  Some real options decision patterns, for example, are designed 
specifically to acquire information (Roberts & Weitzman, 1981).  The acquisition of 
seismic information by oil companies prior to drilling wells and the consumer research 
and test marketing activities of consumer products companies represent such information 
gathering options.  Real options behavior is also induced by uncertainties in which the 
variable of interest is clear and the range of possible outcomes can be specified, but their 
probabilities are not known.  Deferring the expansion of a plant until demand levels are 
clearer or delaying investment until an important regulatory issue is resolved represent 
real options-theoretic behaviors that respond to unknown probabilities.  Finally, real 
options theory applies in those environments in which instability and discontinuity make 
the acquisition of strategically useful information impractical and where the variables of 
interest cannot be fully specified (Loasby, 2002).  Investments in technology, knowledge 
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and capability platforms are real options-theoretic responses to such environments (Kogut 
& Kulatilaka, 2001).  
2.3.3  Market and Competitive Uncertainty 
 
As discussed above, uncertainty is fundamental to real options theory.  In much of 
the real options literature, however, uncertainty is implicitly treated as a unitary 
omnipresent construct, rather than as a feature of the environment that varies in 
magnitude and source.  In this section I establish the conceptual basis for how uncertainty 
has been incorporated in the research, focusing on the relevance of market and 
competitive uncertainty as the two most influential sources of environment uncertainty 
from the perspective of real options theory. 
A number of authors have argued that the breadth of uncertainty as a construct 
requires a multidimensional approach to conceptualizing and measuring it (Milliken, 
1987; Sharfman & Dean, 1991; Sutcliffe & Zaheer, 1998; Tosi & Slocum, 1984; Yasai-
Arkedani, 1986).  Consistent with this view, differentiating among sources of uncertainty 
in the environment is an established practice in both organizational and strategy research.  
Dill’s (1958) four-component formulation – consisting of customer, supplier, competitor 
and regulatory uncertainties – has been repeated, modified and used extensively in both 
organizational and strategic research.  Subsequent authors have introduced technology 
uncertainty into this typology, but in other respects have generally remained faithful to 
Dill’s breakdown (Daft et al., 1988; Duncan, 1972; Elenkov, 1997; Kumar & Seth, 1998; 
Miles & Snow, 1978).  There is therefore ample theoretical support and precedent in the 
literature for analyzing strategic variables in relation to multiple dimensions of 
environmental uncertainty. 
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Determining which sources of environmental uncertainty are most relevant in the 
context of the present research, however, required careful consideration of the 
relationship between environmental and investment uncertainty.  From the perspective of 
real options theory, environmental uncertainty affects investment decisions in two ways.  
The first is financial.  Environmental uncertainty creates uncertainty regarding the cash 
flows associated with identifiable projects.  Numerous sources in the finance-related real 
options literature make it clear that the uncertainty directly relevant to real options 
decision-making is that associated with investment cash flows and project values.  The 
second is strategic.  Environmental uncertainty makes it difficult to anticipate the 
opportunities that will be strategically attractive in the future.  The literature regarding 
platform and capabilities investments as real options emphasize this second aspect.  
Kogut & Kulatilaka (1994b and 2001), for example, specifically describe investment in 
platforms and capabilities as positioning the firm to take advantage of emerging future 
opportunities not clearly identifiable at the time such investments are made.  
Accordingly, the appropriate sources of environmental uncertainty for this 
research are those that most directly influence (1) the cash flows and therefore the value 
of identifiable investment possibilities and (2) the ability of firms to anticipate the kind of 
investment opportunities that will emerge in the future.  Two sources of environmental 
uncertainty are directly relevant to both of these dimensions.  The first of these is market 
demand uncertainty, broadly defined as uncertainty related to aggregate customer actions 
and choices (Kumar & Seth, 1998; Sutcliffe & Zaheer, 1998).  In making current 
investment decisions, companies face uncertainty regarding the volume of total market 
demand, the composition of demand by product and the prices that can be realized at 
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different levels of demand, all of which directly affect project revenues.  To the extent 
that there are non-variable costs in the production system, these uncertainties also affect 
aggregate operating margins and therefore project value.  Market-related uncertainties are 
characteristic of a wide range of investment decisions, including, for example, plant 
construction/expansion, new product development and entry into new markets.  Market 
uncertainty is also a potent determinant of future opportunities.  Shifts in customer tastes, 
needs, preferences, and demographics create uncertainty regarding the kinds of products 
and businesses that will be strategically attractive in the future (DeSarbo et al., 2005).  
The second dimension of the environment influential in determining real options 
decision patterns is competitive uncertainty, encompassing uncertainty regarding the 
population of firms whose products compete with or can be substituted for those of the 
focal firm; the strategies, plans, and tactical actions of those competitive firms; and how 
they may respond to the actions of the focal firm and other competitors.  Competitive 
uncertainty directly affects the cash flows of current investment projects.  Competitor 
actions, for example, affect market shares and therefore that portion of aggregate demand 
that will accrue to the focal firm, critically influencing both revenues and unit costs 
(Bergh, 1998).  Competitor investment actions influence the industry supply-demand 
balance and therefore prices.  Competitor actions may also influence input costs and 
therefore margins.  Furthermore, the timing of competitor actions may affect both the 
feasibility and cost of investment by the focal firm.  Except in perfectly competitive 
markets, competitor actions may create first mover advantage or preemptive effects that 
influence the profitability of investments (Kulatilaka & Perotti, 1998; Lieberman & 
Montgomery, 1988; Smit & Ankum, 1993). 
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 Competitive uncertainty is also influential in determining the landscape of future 
opportunities.  Competitor innovation creates new and unforeseen product categories and 
markets.  Competitors introduce new technologies that threaten to render obsolete 
existing technology platforms, raise product performance standards or change industry 
cost structure.  Uncertainty regarding the intentions and actions of competitors is, 
therefore, a prominent source of uncertainty regarding both investment cash flows and 
the nature of future investment opportunities.  
 In conclusion, there is a solid conceptual foundation for regarding market and 
competitive uncertainty as two distinct and highly influential sources of uncertainty that 
affect real options decision patterns, and both are well-supported in the real options and 
uncertainty literatures.  It is noted also that these uncertainty sources are well suited to the 
present research from several other perspectives.  First, both market and competitive 
uncertainty influence a wide range of real option decision patterns.  As will be discussed 
in detail in Chapter 3, both are linked theoretically with all five classes of real options 
decision patterns described earlier.  Market and competitive uncertainty therefore 
comprise a robust basis for generating hypotheses across the full range of real options-
theoretic decision patterns.  
Second, as will also be evident from the theoretical development presented in 
Chapter 3, market and competitive uncertainty tend to promote different and sometimes 
directly competing real options decision patterns.  As described earlier, for example, 
market uncertainty frequently encourages deferral behavior, while competitive 
uncertainty often argues for acceleration (Kester, 1984; Smit & Ankum, 1993; Trigeorgis, 
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1991).  In combination, therefore, these two sources of uncertainty provide a basis for 
generating analytically useful variance in real options decision patterns.  
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CHAPTER 3 
THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT AND HYPOTHESES 
 This chapter integrates the theoretical foundation laid in Chapter 2 in an overall 
conceptual model for the proposed research and presents a group of hypotheses which 
state expected relationships (1) between market and competitive uncertainty as 
independent variables and various real options decision patterns as dependent variables, 
and (2) between real options decision patterns and uncertainty as independent variables 
and firm performance as the dependent variable.  
3.1  General Model 
 Figure 3.1 presents the overall conceptual model on which the proposed research 
rests.  The model indicates that real options-based decision-making patterns are 
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conditioned by the uncertainty characteristics of the environment in which decisions are 
made.  The model treats uncertainty as a multidimensional construct in which sources of 
uncertainty are influential.  Different patterns of real options decision-making are more 
likely to emerge in response to different sources of uncertainty, specifically market and 
competitive uncertainty as defined in Chapter 2.  
The model further anticipates that the fit between uncertainty and real options 
decision patterns will influence firm performance.  Real options theory represents a 
normative as well as an explanatory framework for strategic resource allocation 
decisions.  Implicitly, therefore, application of real options principles in decision-making 
should produce positive differential performance effects.  Since, however, appropriate 
real options decision patterns are a function of the sources of environmental uncertainty, 
it is the degree of fit or consistency between the two that influences performance, rather 
than any inherently superior decision pattern.  
3.2  Hypotheses Regarding Uncertainty and Real Options Decision Patterns 
 As described in the earlier literature review and the general model presented 
above, it is a central premise of this research that optimal real options decision patterns 
vary based on the magnitude and source of uncertainty encountered in the external 
environment.  Patterns of real options behavior that are appropriate under one set of 
conditions as regards market and competitive uncertainty may be inappropriate under 
another.  Further, different sources of uncertainty may lead to competing real options 
decision patterns, requiring that firms strike a balance between offsetting options.  These 
relationships between uncertainty and real options behavior are elaborated below, 
examining in turn each of the five classes of real options decision patterns described in 
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Chapter 2.  In the interest of clarity in developing theory and hypotheses, I first consider 
the relationships between market uncertainty and real options decision patterns in the 
absence of competitive uncertainty.  I then introduce competitive uncertainty.  This 
protocol has been adopted purely for expository purposes and implies no judgment 
regarding the primacy, either conceptually or empirically, of the two uncertainty sources.  
3.2.1  Timing 
 
 Real options theory suggests that market uncertainty provides a strong incentive 
for firms to defer investment commitments.  The option to defer has considerable value in 
the presence of uncertainty regarding market demand, since market factors are an 
important determinant of investment cash flows.  This option value derives from the 
opportunity to proceed with the investment later if additional information indicates 
favorable market conditions, but not to proceed under an unfavorable market evolution.  
The option to defer entails an opportunity cost in the form of a postponement or reduction 
of project dividends.10  When the value of the deferral option exceeds its cost, real 
options theory suggests that firms as rational actors will delay investment pending 
uncertainty resolution.  The incentive to defer increases with market uncertainty, since 
the value of the deferral option increases with variability in investment cash flow.  
There is a large theoretical literature linking deferral and market uncertainty, 
consisting principally of formal economic and financial models of deferral option values 
in relation to project-specific cash flow uncertainty resulting from exogenous market 
factors (for example, Dixit, 1989; McDonald & Siegel, 1986; Smit & Ankum, 1993).  It 
                                            
10
 For investments characterized by indefinite cash flow streams, the relevant option cost is that of 
postponed cash flow.  Where cash flow is time limited (for example, investments involving patents), 
deferral may result in an aggregate loss of dividends (Reiss, 1998).  
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is implicit in these studies that the incentive to defer increases with market uncertainty.  
The greater the market uncertainty surrounding an investment, the more uncertain is its 
cash flow, and the more valuable therefore is the associated deferral option.  
Several empirical studies of market entry support the expectation that firms delay 
investment in response to market uncertainty.  O’Brien et al. (2003), for example, 
conducted a multi-industry archival study of new entrepreneurial entry in relation to 
industry uncertainty.  They found a significant negative relationship between levels of 
entry and market uncertainty.  They concluded, consistent with real options theory, that 
entrepreneurs delay entry when market uncertainty is high.  Folta & O’Brien (2004) also 
examined the relationship between uncertainty and entry in real options-theoretic terms, 
with a particular emphasis on the tradeoff between deferral and growth options.  The 
authors maintained that deferral options have dominated thinking about real options, 
suggesting a unilaterally negative relationship between investment and uncertainty.  They 
instead proposed that deferral and growth represent “dueling” options, the former 
encouraging delay, and the latter generally favoring early action.  They hypothesized that 
the timing effect of uncertainty is not monotonic but curvilinear.  Market uncertainty 
deters entry only when the growth options associated with entry are modest, but 
encourages entry when the associated growth options are substantial.  They found support 
for this formulation, but they also found that the option to defer appears to dominate the 
duel, coming into play over 93% of the range of market uncertainty.  Folta & O’Brien’s 
study therefore provides partial empirical support for deferral in response to market 
uncertainty.  
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Folta & O’Brien’s contrary finding that at very high levels of market uncertainty 
firms forego deferral in order to capture growth options is ambiguous.  Though their 
study did not incorporate competition as a variable, other literature clearly suggests that 
competitive uncertainty strongly promotes growth capture actions, as discussed in the 
next section.  I therefore conclude that, because their analysis did not account for 
competitive uncertainty, the growth capture behavior observed in the Folta & O’Brien 
study is indeterminate as regards the effects of market uncertainty purely on investment 
timing.  I consider this issue in greater detail subsequently in the discussion of growth 
options.  
In summary, both theory and empirical evidence argue that deferral option values 
increase with market uncertainty, and that, absent other considerations, as market 
uncertainty rises firms have a progressively stronger incentive to defer investment until 
clarifying market information is available.  
Deferral may not, however, represent optimal investment timing in the presence 
of competitive uncertainty.  As the level of competitive uncertainty increases, the danger 
of preemptive action by a competitor increases as well.  Except in perfectly competitive 
markets, preemptive action by competitors may create first mover advantage, making 
later action by the focal firm less rewarding and/or more costly.11  At the extreme, if such 
preemptive effects are severe, deferral can lead to total loss of the investment opportunity 
to a quicker-moving competitor whose actions have the effect of forestalling subsequent 
                                            
11
 As used here, first mover advantage is broadly defined as the ability of early movers to earn economic 
rents based on achieving a favorable competitive position deriving from the timing of their investments.  
First mover advantage may consist of (1) technology leadership through learning curve effects or patents, 
(2) preemption of scarce factors, including product positions or scale economies, and (3) switching costs, 
broadly defined to include both financial costs and the psychological costs associated with brand loyalty 
(Liebermen & Montgomery, 1988). 
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entrants.  In real options terms, competitive uncertainty introduces an additional cost to 
the option to defer beyond the postponement of dividends.  This cost consists of the 
potential reduction in the value of the investment opportunity resulting from ceding first 
mover advantage.  Once a position is established by a competitor, it may be more costly 
for the focal firm to act, and the benefits from doing so may be smaller.  Where complete 
preemption is possible, deferral may surrender the entire value of the investment to a 
competitor.  As competitive uncertainty increases, these competition-related costs of 
deferral loom progressively larger.  
That competitive uncertainty may lead to different investment timing decisions 
than market uncertainty has strong theoretical support in both the finance and strategy 
literatures.  Grenadier (2002), for example, modeled the relationship between competitive 
uncertainty and deferral from a game-theoretic perspective.  He noted that the typical 
modeling of option values in the financial literature is unrepresentative of many real 
world situations in that it assumes competitive isolation.  In particular, high deferral 
option values, and therefore the attractiveness of deferral as a course of action, depend on 
the lack of strategic interaction among option holders.  Grenadier’s model demonstrates 
that the presence of competition greatly erodes deferral option values, due to the danger 
of preemption, such that the real options-theoretic decision rule converges with 
conventional ENPV decision standards as competitive uncertainty increases.  In 
Grenadier’s analysis, this effect is pronounced even in the presence of relatively few 
competitors.  In summary, Grenadier established a theoretical foundation for expecting 
that uncertainty regarding the actions of competitors greatly reduces the attractiveness of 
deferral and constitutes a disincentive to delay.  
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 Other authors maintain that competitive uncertainty not only reduces the value of 
deferral, but may make early action and acceleration optimal from a real options 
perspective (Kogut & Kulatilaka, 2001; Kulatilaka & Perotti, 1998; Smit & Ankum, 
1993).  Acting early on an investment, even when it does not promise a positive expected 
net present value, may be justified if such early action (1) creates or consolidates first 
mover advantage for the focal firm, (2) preempts competitors from acting, or (3) protects 
valuable growth options.  
In conclusion, real options theory strongly suggests that market and competitive 
uncertainty induce different and competing patterns of real options-optimal investment 
timing.  High competitive uncertainty undermines the value of deferral and may, 
depending on the competitive structure of the industry, create incentives to commit even 
when ENPV standards would indicate that such commitment is premature.  When market 
uncertainty is low but competitive uncertainty high, the incentive for prompt or early 
commitment is likely to dominate the offsetting incentive to delay, since the option value 
of deferral under those conditions is low and its cost high.  When both are high, however, 
market and competitive uncertainty create competing incentives, since both the value and 
the cost of deferral are high.  In either case, investment decisions in environments 
characterized by high competitive uncertainty are likely to demonstrate a time pattern 
different from that which would result from market uncertainty alone.  Based on these 
considerations, it is hypothesized that: 
H1a:    Competitive uncertainty will negatively moderate the relationship between     
market uncertainty and deferral.  
 
H1b:    Competitive uncertainty will positively moderate the relationship between 
market uncertainty and acceleration. 
 
 36
3.2.2  Staging 
 
In addition to deferral, real options theory argues for specific project sequencing 
patterns in response to market uncertainty.  Where important market factors are unclear, 
staging or phasing of investment represents a directionally optimal real options decision 
pattern.  Following Roberts & Weitzman (1981), I here distinguish between “one-sided” 
projects and “two-sided” projects.  One-sided projects are those in which all project steps 
must be undertaken to reach project conclusion.  R&D is illustrative of such projects:  
basic research must precede development, and development must precede 
commercialization.  Two-sided projects are those where it is possible to proceed at any 
point to project conclusion but in which discretionary steps may be added to clarify 
uncertainty.  The introduction of a new product, which may either be undertaken 
immediately upon development or clarified by such additional steps as market research or 
test marketing, is a representative two-sided investment situation.  
For one-sided projects, breaking required project elements down into stages for 
purposes of decision-making encourages close monitoring of market developments as 
commitment levels increase, permitting appropriate mid-course corrections, changes in 
project timing and even discontinuation if conditions warrant.  Staging maximizes the 
potential to continuously review project status based on the most recent uncertainty-
clarifying market information.  Such information may result from the firm’s learning 
from previous stages, or simply from the passage of time (Roberts & Weitzman, 1981).  
Implicit in staging is an active stage-gate or milestone review process in which the firm 
carefully and rigorously monitors project fundamentals and makes appropriate decisions 
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in response to developments (Kogut & Kulatilaka, 2004; Kumaraswamy, 1996; McGrath 
et al., 2004; Zardkoohi, 2004).  
As described in Chapter 2, real options reasoning conceptualizes investment in 
each project stage as the purchase of an option to proceed to the next stage.  The value of 
these compound sequential options increases with the variance in project outcomes.  
Since market uncertainty directly influences project variance, the value of the staging 
option increases with market uncertainty.   
In two-sided projects, firms have the discretion to add uncertainty-resolving steps 
to investment projects, as in the case of test marketing by consumer product firms or the 
acquisition of seismic data by petroleum companies prior to drilling exploration wells.  
Such discretionary actions also constitute investments in real options.  The value of such 
information options increases with project variance, but their cost (consisting of their 
explicit cost and any delay they may introduce into the project) does not.  Accordingly, 
the incentive to undertake discretionary uncertainty-resolving project steps increases with 
market uncertainty.  Hence, the attractiveness of undertaking market research or test 
marketing programs increases to the extent that market acceptance is unclear. 
As in the case of deferral, however, competitive uncertainty introduces additional 
and competing considerations into staging decisions.  The danger of preemptive action by 
a competitor makes staging within projects less attractive from a real options perspective.  
Similarly, the option value of market uncertainty reduction through information 
acquisition is offset by the increased option cost of degradation in project benefits or the 
loss of the underlying opportunity due to competitor action (Childs & Triantis, 1999).  In 
response to competitive uncertainty, firms are therefore more likely to pursue the 
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components of individual investment projects concurrently rather than in stages and to 
forego efforts to collect uncertainty-clarifying information before full commitment.  
Hence, it is hypothesized that: 
H2:   Competitive uncertainty will negatively moderate the relationship between 
market uncertainty and project staging.  
 
3.2.3  Operating Flexibility  
 
It is also consistent with real options theory to expect that investments in 
operating flexibility will increase with market uncertainty.  Increments in market 
uncertainty increase the option value of flexible producing assets, while the incremental 
cost of such assets remains fixed.  Flexible assets therefore become increasingly 
attractive from a real options perspective as market uncertainty rises.  Conversely, as 
market uncertainty falls, the option value of flexibility declines toward or below the cost 
of the option, making flexibility decreasingly attractive.  
By this logic, companies are more likely to add capacity incrementally than in 
large periodic expansions to the extent that they are uncertain about market demand.  A 
pattern of multiple small additions maximizes management’s flexibility to make optimal 
future capacity decisions as market uncertainty is clarified (Dixit & Pindyck, 1995).  
Firms are also more likely to invest in producing assets that maximize their flexibility to 
vary easily the level and mix of production and to make such changes with minimal 
adverse impact on profitability.  In effect, both incrementalism in capacity expansion and 
flexible producing assets provide buffers between market demand uncertainty and 
variance in investment cash flow. 
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There is a strong conceptual foundation for linking flexible assets with market 
uncertainty.  Sanchez (2003), for example, attempts a theoretical integration of real 
options theory and transaction cost economics perspectives on asset investment 
preferences.  He notes that the two theoretical perspectives suggest seemingly 
contradictory prescriptions for making asset decisions, with transaction cost economics 
generally favoring internalization of highly specific assets and real options theory instead 
arguing for investing in flexible assets and avoiding the commitment of internalization.  
He proposes a contingent application of the two theoretical frames depending on the 
source of uncertainty.  His conceptual model distinguishes between asset characteristics 
(flexible or highly specific) and governance (market or hierarchy) as separate dimensions 
of the production decision, with transaction cost considerations of opportunism driving 
governance choices and real options considerations of market uncertainty driving the 
choice between flexible or highly specific assets.  Sanchez notes that flexible producing 
assets provide multiple benefits in the face of market uncertainty.  They typically entail 
lower fixed costs relative to highly specific assets, thus alleviating the profitability 
consequences of variability in demand, and they allow for easier adaptation to such 
variability.  Sanchez thus lays the real options-theoretic foundation for interpreting 
investments in flexible operating assets as significantly conditioned by market 
uncertainty.  
While the above discussion points to the existence of theoretical work, I am aware 
of no empirical studies that examine the relationship between market uncertainty and 
operational flexibility.  There is, however, considerable anecdotal evidence that flexible 
producing assets are common in industries characterized by high market demand 
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variability.  Petroleum refineries and chemical plants, for example, have traditionally 
invested extensively in process flexibility to adapt to variations in overall demand levels, 
product mix and the availability and cost of feedstock (Chen et al., 1998).  Despite the 
potent scale economies of large coal-fired power generation facilities, electric utilities 
commonly invest in smaller, fuel-flexible plants to accommodate to demand variations, 
even though the unit production cost of such facilities is considerably higher (Dixit & 
Pindyck, 1995).  
None of the literature examined in the course of this research provides direct 
theoretical foundation for considering the impact of competitive uncertainty on operating 
flexibility decision patterns.  I therefore seek to extend theory by suggesting that 
competitive uncertainty counteracts the real options-based incentives to maximize 
operating flexibility in response to market uncertainty.  As regards the pattern of capacity 
additions, competitive uncertainty creates contrary incentives to market uncertainty, 
directionally encouraging companies to make large-scale rather than incremental capacity 
additions.  These contrary incentives are two-fold.  First, large-scale additions can have 
an important preemptive effect (Lieberman & Montgomery, 1988).  By adding capacity 
in excess of clearly visible market demand, the firm discourages competitor capacity 
additions and therefore maximizes its ability to capture future growth in demand.  
Conversely, incremental capacity addition may encourage more aggressive competitors to 
add capacity, and positions competitors who do so to take advantage of upside demand 
evolution.  
Expressed in real options terms, the value of the flexibility option created by 
incremental capacity addition is dominant in the capacity planning decision only so long 
 41
as the growth option to meet future demand is preserved.  Competitive uncertainty puts 
that growth option at risk by permitting competitors to make the next increment of 
capacity addition.  Competitive uncertainty therefore introduces a tradeoff between 
competing flexibility and growth options, and directionally argues for adding capacity in 
large preemptive chunks rather than in multiple smaller increments.  
The second disincentive to investing in asset flexibility associated with 
competitive uncertainty is cost related.  As noted earlier, both incremental capacity 
additions and flexible producing assets sacrifice the competitive benefits of scale, which 
include both lower average unit costs and lower marginal costs.  In industries where cost 
leadership is an important basis of competition, asset flexibility may thus reduce 
competitive position by ceding cost leadership to competitors.  It is well established that 
scale economies are an important source of competitive advantage (Ghemawat, 1991; 
Lieberman & Montgomery, 1988; Porter, 1985), and preserving them becomes an 
increasingly important consideration in investment decisions as competitive uncertainty 
increases.  Based on these considerations, it is hypothesized that: 
H3:   Competitive uncertainty will negatively moderate the relationship between 
market uncertainty and investments in operating flexibility. 
 
3.2.4  Partial Commitment 
Real options theory specifies that market uncertainty creates growth options, and 
that the value of these growth options increase with the level of market uncertainty.  
When the variability of future market conditions is high, the potential for a very favorable 
evolution is also high, leading to new opportunities not currently identifiable. In short, 
industry environments characterized by large market-related uncertainties give rise to 
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valuable growth options associated with upside market potential.  Conversely, stable, 
predictable markets present little downside risk, but offer little growth potential as well.  
As market uncertainty rises, therefore, firms have increasing incentives to take action to 
capture growth options (Folta & O’Brien, 2004; Kulatilaka & Perotti, 1998).  At the same 
time, however, as noted in section 3.2.1 above, market uncertainty encourages deferral of 
commitments in order to minimize exposure to the downside potential inherent in market 
variance.  Hence, as market-related uncertainty increases, firms are faced with the 
progressively more difficult challenge of optimizing the competing benefits of restraint 
and aggressive action in resource allocation decisions.   
 Consistent with real options theory, therefore, firms operating in task 
environments characterized by large market-related uncertainties have strong incentives 
to seek investment alternatives that simultaneously capture future growth options but 
avoid full and immediate commitment.  As described in Chapter 2, partial commitment is 
a decision pattern for doing so.  Through partial commitment the firm makes a sufficient 
investment to preserve access to the growth opportunities of interest, but one that 
represents less than full-scale commitment.  Such actions include small acquisitions, 
minority equity interests and joint ventures (Kogut, 1991; Smith & Triantis, 1994).  
Kogut’s previously described real options theoretic interpretation of joint ventures (1991) 
explicitly describes them in these terms.  Joint ventures simultaneously provide discretion 
to expand under favorable conditions, but limit downside exposure to unfavorable ones 
by limiting commitment and preserving some degree of reversibility.  
As for other real options decision-patterns, however, competitive uncertainty 
reduces the incentive to make partial commitments.  In the presence of competition, there 
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is a strong incentive to avoid loss of growth options through competitor preemption 
(Kester, 1984; Trigeorgis, 1993; Trigeorgis & Mason, 1987).  There is strong theoretical 
foundation for this expectation in the real options literature. Kulatilaka & Perotti (1998), 
for example, modeled the impact of competition on real options decisions, focusing in 
particular on the relative value of deferral and growth options.  In their analysis of growth 
options and competition, Kulatilaka & Perotti found two important effects.  First, the 
presence of competition alters the relative value of the deferral and growth options 
associated with strategic investment.  When the focal firm enjoys exclusive access to an 
opportunity or a monopolistic position in the target market, the growth options associated 
with the focal investment are not at risk competitively and deferral is directionally the 
better strategy in response to market uncertainty.  When, however, both the opportunity 
and the focal market are exposed to competition, the potential for partial or total 
preemption reduces the value of deferral.  Deferral runs the risk of losing growth options 
due to competition, while early action enhances the value of growth options by 
preserving access to them and by reducing the “exercise” price of pursuing them.  
 Second, the presence of competitive uncertainty changes the relative sensitivity of 
deferral and growth option values to market uncertainty.  When an investment produces 
little or no competitive advantage, the value of the deferral option associated with it 
increases more steeply than that of its growth options with increases in market 
uncertainty.  Conversely, when an investment has a strong preemptive effect, the growth 
option value of early action increases more steeply with market uncertainty than the value 
of waiting to invest.  The implication that market uncertainty does not constitute a 
universal disincentive to invest is consistent with Folta & O’Brien’s (2004) empirical 
 44
finding discussed earlier, but clarifies their result by suggesting that market uncertainty 
may selectively encourage growth capture over deferral behaviors because of competitive 
uncertainty.  On the strength of market uncertainty alone, the outcome of the deferral-
growth capture duel is indeterminate.   
The clear implication of Kulatilaka & Perotti’s analysis is that competitive 
uncertainty constitutes a powerful incentive to take action to avoid the loss of growth 
opportunities through preemption or, conversely, to achieve the competitive benefits of 
preemption by the focal firm.  As applied to growth options decision patterns, their work 
suggests that increasing competitive uncertainty will undermine the attractiveness of 
partial commitment as a growth capture strategy.  To the extent that partial commitment 
is an intermediate or temporizing decision pattern (Kogut, 1991), the competitive benefits 
of early action are likely to increasingly offset the benefits of limited commitment as 
competitive uncertainty increases. 
In short, high market uncertainty creates a “duel” between deferral and growth 
options (Folta & O’Brien, 2004).  Which one dominates real options decision-making 
depends on the level of competitive uncertainty.  As competitive uncertainty increases, 
real options reasoning increasingly favors growth capture over deferral.  Hence, partial 
commitment becomes decreasingly optimal versus full commitment as competitive 
uncertainty increases.  
There is some empirical evidence supporting this expectation in Folta’s (1998) 
and Folta & Miller’s (2002) studies of joint venture formation and buyouts in the 
biotechnology industry. These studies, however, examine a single industry, and are 
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therefore of limited generalizability.  The proposed research will seek broader 
confirmation of their findings by testing the hypothesis that: 
H4:   Competitive uncertainty will negatively moderate the relationship between 
market uncertainty and partial commitment investments. 
 
3.2.5  Platform Investments 
  
 For most of the real options decision patterns described above – deferral, staging, 
operating flexibility and partial commitments – market uncertainty has been seen to be 
the principal driving force motivating each behavior.  For each, I have described how 
competitive uncertainty creates countervailing incentives that moderate or reverse them.  
I submit that platform investments entail a substantially different relationship between 
market and competitive uncertainty, one in which market uncertainty constitutes an 
incentive for platform investments, but only in the presence of competitive uncertainty.  
Put in other terms, market uncertainty is a necessary but not sufficient real options basis 
for justifying platform investments. 
 There is ample theoretical foundation for viewing platform investments as real 
options-based responses to market uncertainty.  Since they apply over a broad range of 
future conditions, platform investments preserve future growth opportunities when 
market uncertainty precludes immediate identification of the products and markets that 
will be most rewarding in the future.  For this reason, platform investments are especially 
well-suited to discontinuous, high uncertainty environments (Kogut & Kulatilaka, 2001). 
 Platform investments do not, however, represent an optimal response to market 
uncertainty in the absence of competitive uncertainty.  Kulatilaka and Perotti’s (1998) 
previously cited theoretical discussion of competition and growth options supports this 
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contention.  They pointed out that where growth options are insulated from competition, 
the incentive to act on them is greatly reduced.  Only when there is the potential for the 
competitive preemption of growth options does it become real options-optimal to capture 
them by making platform investments.  Kulatilaka and Perotti’s reasoning can be 
extended and clarified by considering the hypothetical case of complete competitive 
isolation, that is, when the focal firm enjoys exclusive access to growth options.  In this 
case, the firm gains little from investing in readiness for unknown future market 
developments.  With no exposure to preemption or first mover advantage, waiting to see 
what happens is arguably the optimal strategy, since it entails no platform costs and does 
not compromise access to future opportunities when they arise.  
 Competitive uncertainty, however, alters the decision dynamics of platform 
investments by exposing future growth opportunities to preemption.  Competitive 
uncertainty creates a race toward future, presently invisible opportunities, and provides 
the driving force behind platform investments.  That competitive uncertainty is the 
mainspring of platform investing is well-supported by the real options literature.  
McGrath (1987), for example, described technology platforms not simply as preparing 
for unknown future products/markets, but achieving an advantaged competitive position 
in them.  Technology platforms allow the focal firm to idiosyncratically reduce 
uncertainty for itself and not for other firms, thereby becoming better prepared for the 
future than its competitors. 
The central position of competitive uncertainty in platform investing is even more 
evident in the case of capabilities and competencies.  Creating and maintaining 
capabilities are direct investments in competitive advantage.  They constitute the early 
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acquisition of strategic factors that are valuable, non-tradable and difficult to imitate 
(Kogut & Kulatilaka, 1994b & 2001).  They also permit the firm to move more quickly as 
market developments unfold.  The essence of platform investments is the creation of 
competitive isolation and timing advantage (Kogut & Kulatilaka, 1994b & 2001). 
 Based on these considerations, I conclude that there is little incentive to undertake 
platform investments on the strength of market uncertainty alone, but that the 
combination of market and competitive uncertainty makes platform investment a real 
options-optimal decision pattern.  Hence: 
 H5:  Competitive uncertainty will positively moderate the relationship between 
market uncertainty and platform investments. 
 
3.3  Hypotheses Regarding Real Options Decision Patterns and Performance 
 
The second part of the research examines the relationships between real options 
decision patterns and firm performance.  The theoretical foundation for expecting that 
adherence to real options decision-making principles contributes to firm performance is 
strong.  That how a firm responds to uncertainty has a significant effect on performance 
is a long-standing premise in strategy research (Aldrich, 1979; Child, 1972; Miles & 
Snow, 1978).  Further, real options reasoning has been widely advanced as a better basis 
for making investment decisions under uncertainty than the expected net present value 
framework as it is typically employed, implying that real options decision making 
enhances performance.   
There is an extensive literature that describes the limitations and weaknesses of 
ENPV and lays the theoretical foundation for the superiority of real options-based 
decision-making.  This literature identifies four ways in which real options theory leads 
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to better investment decisions.  First, the ENPV rubric is “static,” in that it does not 
consider alternate possible timings to the present (Dixit & Pindyck, 1995; Luehrman, 
1998a; Miller & Park, 2002).  Second, expected value does not value management 
discretion (Bowman & Moscowitz, 2001; Brennan & Schwartz, 1985; Chen et al., 1998; 
Miller & Park, 2002; Triantis & Hodder, 1990; Trigeorgis & Mason, 1987).  It implicitly 
assumes that, once taken, decisions will not be modified and that management does not 
take action to ameliorate unfavorable developments or to capitalize on favorable ones 
(Luehrman, 1998b).  It therefore assumes a passive response to the future that is 
inconsistent with the foundations of strategy as a field of study (Yeo, 2003).  Third, 
ENPV values investments on a stand-alone basis, failing to take project interrelationships 
into account or to optimize their sequencing (Childs et al., 1998; Trigeorgis & Mason, 
1987).  Finally, ENPV does not incorporate the value of growth options (Dixit & 
Pindyck, 1995).  It has been argued that as a result of these shortcomings ENPV distorts 
investment decision-making, systematically underestimating the value of those option-
rich investments that are important to long-term strategic success (Hayes & Abernathy, 
1980; Hayes & Garvin, 1982; Kemna, 1993; Lewis, Enke & Spurlock, 2004; Trigeorgis 
& Mason, 1987).  By focusing attention on optimal timing, by partially endogenizing 
project performance, by optimizing the relationships among projects and by explicitly 
addressing growth options, real options reasoning represents a conceptually superior 
basis for making strategic resource allocation decisions. 
There has, however, been very minimal study of the relationship between real 
options-based decision-making and performance, and virtually no empirical research.  I 
am aware of only three studies that address real options and performance in any way.  
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Miller & Arikan (2004) conducted a simulation analysis of the comparative performance 
of evolutionary, formal real options pricing and informal real options reasoning 
approaches to resource allocation.  They found that real options reasoning did not emerge 
as a clearly superior basis for decision-making.  Reuer & Leibling (2000) conducted an 
empirical study to test Kogut & Kulatilaka’s (1994a) interpretation of the multinational 
corporation as a network of real options designed to provide operational flexibility.  They 
analyzed whether multinationality, as predicted by Kogut & Kultatilaka’s real options 
interpretation, reduces downside risk, which they measured by inter-period comparisons 
of return on assets and equity.  They found no evidence that multinational companies 
achieve reduction in downside risk versus comparable domestic companies.  
Kumaraswamy (1996) studied the extent to which high-technology companies adopted a 
real options perspective in their R&D activities and further explored the relationship 
between adoption and various measures of performance.  While his study did not directly 
test the impact of real options R&D management on financial performance, it did find 
strong relationships between a real options approach to the management of R&D and a 
several measures of R&D performance.  In summary, empirical research regarding real 
options and performance is meager, and as such provides little support for real options 
reasoning as an avenue to differential performance.  
As a normative framework for decision-making, however, it is implicit that 
consistent application of real options principles to resource allocation decisions will lead 
to superior aggregate outcomes at the level of the firm.  To the extent that firms using 
those principles are able to (1) achieve asymmetrical exposure to uncertainty, selectively 
benefiting from upside potential while reducing downside risk; (2) maximize the value of 
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managerial flexibility; and (3) capitalize on growth options, they can be expected to make 
investment decisions of superior average quality in comparison with firms not using those 
principles.  Superior investment decision quality should, in turn, positively affect relative 
performance.  
Mere adoption of real options decision patterns is not, however, sufficient to 
achieve improved performance.  Consistent with the central contention of this research, 
not all real options decision patterns are optimal in all task environments.  Only those 
decision patterns that are consistent with the underlying sources of environmental 
uncertainty are likely to have positive performance effects.  Further, real options decision 
patterns often compete with each other, and must be balanced by firms, considering the 
specific magnitude and source of the uncertainties they face.  Therefore, the appropriate 
conceptual framework for examining the performance impacts of real options as a basis 
for resource allocation decision-making is to examine the fit between real options 
decision patterns and the sources of uncertainty in the environment.   
Accordingly, hypotheses were developed to express the expected relationships 
between the uncertainty/decision pattern fit and performance.  As described earlier, 
market and competitive uncertainty frequently represent countervailing incentive and 
disincentive for employing specific decision patterns.  To facilitate exposition and 
interpretation, hypotheses for each decision pattern were structured to isolate the effect of 
the disincentive uncertainty source on the relationship between the incentive uncertainty 
source and performance.  Hence, for deferral, market uncertainty is the primary incentive 
for the decision pattern and competitive uncertainty the countervailing disincentive.  
Accordingly, it is hypothesized that: 
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H6a:    When competitive uncertainty is low, a positive relationship will exist 
between deferral and performance as market uncertainty increases.  
 
H6b:    When competitive uncertainty is high, a negative relationship will exist 
between deferral and performance as market uncertainty increases. 
 
In the case of acceleration, competitive uncertainty represents the principal real 
options rationale for the decision pattern and market uncertainty the offsetting 
disincentive. Hence, it is hypothesized that: 
 
H6c:    When market uncertainty is low, a positive relationship will exist between 
acceleration and performance as competitive uncertainty increases.  
 
H6d:   When market uncertainty is high, a negative relationship will exist between 
acceleration and performance as competitive uncertainty increases.  
 
 Staging, operating flexibility and partial commitment all share in the same 
theoretical structure as deferral, with market uncertainty promoting those decision 
patterns and competitive uncertainty discouraging them.  Accordingly it is hypothesized 
that: 
H7a:    When competitive uncertainty is low, a positive relationship will exist 
between staging and performance as market uncertainty increases.  
 
H7b:    When competitive uncertainty is high, a negative relationship will exist 
between staging and performance as market uncertainty increases. 
 
H8a:    When competitive uncertainty is low, a positive relationship will exist 
between operating flexibility and performance as market uncertainty 
increases.  
 
H8b:    When competitive uncertainty is high, a negative relationship will exist 
between operating flexibility and performance as market uncertainty 
increases. 
 
H9a:    When competitive uncertainty is low, a positive relationship will exist 
between partial commitment and performance as market uncertainty increases.  
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H9b:    When competitive uncertainty is high, a negative relationship will exist 
between partial commitment and performance as market uncertainty increases. 
 
Finally, for the platform decision pattern, the expected relationships entail a 
different theoretical structure, with market and competitive uncertainty acting as mutually 
reinforcing incentives, both of which are required to make platform a performance-
enhancing decision pattern. Accordingly it is hypothesized that: 
 
H10a:  When competitive uncertainty is low, a negative relationship will exist 
between platform and performance as market uncertainty increases. 
 
H10b: When competitive uncertainty is high, a positive relationship will exist 
between platform and performance as market uncertainty increases. 
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CHAPTER 4 
DATA AND ANALYSIS METHODS 
 
 In this chapter, I describe (1) the sample of firms included in the research, (2) the 
measures used for each of the independent and dependent variables and the data sources 
for these measures, and (3) the analysis methods that were used to test the hypotheses 
presented in Chapter 3. 
4.1  Research Sample 
The survey population was drawn from domestic public companies in the 
manufacturing sector (2-digit NAICS codes of 31, 32 and 33).  Only manufacturing 
companies were included since the archival measures of uncertainty used in the analysis 
are available only for such companies in the Census Bureau’s Annual Survey of 
Manufacturers.  Manufacturing companies represent a suitable research population since 
they are typically capital asset-intensive and therefore susceptible to real options logic.  
Further, the manufacturing sector contains a broad range of industries, creating variance 
in both the dependent and independent variables and increasing the generalizability of the 
results.  The population included only publicly-held companies in order to assure the 
availability of secondary performance data for testing the relationships between real 
options decision patterns and firm performance.   
Two additional constraints were placed on the selection of companies for the 
survey population.  First, only companies with annual revenues of $50 million or more 
were included.  Applying a minimum size requirement was deemed necessary to assure 
that the sample included only companies with sufficient scale to provide meaningful data 
on the broad range of investment behavior that the survey was intended to tap.  While 
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there is no clear basis from previous literature for setting an appropriate minimum size 
criterion, the $50 million annual revenue test used was considered a conservative one for 
this purpose.  
The survey population was further confined to firms with an identifiable dominant 
business line, using a minimum requirement of 70% of revenue accounted for by a single 
3-digit NAICS code as a diversification cut-off standard.  Limiting the sample to 
substantially undiversified companies was necessary to maintain correspondence between 
the survey data and industry-level uncertainty and performance data from secondary 
sources.  The 70% standard has extensive support in the literature (Rumelt, 1974, 1982 & 
1991) and is considered conservative.  Diversification levels at or below 30% of total 
revenues was judged unlikely to distort the results of the analysis.  There is strong 
support in the literature for expecting that firms, even those with a significant level of 
diversification, make decisions based on the frame of reference derived from their 
dominant business (Keats & Hitt, 1988; Porter, 1985; Pralahad & Bettis, 1986).  
Using these criteria, screening of the Compustat database identified 1375 
companies for inclusion in the survey population.12  
4.2  Measurement of the Research Variables 
The proposed research required measurement of four primary groups of variables, 
as follows: 
• Real options decisions patterns exhibited at the level of the firm (dependent 
variables); 
 
                                            
12
 Included in this total are 29 publishing companies categorized as manufacturing in the NAICS coding 
system at the time the survey population was established, but which have since been reclassified to other 
codes.  Since these companies were included in the survey and yielded 6 responses, they have been retained 
in the analysis sample. 
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• Market and competitive uncertainty (independent variables); 
 
• Firm performance (dependent variable); 
 
• Control variables. 
The purpose of this section is to describe how each of these variables was measured and 
the methods used for data collection. 
4.2.1  Real Options Decision Patterns 
4.2.1.1  Survey Development 
 Specific real options decision patterns are extensively described in the theoretical 
literature, as reviewed in Chapter 2.  Review of this literature, however, identified no 
scales for measuring these patterns individually or for combining them into an overall, 
comprehensive instrument that incorporates multiple decision patterns.  The research 
therefore required the development of such an instrument. 
Spector (1992) emphasizes the importance of careful theoretical grounding in 
developing scales.  The first step, therefore, in constructing a survey instrument for this 
research was to derive a preliminary specification of real options-theoretic decision 
patterns, and to categorize those patterns into conceptually distinct groups representing 
different dimensions of the real options construct.  Based on a review of the real options 
literature in both the strategy and finance domains, five real options constructs and 
specific decision patterns associated with each were identified, as described in Chapter 2.  
An initial item pool was then developed, including items reflecting each of the five 
constructs and specific decision patterns within each.  In addition to real options decision 
patterns, the survey was used to collect data regarding (1) perceived market and 
competitive uncertainty, and (2) firm strategic orientation.  The sources for these scales 
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and the analysis undertaken to establish their construct validity and reliability are 
described later in this section.  
 The initial survey instrument was subjected to detailed critical review by a panel 
of experts with experience in survey design and/or knowledge of real options.  In addition 
to the members of the committee supervising this research, each of whom provided 
review and commentary, the expert panel consisted of five academics at four institutions, 
including a professor of finance knowledgeable about real options, one professor of 
organization studies with extensive survey research experience, and three professors in 
strategic management, one of whom has published extensively on the subject of real 
options.  Panel members conducted a broad review of the draft survey instrument, 
including the conceptual coherence of the constructs, the clarity and appropriateness of 
the individual items and the design of the instrument as a whole. 
 A pilot test of the survey was then conducted with a group of executives similar in 
profile to the survey target population.  A complement of 12 executives was enlisted to 
take the survey and to provide feedback on (1) the clarity of the individual items, (2) 
survey completion time, and (3) the overall format and structure of the survey.  All were 
CEO’s or COO’s of their respective companies.  Each of the firms was in a different 
industry.  The companies represented a broad spread of firm size, ranging from 
approximately $30 million to $50 billion in annual revenue.  In addition to taking the 
survey, participants in the pilot test responded to additional questions regarding the 
survey itself.  Follow-up conversations were undertaken with approximately half of the 
pilot test respondents, either by telephone or in person.  None of the pilot test respondents 
or their firms were included in the survey sample itself. 
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 The pilot test resulted in substantial revisions to the survey instrument.  These 
changes had the net effect of shortening the survey, eliminating specific items that the 
respondents found confusing, and clarifying ambiguous items.  The pilot test also 
confirmed that the survey generated substantial variance across the 12 companies.  
 The final survey instrument resulting from these steps is contained in  
Appendix A. 
4.2.1.2  Survey Administration 
Limiting the survey to the most senior general managers in each company was 
considered crucial since only such executives could confidently be expected to be aware 
of the firm’s overall resource allocation decision patterns.  Extensive effort was required 
both to identify appropriate target respondents for each company in the research sample 
and to secure an adequate volume of responses to support the research.  Target 
respondents for the survey were members of the top management team (TMT), typically 
the Chairman, CEO, President/COO or CFO.  TMT members were identified from Dun 
and Bradstreet’s Million Dollar and S&P’s Net Advantage databases.  The accuracy and 
currency of the data from these sources was checked for most companies by reference to 
company websites.  In some cases, executives in other positions than those listed above 
were included in the survey (for example, senior group executives, chief planning and 
development officers, and chief technology officers) but only in those cases where 
company websites confirmed that these executives were members of the top management 
team.  In a few cases, former or retired Chairman and CEO’s were surveyed, but only in 
those cases where their departures were recent (2007 or later). 
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A multi-stage process was used to administer the survey over a period of five 
months.  Two survey mailings were undertaken to CEO’s and CFO’s respectively.  
Response rates for both mailings were on the order of 2%.  Additional efforts were 
undertaken to increase overall response rates, including (1) online and mail 
administration of the survey to members of various alumni networks (the Harvard 
Graduate School of Business Administration, the Smeal College of Business at Penn 
State University, the Amos Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth College and the 
University of Massachusetts Alumni Association), (2) direct contacts with specific 
executives based on prior relationships or other associations,  and (3) a large-scale email 
campaign covering approximately 3000 executives in those firms that had not responded 
to previous survey rounds.  After the initial survey mailings, data collection relied heavily 
on online administration of the survey, using the Qualtrics survey software.  Where 
online administration was employed, multiple follow-ups to the initial approach were 
used to increase response rates (Dillman, 2007). 
These data collection efforts yielded 173 usable unique company responses, 
representing a response rate of 12.6%.  While this response rate is low in comparison 
with those generally considered desirable, it reflects the difficulty of securing research 
participation from top management in public companies and is consistent with response 
rates in other recent research entailing surveys of similar target respondents (Skaggs & 
Huffman, 2003; Skaggs & Youndt, 2004).  Respondents included a very high proportion 
of the most senior executives in each of the firms.  Table 4.1 summarizes respondents by 
position.  Further, the respondent sample represents a broad range of industries.  Table 
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4.2 summarizes the industry composition of both the survey population and the 
respondent sample, based on three-digit NAICS codes. 
 
Table 4.1 
 
Survey Respondents by Position 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                   
4.2.1.3  Scale Validation and Reliability 
The survey data was factor analyzed to test the construct validity of the five real 
options decision patterns and to identify those survey items constituting scales of 
sufficient reliability.  Both exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses were conducted.  
Exploratory factor analysis was deemed advisable given the newness of the survey 
instrument, the absence of previous scales for measuring real options-related constructs 
and the tentativeness of some of the constructs themselves.  Stevens (1996) and Gorsuch 
(1983), however, stress that confirmatory factor analysis is an appropriate approach for 
validating measurement models when there is a pre-existing theoretical basis for  
 
Position Responses 
Chairman/CEO 71 
Chief Financial Officer 44 
President/Chief Operating Officer 22 
Group Executive 15 
Senior Strategy/Corporate Development Officer 9 
Chief Marketing Officer 3 
Chief Technology Officer 1 
Other TMT Members (Senior and Executive VP)  8 
 
TOTAL 173 
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                                                  Table 4.2 
Survey Population and Respondents by Industry 
 
NAICS 
Code 
Industry Survey 
Population 
Respondent  
Sample 
 
 
  
311 Food Mfg 60 6 
312 Beverage & Tobacco 18 3 
313 Textile Mills 9 1 
314 Textile Product Mills 4 0 
315 Apparel Mfg 41 3 
316  Leather & Allied Products 22 2 
321 Wood Products 17 1 
322 Paper Mfg 34 5 
323 Printing & Related 18 3 
324 Petroleum & Coal 20 4 
325 Chemicals 197 20 
326  Plastics & Rubber Products 39 2 
327 Non-Metallic Minerals 19 1 
331 Primary Metals 47 6 
332 Fabricated Metal Products 50 11 
333 Machinery Mfg 127 21 
334 Computers & Electronics 373 38 
335 Electrical Equipment 51 10 
336 Transport Equipment 93 10 
337 Furniture & Related 22 2 
339 Miscellaneous Mfg 85 18 
511 Publishing 29 6 
    
 TOTAL 1375 173 
 
 
specifying factor structure.  Since this research was guided by a predefined theoretical 
framework, confirmatory factor analysis was also performed.  
In the exploratory analysis, factors were extracted using the principal components 
method based on eigenvalues over 1.  The resulting factors were then subjected to 
varimax rotation to derive a final factor structure.  In the rotated factor results, only 
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loadings of .600 or greater were considered significant.  Reliability analysis was 
performed on the resulting scales, using Cronbach’s alpha, with a minimum target 
reliability of .7 (Nunnally, 1978).   Each scale was item-analyzed to maximize the 
internal consistency of the items, and items were removed as necessary to achieve 
acceptable alpha (Spector, 1992).   The results of this analysis are described below.  For 
reference, Appendix B contains the rotated factor solution and scale reliabilities for the 
real options decision patterns.   
 Factor analysis strongly supported three of the five real options constructs defined 
in the theory development underlying this research: staging, operating flexibility and 
platform investments.  For staging, four of the six survey items designed to test the 
construct loaded heavily on a single factor.  Further, the absence of significant cross-
loadings for these items indicated that they were factorially pure and divergent from the 
other real options constructs.  Two of the original staging items did not load significantly 
on this factor, and were eliminated from the scale.  Review of the conceptual foundation 
for these items in light of the factor analysis suggests that they in fact relate more to 
project discontinuation than to staging per se.  As discussed further below, these items 
suggest the presence of an additional real options construct, not incorporated in this 
research, relating to project discontinuation.  Based on the factor analysis results, a four 
item scale was retained for staging.  The items are displayed in Table 4.3.  Alpha for this 
scale is .742, and cannot be improved by further item reduction. 
 Similarly strong support was found for the operating flexibility construct.  Four of 
the six survey items designed to measure operating flexibility showed loadings in excess 
of .600 on a single factor, again with no significant cross-loadings.  The remaining two  
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Table 4.3 
Real Options Decision Patterns Scale Items 
 
Timing - Deferral 1. Our investment decisions take into account whether 
delaying a project may improve its attractiveness. 
 2. We postpone projects which meet our standard investment 
criteria in order to further monitor market developments. 
  
Timing - Acceleration 1. If a project looks sound, we proceed with it rather than 
invest time and money to gather further information 
regarding its potential success. 
 2. In executing strategic investment projects, getting them 
done quickly is the most important consideration to us. 
 
 
Staging 1. We break investment projects down into stages and evaluate 
whether or not to proceed at the end of each stage. 
 2. We revise project features (for example, capacity level or 
technology used) throughout the project. 
 3. We revise project schedules and implementation timing 
throughout the project. 
 4. We set project milestones and continuously evaluate 
progress toward them. 
 
 
Operating Flexibility When making investments in productive capacity, our 
company typically: 
 
 1. Invests in facilities that allow for easy changes in production 
levels. 
 2. Invests in facilities that allow for easy changes in 
product/service mix. 
 3. Invests in facilities that allow for easy changes in feedstocks 
or raw materials. 
 4. Places primary emphasis on the ability to easily change 
operating parameters. 
 
 
(Continued Next Page) 
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Table 4.3 (Continued) 
Real Options Decision Patterns Scale Items 
 
Partial Commitment In making investments in new activities, our company 
typically: 
 
 1. Acquires minority equity positions in other companies in the 
target product/service/market which can later lead to full 
acquisition. 
 2. Establishes joint ventures, partnerships or alliances. 
 
 
Platform Our company invests in projects that do not meet our standard 
financial criteria when they: 
 
 1. Offer future growth opportunities not captured in the project 
financial projections. 
 2. Generate important knowledge or experience. 
 3. Contribute to important competencies and capabilities. 
 4. Establish and early position in an attractive product or 
market. 
 5. Have the potential to yield multiple products/services rather 
than a single product/service. 
 
 
survey items did not load significantly and were dropped from the scale.  Conceptual 
review of these two items clarified this result, since both items relate to the pattern of 
capacity additions, rather than to operating flexibility per se.  Accordingly, operating 
flexibility has been measured on the basis of four items (Table 4.3).  Alpha for the scale 
is .721, and cannot be improved by further item reduction. 
Five items were included in the survey to measure investments and resource 
commitments which do not provide immediately attractive financial rewards but which 
provide a platform for future growth opportunities (Table 4.3).  All the items loaded 
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heavily on a single factor, with no significant cross loadings on other factors.  These 
results indicated that the original platform scale was both internally consistent and 
sharply distinct from other real options sub-constructs.  Alpha for the resulting five-item 
scale is .839, and cannot be improved by item reduction. 
 The remaining two real options constructs – timing and partial commitment – did 
not show the same degree of support from the factor analysis, and the scales for 
measuring them are of lower reliability than those discussed above.  For the timing 
construct, five items were included in the survey.  These items were intended to 
incorporate two competing aspects of timing in a single scale – deferral (three items) and 
acceleration (three items).  The acceleration items were reverse coded for purposes of 
factor analysis.  Contrary to expectations, however, the factor analysis separated these 
two aspects of timing into distinct constructs.  The deferral items loaded heavily together, 
as did the acceleration items.  There were no significant cross-loadings between the 
deferral and acceleration items.  Interpreting these results, it was concluded that deferral 
and acceleration in fact represent distinct sub-constructs, and both have been employed in 
the subsequent analysis.  Deferral has been measured by a two item scale (Table 4.3).  
The three acceleration items loaded together.  However, reliability analysis indicated that 
alpha was materially improved by the elimination of one item, which was therefore 
dropped, resulting in a two item scale (Table 4.3).  Reliabilities for these scales – alpha of 
.584 for deferral and .621 for acceleration – are lower than is desirable, but are 
considered minimally acceptable for use in the analysis. 
 The factor analysis similarly indicated that the six survey items designed to 
measure the partial commitment real options decision pattern do not constitute a single 
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construct.  Only two of the items loaded significantly together, with the other four spread 
over other factors.  The resulting partial commitment scale (Table 4.3) is not strong, 
consisting of only two items with low reliability (alpha of .540) and not fully tapping the 
intended conceptual boundaries of the construct.  
 Exploratory factor analysis suggested the presence of two additional real options 
constructs not contemplated in this research that are worthy of further consideration.  
First, three items relating to project discontinuation or reversal loaded significantly on a 
single factor.  Since discontinuation is widely regarded as an important element of real 
options theory (Adner & Levinthal, 2004a & 2004b), an abandonment construct is 
conceptually appealing.  Second, three items relating to gradualism or small scale, 
reversible entry decision patterns loaded significantly on a single factor, suggesting that 
“toehold” may represent an additional construct of interest.  In neither case, however, did 
the items constitute reliable scales and have therefore not been further developed in this 
research.  
 Table 4.4 summarizes the characteristics of the final scales for measuring real 
options decision patterns. 
Confirmatory factor analysis was conducted on the  scales derived from 
exploratory factor analysis and reliability testing, using LISREL 8.8.  Confirmatory factor 
analysis of the real options decision patterns was complicated by the limited number of 
items associated with some of the real options constructs.  Three of the constructs 
(deferral, acceleration and partial commitment) are measured by two-item scales.  Since 
LISREL does not permit latent variables with fewer than three observed variables, it was 
not possible to directly test these scales in LISREL.  Two analyses were performed 
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Table 4.4 
Scale Characteristics – Real Options Decision Patterns 
 
Decision Pattern Number of    
Items 
Cronbach’s Alpha 
   
Timing (Deferral) 2 .584 
Timing (Acceleration) 2 .621 
Staging 4 .742 
Operating Flexibility 4 .721 
Partial Commitment 2 .540 
Platform 5 .839 
 
 
 
in order to derive as representative a picture of overall model fit as possible given this 
constraint.  
 First, LISREL was run including only the three real options constructs with three 
or more items (staging, operating flexibility and platform).  Table 4.5 displays the 
resultant goodness of fit statistics.  The four fit indicators shown are those recommended 
by Kline (2005), including (1) normed chi-square (minimum fit chi-square divided by 
degrees of freedom), (2) comparative fit index (CFI), (3) the 90% confidence interval for 
the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA), and (4) the standardized root 
mean square residual (SRMR).  For each indicator the table displays Kline’s (2005) 
suggested guidelines for goodness of fit. 
 The analysis shows good fit for the three-construct analysis (Column 1 of Table 
4.5).  Normed chi-square, CFI and RMSEA are all well within generally accepted 
guidelines.  Further, the path diagram indicates that all item/construct paths are 
significant to the .001 level.  Hence, this partial analysis demonstrates good fit for that  
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portion of the real options decision pattern model that can be directly evaluated in 
LISREL. 
 
Table 4.5 
Summary of Real Option Decision Pattern Fit Statistics 
 
 
Additional LISREL analysis was undertaken to estimate indirectly the fit of the 
other three real options constructs.  In this second analysis, one additional item was 
included for each of the two-item constructs.  These additional items were drawn from 
the initial item pool for each of the constructs.  However, these items are extraneous in 
the sense that they did not survive exploratory factor analysis and reliability testing and 
were not therefore among the items included in the final scales.  Hence, the added items 
were included in the analysis solely to permit evaluation on a basis as close as possible to 
the optimal two-item measurement scale.  The rationale for this procedure was as 
follows:  If the resultant sub-optimal model demonstrates acceptable goodness of fit, it 
 
Guideline 
(Kline, 2005) 
Column 1: 
Excluding  
2-Item 
Constructs 
Column 2: 
Expanded  
Items 
 
   
Normed Chi-Square < 3* 1.894 1.814 
Comparative Fit Index ≥ .9** .933 .856 
Root Mean Square Error  
Of Approximation (Upper Bound) 
≤ .08** .092 .074 
Standardized Root Mean Square Residual ≤ .10** .085 .102 
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would provide indirect but relevant evidence that the fit of the optimal model was at least 
as good.  
 The results are displayed in Column 2 of the table, indicating what appears to be 
marginally acceptable fit.  Normed chi-square and RMSEA are well within guidelines, 
while SRMR and CFI are slightly outside them.  While not definitive, these results 
provide a reasonable basis for expecting that the optimal measurement model 
incorporating two-item scales would demonstrate good fit. 
4.2.2  Market and Competitive Uncertainty 
 
4.2.2.1  Objective versus Perceived Environmental Uncertainty 
 
Whether uncertainty is best measured based on objective metrics or perceptions 
has been a subject of long-standing and continuing discussion in the uncertainty 
literature.13  Proponents of perceived environmental uncertainty measures point out that 
uncertainty, properly speaking, is not an attribute of the external environment but a 
psychological or cognitive state (Downey et al., 1975; Downey & Slocum, 1975; Miles, 
Snow & Pfeffer, 1974; Milliken, 1987).  Organizations come to know environments only 
through perceptions, and therefore objective attributes have no inherent meaning until 
structured by a perceiver (Downey et al., 1975; Weick, 1969).  Firms in the same industry 
can and do perceive uncertainly differently (Bourgeois, 1985; Downey & Slocum, 1975; 
Miles, Snow & Pfeffer, 1974). 
Proponents of objective measures argue that industry attributes inherently affect 
the ability of firms to predict the future, independent of the perceiver (Hrebiniak & Snow, 
                                            
13
 Both perceived and objective approaches have been extensively used. Several long-standing and much 
used scales have been developed to measure perceived environmental uncertainty (Lawrence & Lorsch, 
1967; Duncan, 1972; Miles &Snow, 1978). Similarly, a large body of empirical work has been based on 
objective uncertainty metrics, most notably that developed by Dess & Beard (1984). 
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1980; Jauch & Kraft, 1986; Tinker, 1976; Yasai-Arkedani, 1986).  This objectivist view 
emphasizes the correspondence of perceived uncertainty to objective measures as 
important to successful management.  Bourgeois (1978 & 1985), for example, studied the 
degree of correlation between perceived and objective uncertainty measures in relation to 
performance, and found that consistency between them was significantly and strongly 
correlated with firm financial performance. 
Objectivists also point out several conceptual and methodological problems 
associated with using perceived uncertainty measures in strategic and organizational 
research.  Perceived uncertainty measures, for example, are by definition based on 
individual perceptions and may not be representative of the larger organizational units in 
which individuals reside (Boyd et al., 1993; Buchko, 1994; Duncan, 1972).  Such 
perceptions may be significantly affected by individual cognitive processes, behavioral 
response repertoires, social expectations and prior experiences, and may not therefore be 
consistent across individuals (Bourgeois, 1980; Downey & Slocum, 1975).  Further, 
individual perceptions are conditioned by organizational factors such as level and 
position in the firm (Boyd et al., 1993; Yasai-Arkedani, 1986).  Reliance on perceptual 
measures in the study of organizational behavior therefore raises issues regarding the 
correspondence between uncertainty as perceived by any one individual and the 
aggregate perceptions on which firm actions are based.  Finally, there is some evidence 
that perceived measures of uncertainty are less stable over time than objective ones.  
Buchko (1994) reports poor test-retest reliability of perceived uncertainty scales, 
suggesting the time dependence of such measures.  In the context of strategic research, 
time-stable measures of uncertainty are desirable. 
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 Several notable attempts have been made to integrate or reconcile the perceived 
and objective approaches to conceptualizing and measuring uncertainty (Bourgeois, 
1980; Boyd et al., 1993; Sharfman & Dean, 1991; Yasai-Arkedani, 1986).  The general 
consensus of this literature has been to recognize that both approaches are relevant, 
depending on the research context in which they are used, and to emphasize the 
importance of selecting a measurement basis appropriate to the underlying research 
purpose.  Perceived environmental uncertainty is generally regarded as best-suited in 
studying behavior, action and decision-making processes, while objective measures are 
appropriate for studying strategy content, constraints and outcomes (Bourgeois, 1980; 
Boyd et al., 1993; Snyder & Glueck, 1982).  Insofar as the proposed research entails both 
relationships between uncertainty and behavior and relationships between uncertainty, 
behavior and performance, there is therefore support in the literature for using either 
perceived or objective measures for operationalizing uncertainty in this case. 
In summary, an extensive review of the literature did not clearly establish the 
superiority of either approach in the specific context of this research.  It was therefore 
decided to use both objective and perceived measures of uncertainty.  Since the research 
examines the relationship between decision patterns and performance, objective measures 
were considered appropriate.  At the same time, perceived uncertainty is a direct 
reflection of the bases on which decisions are made, which arguably makes it relevant for 
studying the relationships between uncertainty and real options decision patterns.  
4.2.2.2  Perceived Market (PMU) and Competitive Uncertainty (PCU) 
 Data regarding perceived environmental uncertainty was collected in the survey 
instrument.  A number of perceived uncertainty scales have been developed by other 
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researchers, some of which are structured on the basis of specific sources of uncertainty, 
as required by the present research (Buchko, 1994; Daft et al. 1988; Desarbo et al, 2005; 
Kumar & Seth, 1998; Miles & Snow, 1978; Sutcliffe & Zaheer, 1998).  After reviewing 
the relevant scales, I selected that developed by Desarbo et al. (2005) as the basis for the 
survey items because of the compactness of the scale and the conceptual proximity of the 
items to the market and competitive uncertainty constructs as defined in this research.  
The items were adapted to make the scale more compact, to shorten the items, and to link 
them more directly to the market and competitive uncertainty constructs.  Three items 
were used to measure perceived market uncertainty (PMU) and five for perceived 
competitive uncertainty (PCU).  The items were structured on a seven-point Lickert scale 
measuring perceived degree of predictability.  
The perceived uncertainty items were factor-analyzed, using the same procedures 
described earlier for the real options decision patterns.  Rotated factor results and 
reliabilities are displayed in Appendix B for reference.  The results support the construct 
validity of both PMU and PCU.  In each case, all the survey items loaded significantly 
and exclusively on a single factor.  For PCU, one item with a marginally significant 
loading of .539 was retained because of its theoretical importance in the construct.  
Alphas of the resulting scales are .630 for PMU and .756 for PCU.  Scale items are 
displayed in Table 4.6. 
Confirmatory factor analysis indicated a reasonably good measurement model fit 
for the perceived market and competitive uncertainty constructs.  Normed chi-square 
(2.91) and SRMR (.067) were within guidelines and CFI (.894) close to the > .9  
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Table 4.6 
Perceived Uncertainty Scale Items 
 Market Uncertainty 1. Customer demand for existing products/services is 
predictable/unpredictable. 
 2. Customer demand for new products/services is 
predictable/unpredictable. 
 3. Customer needs and desires are predictable/unpredictable. 
 
  
Competitive Uncertainty 1. Competitor price actions are predictable/unpredictable. 
 2. Competitor changes in product/service quality are 
predictable/unpredictable. 
 
3. Competitor changes in product/service technology are 
predictable/unpredictable. 
 4. Competitor introductions of new products/services are 
predictable/unpredictable. 
 5. The entry of new competitors is 
predictable/unpredictable. 
 
 
 
guideline.  However, the 90% confidence interval for RMSEA (.133) was clearly outside 
guideline, indicating poor fit for this measure.  Item/construct paths were found to be 
significant to the .01 level for all three perceived market uncertainty items and to the .001 
level for all four perceived competitive uncertainty items.  
4.2.2.3  Objective Uncertainty Measures 
The objective measures of uncertainty used in the research are rooted in the 
objective measurements of task environments developed by Dess & Beard (1984), with 
adjustments based on improvements and refinements introduced by subsequent authors.  
Drawing on prior work by Aldrich (1979) and others, Dess & Beard developed a scale for 
measuring task environment characteristics consisting of three dimensions: munificence, 
dynamism and complexity.  Of these, the latter two are conceptually related to 
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uncertainty (Castrogiovanni, 2002).  In Dess & Beard’s formulation, dynamism reflects 
the instability, lack of pattern and unpredictability of the task environment.  They 
operationalized dynamism for 460 industry groups based on 4-digit SIC codes using 
measures of the variability (volatility) of sales, margins, employment and value-added 
over a ten-year period based on data from the U.S. Department of Commerce Census of 
Manufacturers.  Since it reflects unpredictable variability in industry-level demand and 
margins, Dess & Beard’s dynamism measure, with adjustments as described below, 
formed the basis for the objective measure of market uncertainty used in this research.  
Dess & Beard’s complexity dimension captures the degree of heterogeneity in the 
task environment, representing the range of external environment factors that must be 
monitored by the firm and to which it must respond.  Managers facing complex, non-
homogeneous environments will perceive greater uncertainty and experience greater 
difficulty in anticipating future developments than managers facing simple environments.  
Dess & Beard operationalized the complexity construct by a series of concentration 
measures, including sales, value-added, employment and number of establishments.  
Since their complexity measure is primarily related to industry structure, it approximates 
the competitive uncertainty construct required for this research. 
Dess & Beard conducted extensive item and factor analysis to establish the 
reliability and construct validity of their scale.  Other authors have confirmed their 
findings (Castrogiovanni, 2002; Rasheed & Prescott, 1987).  Their task environment 
measures of uncertainty have been extensively used by other researchers in a variety of 
contexts (Bergh, 1998; Bergh & Lawless, 1998; Boyd, 1990; Carpenter & Fredrickson, 
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2001; Castrogiovanni, 2002; Keats & Hitt, 1988; Lawless & Finch, 1989; Sharfman & 
Dean, 1991; Subramaniam & Youndt, 2005).   
4.2.2.3.1  Objective Market Uncertainty (OMU) 
 Following Dess and Beard, this research uses a volatility-based measure to 
operationalize market uncertainty.  Conceptually, volatility measures enjoy strong 
legitimacy in the study of uncertainty.  Tosi et al. (1973) maintain that volatility is a good 
proxy for uncertainty, since a high degree of variability implies low ability to predict and 
is thus convergent with the core uncertainty dimension of unpredictability.  Downey et al. 
(1975) also regard volatility as a valid indicator of unpredictable and dynamic market 
conditions.  
Volatility measures have been the most frequently used objective measures of 
uncertainty in strategic and organizational research.  David & Han (2004), in their review 
of the empirical evidence for transaction cost economics, documented 23 different 
uncertainty metrics, the large majority of which were based on volatility measures.  
Volatility measures have also been used extensively in the real options empirical 
literature as measures of uncertainty.  A number of real options studies use the volatility 
of stock price indices (Folta, 1998; Folta & Miller, 2002; Miller & Folta, 2002; Vassolo 
et al., 2004) or unit demand (Leiblein &Miller, 2003) as a measure of uncertainty for 
specific industries.  Several multi-industry real options studies have used the volatility in 
industry gross domestic product as a measure of market uncertainty (Folta & O’Brien, 
2004; O’Brien et al., 2003).    
 Following these authors, I have used the variability in the value of shipments as 
reported in the Department of Commerce Annual Survey of Manufacturers as the basis 
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for operationalizing market uncertainty.  The Survey reports annual shipment data by 
NAICS code.  Data from the Survey was collected on the basis of six-digit NAICS codes, 
representing the finest level of industry disaggregation in the NAICS coding system.   
Considerable effort was taken to select the appropriate time period for this 
measure.  Since the real options survey implicitly measures current and recent decision 
behavior, a relatively contemporaneous measure of uncertainty is appropriate.  At the 
same time, however, a larger number of data points yields a more stable measure.  After 
careful consideration, I selected a five-year time horizon ending with the most recent year 
for which data was available in the Annual Survey of Manufacturers (2002-2006).  
Previous research provides support for this choice.  While some studies focusing on long-
term trends in environments have examined longer time periods (Castrogiovanni, 2002; 
Wholey & Britain, 1989), five years has been the most widely used analysis period in 
research that relates uncertainty to a current/recent dependent variable (Bergh, 1998; 
Bergh & Lawless, 1998; Bourgeois, 1978 & 1985; Boyd, 1990; Carpenter & 
Frederickson, 2001; Keats & Hitt, 1988; Leiblein & Miller, 2003). 
Selection of the appropriate procedure for using the data as a measure of market 
uncertainty is a subject of importance to the research.  A number of authors have pointed 
out that simple measures of variability do not equate with unpredictability (Bourgeois, 
1978; Buchko, 1994; Downey & Slocum, 1975; Milliken, 1987; Yasai-Arkedani, 1986).  
To the extent that variance includes a systematic component, such as cyclical variation or 
trend, total volatility may include a predictable component that is not convergent with the 
uncertainty construct as it is defined in this research.  Accordingly, a metric which de-
trends the data is required.  Bourgeois (1978 & 1985) argues for using the coefficient of 
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variation of first differences, a procedure that measures variations in the year-to-year rate 
of change.  A high coefficient of first differences indicates unpredictability.  Dess & 
Beard (1984) calculated their dynamism items as the standard error of the regression 
coefficient divided by the mean value of the data.  Others have used the same procedure 
(Bergh, 1998; Bergh & Lawless, 1998; Boyd, 1990; Carpenter & Frederickson, 2001; 
Sharfman & Dean, 1991).  Following the bulk of previous research, I have used the Dess 
& Beard metric.  Thus, for each 6-digit NAICS code, a least-squares regression line was 
fitted to the annual value of shipments data, and the ratio of the standard error of the 
regression slope coefficient to the mean value of the data was derived.  The resulting 
ratios were used as measures of market uncertainty, with a high ratio indicating greater 
variability around the base trend and therefore high market uncertainty.    
4.2.2.3.2  Objective Competitive Uncertainty (OCU) 
 There is a substantial literature supporting industry competitive structure as an 
appropriate basis for measuring competitive uncertainty.  As described earlier, Dess & 
Beard’s (1984) scale for task environment uncertainty defined the complexity dimension 
of the task environment primarily in terms of concentration measures.  In their 
conceptualization, low concentration increases heterogeneity and increases the range of 
factors that contribute to unpredictability.  Other authors, however, drawing on industrial 
organization theory and metrics, have argued that concentration alone is only a partial 
measure of competitive uncertainty.  Boyd (1990), for example, maintains that both the 
number of competitors and the distribution of their market shares are important 
contributing factors.  Relatively few competitors with highly concentrated shares make it 
easier to monitor and anticipate competitor actions.  Such industry structures also 
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increase the likelihood of coordinated action among firms, thereby increasing 
predictability.  At the extreme, complete monopoly entails no competitive uncertainty.14   
By contrast, industries characterized by a large number of competitors have greater 
potential for unexpected or disruptive action by one or several firms.  Where market 
shares are widely distributed, there is less potential for a few dominant firms to exert 
oligopolisitic market control.  Furthermore, industries with dispersed market share 
structures are frequently characterized by intense competitive rivalry, increasing the 
potential for unpredictable competitor actions (Porter, 1980 and 1985).  
 Based on this theoretical foundation and the supporting literature, I have used a 
measure of competitive structure that encompasses both the number of competitors and 
dispersion in market shares as the basis for operationalizing competitive uncertainty. 
There is substantial agreement that the Herfindahl/Hirschman (H-index) is the best 
composite measure of these two dimensions of industry structure (Boyd, 1990; Porter, 
1980; Schmalensee, 1977).  The H-index is the sum of the squared market shares of all 
firms in an industry group. Normalized, it varies between zero (representing perfect 
competition) and one (representing total monopoly).  Hence a low H-index indicates a 
competitive structure consisting of numerous competitors and highly dispersed market 
shares.  In the context of this research, H-index is therefore inversely related to 
competitive uncertainty.  H-index has become increasingly prominent in strategy research 
(Acar & Sankaran, 1999).  A number of studies have used H-index or related measures to 
represent competitive uncertainty (Boyd, 1990; Subramaniam & Youndt, 2005). 
                                            
14
 A number of authors have suggested that the relationship between industry structure and competitive 
uncertainty is not linear (see Boyd, 1990 for relevant citations).  In this view, competitive uncertainty does 
not increase monotonically with number of competitors, but instead declines as industry structure 
approaches perfect competition.  Given the rarity of perfectly competitive industries, however, the practical 
importance of this effect is unclear.  
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 H-index data was collected from the Department of Commerce Census of 
Manufacturers, which reports H-Index data by NAICS code at five year intervals.  The 
most recent available year (2002) was used.  Data was collected on the basis of 6-digit 
NAICS codes so as to be consistent with the operationalization of market uncertainty as 
described earlier.  Since a low H-index reflects a large number of competitors and 
therefore high competitive uncertainty, the H-index data was reversed (1 – H-Index) to 
derive the objective measure of competitive uncertainty employed in the analysis. 
4.2.3  Firm Performance 
 The research includes multiple measures of firm performance, consistent with the 
recognition that performance is a multi-dimensional construct, with individual measures 
reflecting different aspects of performance (Chakravarthy, 1986; Venkatraman & 
Ramanujam, 1986).  All the measures employed are objective and were derived from 
secondary sources so as to avoid the danger of self-report and common methods bias 
associated with survey based, perceptual performance data.  
Performance measures have been selected so as to maintain the strongest possible 
conceptual linkage to the real options construct.  Real options theory suggests, for 
example, that making decisions on the basis of options reasoning will improve the 
efficiency of capital use by selectively limiting exposure to downside risk and taking 
advantage of upside potential.  I have selected return on assets (ROA) as the best widely 
available aggregate measure of capital efficiency.  ROA is widely used in performance 
analysis in strategy research (see Bowman & Helfat, 2001, for a review of ROA in 
strategy research).  ROA was calculated as net income divided by average total assets.  
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The average of the most recent three year ROA data (2005-2007) was used in order to 
reduce the potential for anomalous effects in any single year.  
 Measures of capital efficiency do not, however, capture the growth dimension of 
firm performance, which is also central to the real options construct.  As described in 
Chapter 2, emphasis on identifying and capturing options for future growth is one of the 
conceptual foundations of real options theory, suggesting that firms that make decisions 
consistent with the theory can achieve higher sustained levels of growth than other firms 
in the same industry that do not.  To capture the growth dimension of firm performance, 
compound annual revenue growth rate over five years (2003-2007) has been selected as a 
second performance indicator (GR). 
 Finally, real options theory is explicitly a framework for maximizing firm value, 
making the inclusion of a value-based performance measurement appropriate in this 
research.  To capture the value enhancement dimension of real options theory, the 
research includes a measure of market value relative to book value for fiscal year 2007 as 
a third measure of performance.  Metrics that relate market value to accounting book 
value are well-established in both the real options and broader strategy literatures (Folta 
& O’Brien, 2004; Hambrick & Cannella, 2004; Hawawini et al., 2003; Nayyar, 1993; 
O’Brien, 2003; Tuschke & Sanders, 2003).  As noted earlier, many authors have cited the 
excess of market value over book value as in indicator of option values (Folta & O’Brien, 
2004; Myers, 1977).   
 The specific measure employed to quantify the relationship between market value 
and book value is an adaptation of the traditional market value to book value ratio.  
Approximately 5% of the companies in the research population were found to have 
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negative book net worth, such that the ratio of market value to book value yields an 
uninterpretable negative result.  Further, for companies with very small book net worth, 
the calculation yields a deceptively high apparent performance result due entirely to the 
small denominator.  For these reasons, a variant of the market-to-book ratio (MTB) was 
developed which relates the difference between market value and book value to market 
value.  The specific formula for this adapted ratio is as follows: 
   Market Value of Equity – Book Value of Equity 
                     Market Value of Equity 
This specification is conceptually equivalent to the traditional market-to-book ratio, but 
avoids negative numbers and the artificially high results associated with small book net 
worth.   
The most recent fiscal year was used for the MTB variable in lieu of a multi-year 
average.  Unlike profitability measures, which are inherently periodic in character, 
market-to-book is a cumulative measure of performance, and the most recent available 
data best reflects the cumulative impact on firm value of the resource allocation decisions 
made in previous years.  
Data for all three performance indicators was obtained from the Mergent and 
Compustat databases, which are the principal sources of individual company financial 
data.  
 Although each of the three performance measures represents a conceptually 
distinct dimension of performance, it is possible that they together represent a single 
construct.  To test this possibility, an exploratory factor analysis was performed to test for 
the existence of an overall performance construct.  This analysis clearly confirmed 
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growth as a distinct performance dimension.  ROA and MTB emerged as one factor. 
However, reliability for the combined measure was unacceptably low (alpha = .17).  
Accordingly, the three performance measures have been retained as separate dimensions 
of firm performance in the analysis.  
4.2.4  Control Variables 
 In addition to the main research variables described above, four control variables 
have been included in the analysis. 
 The first is firm size.  Studies have shown that firm size can systematically affect 
a range of strategic and performance variables (Huselid, 1995; Keats & Hitt, 1988).  
While there is no empirical evidence that firm size influences real options decision 
patterns, it is plausible to expect that size may be correlated with the sophistication of 
resource allocation decision processes in general and with the incidence of specific 
patterns of decision making.  For these reasons, firm size, as measured by the natural log 
of fiscal year 2007 total assets, has been used as a control variable.  Measuring size on 
the basis of assets, rather than other bases such as revenues or employment, was 
considered appropriate in research regarding capital investment decisions. 
 A second control variable was incorporated to capture differences among 
companies in capital intensity.  It is well-established in the literature that real options 
decision-making is particularly relevant in industries/firms characterized by large fixed 
asset investment requirements (Merton, 1998; Triantis & Borison, 2001).  Variations 
among companies in capital intensity may therefore be influential in real options decision 
patterns.  For this reason capital intensity at the company level has been incorporated in 
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the analysis, using the ratio of fixed assets (net property, plant and equipment) to total 
revenues for fiscal year 2007 as a suitable measure.  
 A third control variable was used to incorporate strategic differences among 
companies.  Not all companies respond to uncertainty in the same way.  Firm-specific 
strategic factors are likely to influence the relative emphasis placed on the various real 
options decision patterns examined in this research.  Jauch & Kraft (1986) point out that 
some companies adopt a strategic posture aimed to reduce environmental uncertainty 
while others seek to capitalize on it as a source of opportunities.  Miles & Snow (1978) 
identified four distinct strategic types, each of which is characterized by a different 
pattern of strategic response to environmental uncertainty.  Recognizing that strategy may 
represent an intervening variable between environmental uncertainty and real options 
decision patterns, a measure of strategic orientation has been incorporated as a control 
variable in the analysis.  
 Data on strategic orientation was collected in the real options survey instrument.  
Conceptualization of strategic orientation was based heavily on the Miles & Snow (1978) 
strategic typology, since many of the dimensions of their typology are convergent with 
real options theory, including breadth of product domain, degree of orientation to growth 
opportunities, extent of innovation leadership, receptiveness to change, flexibility and 
technology diversity.  A number of existing scales for quantifying the Miles & Snow 
strategic types were identified (Conant et al., 1990; DeSarbo et al., 2005; Segev, 1987; 
Thomas & McDaniel, 1990).  After careful consideration, the Segev (1987) scale was 
selected as the basis for this analysis for three reasons:  (1) the scale is more compact 
than others examined; (2) it is structured in the Lickert-scale format used in the real 
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options survey; and (3) it displayed good reliability (alpha = .82).  The scale was adapted 
for purposes of this research.  The principal adaptation was to limit the scale to the 
“prospector” strategic type.  Whereas previous operationalizations of the Miles & Snow 
typology were designed to categorize companies by type, the analysis process used in this 
research required a continuous variable reflecting strategic orientation.  Using a single 
type as the basis for the scale resulted in such a measurement, in effect reflecting degree 
of similarity with the prospector type.  Segev’s scale was also reduced in item count to 
meet the space limitations of the survey and to focus the items on real options decision 
patterns. 
 Exploratory factor analysis was conducted on the resulting items.  All but one of 
the prospector items loaded significantly as a single factor.  The final five item scale 
(Table 4.7) displays good reliability (alpha = .759).  The rotated factor solution and 
reliability analysis for strategic orientation is displayed in Appendix B for reference. 
 
Table 4.7 
Strategic Orientation Scale Items 
1.   Our firm leads the industry in innovation. 
2.   Our firm’s product domain is periodically redefined. 
3.   Our firm believes in being “first-in” in the industry in 
the development of new products. 
4.   Our firm responds rapidly to early signals of opportunity 
in the environment. 
5.   Our firm quickly adopts promising innovations. 
 
 
Finally, control variables have been incorporated reflecting industry-level 
performance.  There is substantial evidence of significant performance differences among 
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industries, based on different economic structures and industry conditions (Hansen & 
Wernerfelt, 1989; Hawawini, Subramanian & Verdin, 2003; McGahan & Porter, 1997; 
Powell, 1996; Rumelt, 1991; Schmalensee, 1985).  For this reason, industry-level 
controls on performance are common in strategy research.  Since the proposed research 
entails comparative performance analysis of companies in a wide range of industries, 
controlling for industry-level effects is necessary in testing the relationship between real 
options behavior and performance.  Accordingly, data for the three performance 
measures described above were derived for each industry represented in the survey 
population and incorporated as a control variable.  
Since industry level data is not directly available for all three performance 
indicators used in this research, the required data was developed specifically for this 
study based on the total population of 1375 companies included in the survey.  Sixty-two 
of the companies were excluded from this analysis for one of the following reasons: (1) 
the company has ceased to exist since the time the population was first established, 
typically because of acquisition, and performance data was unavailable in the source 
databases; (2) the company’s NAICS code has been changed, such that it is no longer in 
the manufacturing sector; or (3) data for the company was too old (defined as no data 
more recent than fiscal year 2005).  Excluding these companies, 1313 firms were 
included in developing performance control data.  Each of the three performance metrics 
were calculated for each company in the population, using the same data sources, 
calculation procedure and time periods described earlier for the survey sample.  Data for 
the individual companies were then aggregated based on 3-digit NAICS code, and simple 
average performance data calculated for each code.  Extreme outliers (defined as data 
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lying more than two inter-quartile ranges outside the upper and lower quartiles) were 
eliminated in developing these averages.   
Table 4.8 presents descriptive statistics and correlations for all variables used in 
the analysis of uncertainty and real options decision patterns.  Table 4.9 displays the same 
data for all variables used in the analysis of real options decision patterns and 
performance.  
4.3  Threats to Validity 
4.3.1  Common Methods Bias 
This research relied partially on perceptual data collected via survey.  Real 
options decision patterns, which constitute the dependent variables in the first stage of the 
research (the relationships between environmental uncertainty and real options behavior) 
and independent variables in the second stage (the relationships between real options 
behavior and performance) were derived from perceptual measures.  Perceptual measures 
were also used as one approach to measuring market and competitive uncertainty, which 
are the key independent variables in the first stage of the analysis, and for the strategic 
orientation control variable.  Although the survey respondents consisted of senior 
executives with presumably a thorough understanding of their firms and the business 
environments in which they operate, the use of perceptual measures raises the concern 
that common methods bias is present in the analysis (Pedhazur & Schmelkin, 1991).  
Recognizing this danger, a number of design techniques were employed to ensure that 
artificial methods-related variance did not influence the results of the research.
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Table 4.8: Stage 1 Analysis Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
 
                 
   Mean  Std Dev Deferral Accel Staging OpFlex PartCom Platform PerMU PerCU ObjMU ObjCU PMUxCU OMUxCU LogAss CI Index 
                 
Deferral (DEF) 4.857 1.106               
Acceleration (ACC) 3.581 1.445 -.212(**)              
Staging (ST) 5.138 1.090 .251(**) -.237(**)             
OpFlex (OF) 4.464 1.026 0.045 .207(**) 0.101            
PartCom (PC) 3.599 1.435 -0.033 0.013 -0.027 -0.028           
Platform (PLAT) 4.143 1.254 0.115 0.079 0.050 .213(**) .181(*)          
PerMU (PMU) 3.513 0.984 -0.074 -0.020 .151(*) 0.059 0.007 -0.087         
PerCU (PCU) 3.802 1.012 -.202(**) -0.046 0.014 -0.032 0.039 -0.116 0.088        
ObjMU (OMU) 0.017 0.011 -0.011 0.055 0.003 0.034 -0.138 -0.011 0.068 0.142       
ObjCU (OCU) 0.927 0.062 -0.114 0.025 -0.074 0.041 -0.023 -0.084 -0.020 0.051 -.292(**)      
PerMUXCU  0.094 1.008 0.013 0.137 -.207(**) -0.025 0.063 0.083 -0.088 -0.137 -0.072 -0.035     
ObjMUXCU -0.291 1.274 -0.032 -0.026 -.163(*) -0.013 -0.060 -0.070 -0.028 0.022 -.355(**) .198(*) -0.005    
LOG Assets (Size) 7.106 1.848 0.049 -.201(**) 0.121 0.050 -0.008 0.019 -.198(**) -0.053 0.048 -.252(**) 0.107 0.009   
CI Index (CI) 0.213 0.197 0.025 -0.112 0.123 -0.128 0.147 -0.143 0.026 -0.121 0.079 -.157(*) -0.016 -.226(**) .370(**)  
Strategy (SO) 4.697 1.006 .171(*) 0.015 .275(**) .227(**) 0.052 .322(**) -0.082 -0.017 0.024 0.022 -0.038 -0.012 .168(*) -0.019 
                 
** Correlation significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).               
*Correlation significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).        
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Table 4.9: Stage 2 Analysis Descriptive Statistics and Correlations (Continued on next page) 
 
                
   Mean Std Dev Defer Accel Staging OpFlex PartCom Platform PerMU PerCU ObjMU ObjCU ROA MTB Growth 
                
Deferral (DEF) 4.857 1.106              
Accleration (ACC) 3.581 1.445 -.212(**)             
Staging (ST) 5.138 1.090 .251(**) -.237(**)            
OpFlex (OF) 4.464 1.026 0.045 .207(**) 0.101           
PartCom (PC) 3.599 1.435 -0.033 0.013 -0.027 -0.028          
Platform (PLAT) 4.143 1.254 0.115 0.079 0.050 .213(**) .181(*)         
PerMU (PMU) 3.513 0.984 -0.074 -0.020 .151(*) 0.059 0.007 -0.087        
PerCU (PCU) 3.802 1.012 -.202(**) -0.046 0.014 -0.032 0.039 -0.116 0.088       
ObjMU (OMU) 0.017 0.011 -0.011 0.055 0.003 0.034 -0.138 -0.011 0.068 0.142      
ObjCU (OCU) 0.927 0.062 -0.114 0.025 -0.074 0.041 -0.023 -0.084 -0.020 0.051 -.292(**)     
ROA  5.319 9.138 0.033 -0.032 0.021 0.065 -0.067 0.021 -.163(*) 0.028 0.087 0.092    
Mkt-To-Bk (MTB) 0.558 0.417 0.030 -0.072 -0.025 0.074 0.024 0.023 -0.011 -0.005 -0.001 -0.122 0.095   
Growth (GR) 11.623 16.835 0.044 0.042 0.068 0.006 .183(*) 0.073 -0.061 0.023 0.011 0.066 0.087 0.111  
PCUxDef  -0.202 1.062 0.078 0.004 0.011 -.177(*) 0.047 -0.075 0.012 0.017 -0.035 -0.022 -.166(*) -0.014 -0.137 
PCUxAcc  -0.046 1.123 0.002 0.032 -0.094 -0.108 -0.048 0.129 0.119 -0.107 -0.027 -0.013 0.034 0.023 -0.073 
PCUxStag  0.014 1.088 0.009 -0.098 0.133 0.120 0.050 -0.123 -.195(*) 0.075 -.188(*) 0.116 -0.006 -0.064 -0.033 
PCUxOpFl -0.032 1.116 -.171(*) -0.110 0.118 0.057 -0.018 0.047 -0.028 0.129 0.006 -0.081 0.053 .189(*) -0.056 
PCUxPartCom 0.039 0.939 0.052 -0.057 0.057 -0.021 0.082 0.036 0.071 0.039 -0.014 -0.077 -0.027 0.136 0.051 
PCUxPlatform -0.116 1.097 -0.068 0.134 -0.122 0.051 0.028 0.122 0.078 -.180(*) 0.007 -0.051 -0.076 0.083 -0.083 
OCUxDef  -0.115 0.869 0.151 -0.120 0.084 0.110 0.055 -0.077 -0.062 -0.024 -0.046 .323(**) 0.053 -0.023 0.052 
OCUxAcc  0.025 0.876 -0.117 0.139 -0.088 -0.008 -0.087 -0.060 0.018 -0.016 -0.037 .287(**) -0.125 -0.118 0.001 
OCUxStag - 0.074 0.923 0.077 -0.083 .244(**) 0.010 0.103 0.033 0.100 0.137 -.232(**) 0.146 -0.022 .266(**) 0.003 
OCUxOpFl 0.041 0.873 0.109 -0.010 0.010 0.085 -0.017 -0.018 -0.115 -0.104 -0.017 -0.064 0.033 -0.121 -0.027 
OCUxPartCom  -0.023 0.969 0.049 -0.079 0.098 -0.015 0.071 0.076 0.068 -0.075 -0.074 0.141 -0.070 -.281(**) -0.008 
OCUxPlatform -0.084 0.862 -0.073 -0.062 0.037 -0.018 0.084 0.100 0.027 -0.063 -0.100 .255(**) 0.065 -.319(**) 0.022 
LOG Assets 7.106 1.848 0.049 -.201(**) 0.121 0.050 -0.008 0.019 -.198(**) -0.053 0.048 -.252(**) .167(*) .264(**) 0.042 
Control ROA 4.403 2.596 -0.088 -0.101 -0.135 -0.057 0.042 -0.031 -0.101 -0.050 0.095 -0.049 0.142 -0.013 0.064 
Control MTB 0.470 0.182 0.061 0.037 0.087 0.034 0.052 0.016 -0.060 0.012 -0.115 -0.016 0.042 0.109 0.105 
Control GR 11.948 4.273 0.015 -0.003 .152(*) 0.037 0.043 -0.127 -0.040 0.063 .236(**) 0.087 0.033 0.044 .242(**) 
                
**Correlation significant at the .01 level (2-tailed)               
*Correlation significant at the .05 level (2-tailed)              
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Table 4.9 (Continued): Stage 2 Analysis Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
 
                
   PCUxDef PCUxAcc PCUxSt PCUxOF PCUxPC PCUxPla OCUxDef OCUxAcc OCUxSt OCUxOF OCUxPC OCUxPla LOGAss ConROA ConMTB 
                
Deferral (DEF)                
Accleration (ACC)                
Staging (ST)                
OpFlex (OF)                
PartCom (PC)                
Platform (PLAT)                
PerMU (PMU)                
PerCU (PCU)                
ObjMU (OMU)                
ObjCU (OCU)                
ROA                
Mkt-To-Bk (MTB)                
Growth (GR)                
PCUxDef                
PCUxAcc  -.156(*)               
PCUxStag  0.122 -.317(**)              
PCUxOpFl -0.129 0.027 0.066             
PCUxPartCom 0.057 0.067 0.078 0.002            
PCUxPlatform 0.128 0.136 -.158(*) .259(**) .275(**)           
OCUxDef  0.018 0.012 0.035 -0.109 -0.042 -0.021          
OCUxAcc  0.024 0.074 0.020 -0.091 -0.113 0.013 -0.016         
OCUxStag  0.020 0.015 0.007 0.058 0.143 0.055 .306(**) -0.022        
OCUxOpFl -0.100 -0.088 0.064 -0.018 -0.084 -0.088 -0.033 .225(**) 0.073       
OCUxPartCom  -0.045 -0.085 0.114 -0.062 0.076 -0.073 -0.055 0.068 -.189(*) 0.084      
OCUxPlatform -0.028 0.004 0.069 -0.097 -0.085 0.106 .236(**) .241(**) 0.098 .193(*) 0.141     
LOG Assets -0.054 -0.151 0.082 .200(*) -0.005 -0.088 0.022 -0.093 0.030 -0.058 -0.129 -0.118    
Control ROA -0.046 -0.099 0.083 0.101 -0.033 -0.032 -0.089 -0.131 -0.045 .191(*) -0.071 0.061 .283(**)   
Control MTB 0.048 -0.088 -0.068 0.093 -0.011 -0.002 -0.044 -0.030 0.058 0.110 0.027 -0.048 0.041 -.239(**)  
Control GR 0.020 -.188(*) -0.004 0.130 -0.039 -0.021 0.037 0.023 -0.068 -0.064 0.056 -0.043 0.040 0.080 .407(**) 
                
**Correlation significant at the .01 level (2-tailed)               
*Correlation significant at the .05 level (2-tailed) 
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 The threat posed by common methods bias can be reduced by gathering data from 
a variety of sources (Kerlinger, 1996).  Accordingly, I used objective data wherever 
possible.  This includes all performance data, which is exclusively objective, and 
measures of market and competitive uncertainty, which were developed on the basis of 
both perceived and objective data. 
 Where it was not possible to base variables on objective data, a number of design 
techniques were employed to minimize the potential for methods bias.  Following 
Podsakoff et al. (2003), these techniques relate to both survey design and data collection.  
First, the specific purpose of the research was carefully excluded from both the 
presentation of the survey and the individual survey items.  Neither the terminology nor 
the concept of real options appeared in the survey itself or the accompanying materials 
sent to respondents.  This complete masking of real options as the subject of the research 
reduced the danger of methods bias in several ways.  First, it avoided the priming effects 
which could influence the pattern of responses if the subject domain were known and 
reduced the potential for respondents to bias their responses in order to appear consistent 
with real options theory.  Further, cloaking the specific relationships under study 
minimized the potential for percept-percept bias, by which respondents anticipate the 
relationships under study and respond in accordance with their preconceptions regarding 
those relationships.  
Second, every effort was made create physical and psychological separation 
between different classes of variables in the survey instrument.  Survey items regarding 
market and competitive uncertainty were placed in a separate section of the survey from 
the real options decision patterns.  A different response pattern was used for real options 
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decision patterns (agree/disagree) and uncertainty (predictable/unpredictable).  Reverse-
scored items were incorporated in the survey to protect against acquiescence effects 
whereby respondents answer equally and positively to all items.  
In addition, the strong assurances of confidentiality given to respondents 
minimized the potential for response bias.  The survey did not request any information 
regarding the identity of the respondent or the firm, thus creating a strong aura of 
anonymity for respondents and reducing the potential for desirability-biased responses 
(Podsakoff et al., 2003). 
 Complex or ambiguous constructs are especially susceptible to methods bias 
(Podsakoff et al., 2003).  Accordingly, considerable care was taken to derive items which 
were (1) free of emotive or cuing language, (2) concise and simply-worded, (3) 
unambiguous, and (4) free of specialized terms not familiar to respondents.  Both the 
expert panel review and executive pilot test described earlier assisted in this item 
clarification process, resulting in extensive improvement to the instrument along these 
lines.  
 Finally, the underlying design of the research project as a whole reduced the 
danger of percept-percept bias, which can occur when both dependent and independent 
variables are based on respondent perceptions (Kerlinger, 1986; Subramaniam & 
Venkatraman, 1998).  In such cases, there is the danger that respondents will anticipate 
the hypothesized relationships that the researcher seeks to test and respond in a manner 
consistent with those relationships.  The potential for such bias is deemed low in this 
research given the relatively large number of variables and the interactive nature of the 
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research hypotheses, making it highly unlikely that respondents could intuit the nature of 
the relationships under study. 
4.3.2  Sample Bias 
 
 The validity of the study results depends on having an unbiased sample of the 
total research population.  In the present research, two potential sources of sampling bias 
merit attention.  The first is the possibility that the respondent companies are 
systematically different in the primary study variables from the research population as a 
whole.  Even when the sampling procedure is ideally random, such differences may exist 
if certain classes of companies (for example, based on size, industry or performance) are 
more likely to respond than others.  The second potential source of bias derives from the 
methods used in the data collection process.  The use of multiple data collection 
strategies, especially convenience sampling on the basis of affiliation, raises the 
possibility that responses received as a result of these strategies introduced bias in the 
resulting sample.  In particular, graduates of the Harvard Business School (HBS) account 
for 93, or approximately 54% of the total 173 respondent companies.  Accordingly, 
analysis was conducted to determine if there was significant bias in the sample from 
either of these two sources.  
To test for the presence of sample bias, the study sample was compared to the 
total survey population of 1375 companies on the basis of (1) company size (total assets), 
(2) industry composition, based on three-digit NAICS code, and (3) each of the three 
performance measures (ROA, MTB and GR).  In each case a chi-squared test was 
performed to determine if there were significant differences between the population and 
sample distributions.  Table 4.10 summarizes the results.  
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Table 4.10 
Comparison of Sample and Population Distributions 
(Chi-Squared Significance) 
  
Company Size (Total Assets) .093 (.399)* 
Industry .312 
Performance  
    ROA .466 
    MTB .401 
    GR .209 
 
* Excluding companies with total assets in excess 
   of $100 billion. 
 
In no case did the analysis reveal significant differences.  Only for company size 
did the differences between population and sample approach significance.  Examination 
of the company size data indicated that total assets are lognormally distributed in the total 
population of companies surveyed, such that there is a relatively small group of very 
large companies.  This “tail” of large firms is disproportionately represented in the 
respondent sample; of the seven companies with total assets of $100 billion or more in 
the survey population, five are included among the respondent companies.  Further 
analysis revealed that these five companies had a potent effect on the chi-squared results.  
A revised analysis excluding the largest size class changed the chi-squared test results 
from p = .093 to p = .399.  Based on this analysis I concluded that company size bias did 
not threaten the validity of the study results.  This conclusion is reinforced by the use of 
company size (as measured by total assets) as a control variable in all the regression 
analyses, thus accounting explicitly for variance associated with company size. 
Additional analysis was conducted within the respondent sample to further test for 
the presence of sampling bias between HBS graduates and other respondents.  Using 
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ANOVA, means for the HBS and non-HBS sub-samples were compared for (1) market 
and competitive uncertainty, both perceived and objective, (2) capital intensity and (3) 
strategic orientation.  The ANOVA results in all cases indicate no significant mean 
differences between the HBS and non-HBS sub-samples (Table 4.11).  Based on both the 
chi-squared and ANOVA analyses, I concluded that the reliance on HBS graduates in the 
data collection process, while a departure from ideal standards of randomness, did not 
introduce significant bias into the study. 
 
Table 4.11 
ANOVA Analysis of HBS and Non-HBS Sub-Samples (P Value) 
       
Main Independent Variables  
    Perceived Market Uncertainty .303 
    Perceived Competitive Uncertainty .365 
    Objective Market Uncertainty .971 
    Objective Competitive Uncertainty .787 
Control Variables  
    Strategic Orientation .931 
    Capital Intensity .892 
 
 
4.4  Analysis Methods 
 The hypothesized relationships were tested using hierarchical linear regression 
methods (Aiken & West, 1991).  Separate analyses were performed for evaluating (1) the 
relationships between uncertainty and real options decision patterns and (2) the 
relationships between decision patterns, uncertainty and firm performance.  
 For the first analysis, an initial model was evaluated for each real option decision 
pattern individually, incorporating market and competitive uncertainty and three control 
  
94
 
variables (total assets, capital intensity and strategic orientation) as independent variables 
and the real options decision patterns as the dependent variable.  A second model was 
analyzed in which the uncertainty/decision pattern interaction terms were added in order 
to test Hypotheses 1 through 5 by difference from the first model.  Significant 
interactions were graphed to facilitate interpretation and presentation (Aiken & West, 
1991).  This analysis procedure was executed separately for perceived and objective 
measures of market and competitive uncertainty.  An F-statistic of .05 or less was 
considered significant.  However, given that the relationships examined in this research 
have not been previously studied empirically, findings which approach significance (p 
>.05 but ≤.10) have been noted and interpreted.  
In the performance analysis, which entails a number of three way interactions 
between market uncertainty, competitive uncertainty and decision patterns, a three-step 
hierarchical regression procedure was used.  The first step incorporated the six real 
options decision patterns, competitive and market uncertainty and two control variables 
(total assets and industry performance) as the independent variables and firm 
performance as the dependent variable.  This model tested for the presence of significant 
main effect relationships between decision patterns and performance.  A second model 
then introduced two-way interactions between market uncertainty and decision patterns 
and competitive uncertainty and decision patterns.  Model 3 introduced the three-way 
interactions between market uncertainty, competitive uncertainty and decision patterns 
required to test the performance hypotheses.  To facilitate interpretation, significant 
interactions were graphed using the procedures suggested by Aiken & West (1991) for 
three-way interactions.  
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This procedure was repeated for each of the three performance measures (ROA, 
MTB and GR).  Further, the entire performance analysis was conducted for both 
perceived and objective uncertainty measures. 
In both stages of the analysis, survey data was centered to facilitate the calculation 
and interpretation of interactions.  Further, since the objective data for market and 
competitive uncertainty were expressed in different units, Z-scores were used for these 
variables in the regressions.  
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CHAPTER 5 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
5.1  Relationships between Uncertainty and Real Options Decision Patterns 
In the first stage of the analysis, I sought to establish that employment of six 
specific real options-theoretic decision patterns is systematically related to the relative 
presence of uncertainty regarding the level and composition of demand (market 
uncertainty) and uncertainty regarding the intentions and actions of competitors 
(competitive uncertainty).  Table 5.1 summarizes the regression analysis results for this 
phase of the project, highlighting those instances where the change between model 1 and 
model 2 was found to be significant.  The individual regression analyses are contained in 
Appendix C for reference.  The results are reviewed below for each real options decision 
pattern.  
Table 5.1 
Summary of Model Results – Analysis of Uncertainty and Real Options Decision 
Patterns 
 
  Model 1 
P Value 
Model 2 
P Value 
Model 2 
∆ R2 
P Value 
∆ R2 
      
Deferral Perceived  .033 .060 .000 .871 
 Objective .170 .253 .000 .799 
Acceleration Perceived .146 .060 .022 .050 
 Objective .158 .241 .000 .897 
Staging Perceived .000 .000 .035 .009 
 Objective .005 .002 .021 .049 
Operating Flexibility Perceived .018 .032 .001 .709 
 Objective .033 .054 .002 .596 
Partial Commitment Perceived .325 .315 .007 .263 
 Objective .081 .101 .005 .365 
Platform Perceived .000 .000 .005 .327 
 Objective .000 .000 .010 .176 
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5.1.1  Timing 
As described earlier, the real options timing construct was divided into two sub-
constructs – deferral and acceleration – based on the results of factor analysis.  Separate 
regression analyses were therefore performed for each of the sub-constructs.  
Analysis of deferral using perceived uncertainty data revealed a significant  
(b = -.213, p =.011) negative main effect relationship between competitive uncertainty 
and deferral.  This finding is consistent with theory, which suggests that competitive 
uncertainty discourages deferral, and therefore provides general support to the theory 
underlying H1a.  However, no significant interaction between market and competitive 
uncertainty was found.  Hence H1a is not supported on the basis of perceived uncertainty 
data.  Replicating the deferral analysis using objective uncertainty data yielded no 
significant results for either model 1 or model 2 and therefore no support for H1a. 
 The analysis did find support for the hypothesized relationships between MU, CU 
and acceleration.  Based on perceived uncertainty data, model 1 was not significant. 
Model 2, however, did find a significant relationship (b = .217, p =.050) between the 
MUxCU interaction and acceleration.  To facilitate interpretation of this finding, the 
interaction was graphed.  Following Aiken & West (1991), the regression equation was 
used to calculate values for acceleration at intervals of one standard deviation above and 
below the mean for both MU and CU.  The plotted results are displayed in Figure 5.1, 
revealing a disordinal interaction between PMU and PCU in relation to acceleration.  
When PCU is low, acceleration shows a strong negative correlation with PMU.  High 
PCU, however, changes the direction of the PMU/acceleration relationship.  Thus H1b is 
supported on the basis of perceived uncertainty.  
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Figure 5.1: Acceleration PMUxPCU Interaction
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Evaluation of the same relationships using objective uncertainty measures did not 
detect any significant main effect or interaction relationships between MU or CU and 
acceleration.  Hence, on the basis of objective uncertainty data, H1b is not supported. 
5.1.2  Staging   
The analysis provided strong support for the hypothesized relationships between 
uncertainty and staging, both on the basis of perceived and objective uncertainty 
measures.   Using perceived uncertainty data, model 1 revealed a significant (b = .203,  
p =.015) positive main effect relationship between market uncertainty and staging.  More 
important, there is a highly significant (b = -.208, p =.009) relationship between the 
PMU/PCU interaction and staging in model 2.  Graphic analysis of this interaction is 
consistent with the hypothesized relationships (Figure 5.2).  When PCU is low, staging 
displays a strong positive relationship with PMU.  This is consistent with theory, which 
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anticipates that MU will induce staging in the absence of CU.  When PCU is high, 
however, the PMU/staging relationship disappears.  This result supports the expectation 
that competitive uncertainty will negatively moderate the relationship between market 
uncertainty and staging.  Thus the analysis supports H2 based on perceived uncertainty. 
Figure 5.2: Staging PMUxPCU Interaction
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Analysis of staging using objective uncertainty data also supports H2.  Model 1 
detected no OMU or OCU main effects, but model 2 revealed a significant (b = -.140,  
p =.049) OMU/OCU interaction.  A plot of this interaction (Figure 5.3) reflects the same 
relationship structure as did the perceived uncertainty regression.  Thus the hypothesized 
moderating relationship between market uncertainty, competitive uncertainty and staging 
is supported on the basis of both perceived and objective uncertainty measures.  
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Figure 5.3: Staging OMUxOCU Interaction
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5.1.3  Operating Flexibility 
The regression analysis did not support the hypothesized relationship between 
MU, CU and operating flexibility.  Using perceived uncertainty data, model 1 revealed no 
main effects linking operating flexibility to either PMU or PCU.  The only significant 
main effects detected were a negative relationship between operating flexibility and the 
capital intensity control variable (b = -.839, p =.047) and a positive relationship with the 
strategic orientation control variable (b =.212. p =.006).  Further, the hypothesized 
interaction between PMU and PCU was not significant.  Hence, the analysis indicated no 
relationship, either direct or moderated, between PMU, PCU and operating flexibility.  
Replication of this analysis using objective uncertainty data also failed to reveal 
significant MU or CU main effects or interactions.  Hence H3 is not supported either on 
the basis of perceived or objective uncertainty data.    
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5.1.4  Partial Commitment 
As a result of the factor analysis, the partial commitment construct was more 
narrowly defined than in its original conception, and relates primarily to joint ventures, 
minority investments and alliances.  The regression analysis did not provide support for 
the hypothesized relationship between partial commitments so defined and either MU or 
CU.  Using perceived uncertainty measures, no significant PMU or PCU main effects 
were found, nor was the PMU/PCU interaction significant.  Regression using objective 
uncertainty data produced the same result.  As in the perceived uncertainty analysis, the 
OMU/OCU interaction was not significant.  Hence there is no support for H4 from either 
the perceived or objective uncertainty regressions.  
5.1.5  Platform Investments 
As for partial commitments, regression analysis using perceived uncertainty 
measures revealed no significant main effect or interaction relationships between 
environmental uncertainty and platform investments.  Thus H5 is not supported on the 
basis of perceived uncertainty.  The regression did detect a near-significant (b = -.155, p 
=.089) negative main effect relationship between competitive uncertainty and platform, a 
result directionally contrary to H5, which anticipates that competitive uncertainty will 
promote platform investment.  The comparable analysis using objective uncertainty data 
also detected a near-significant (b = -.162, p =.103) negative main effect relationship 
between CU and platform, but the MUxCU interaction was not significant, indicating no 
support for H5 based on objective uncertainty. 
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5.2    Relationships between Uncertainty, Real Options Decision Patterns and   
Performance 
 As described earlier, analysis of the relationships between uncertainty, real 
options decision patterns and performance was conducted using a hierarchical regression 
analysis procedure consisting of three steps, which permitted identification of main 
effects (Model 1), two-way interactions between real options decision patterns and 
market and competitive uncertainty individually in relation to performance (Model 2), 
and three-way interactions between real options decision patterns and market and 
competitive uncertainty jointly in relation to performance (Model 3).  The last of these 
three steps tests the relationships specified in Hypotheses 6 through 10.  Separate 
analyses were conducted for each of the three performance measures, using both 
perceived and objective uncertainty data.  Hence, six analyses were conducted for each of 
the real options decision patterns. The regression analyses are displayed in Appendix D 
for reference. 
Table 5.2 summarizes the results for each of the models evaluated, highlighting 
significant results.  In each case, Model 3 reflects the three-way interactions between 
market uncertainty, competitive uncertainty and the six real options decision patterns 
which constitute the basis for the performance hypotheses.  In two cases (perceived 
growth and perceived MTB), the change in R2 associated with Model 3 is significant  
(p = .000 and .025 respectively), indicating that the MUxCUxRODP interactions are 
significant factors in explaining performance in these cases.  The incremental R2 values 
(.155 and .078 respectively) indicate that the additional variance explained by these 
interactions is material.  No significance was found for either GR or MTB using objective 
uncertainty data.  Further, no significant relationships were found for the return on assets 
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performance metric in any of the regressions.  Hence, none of the performance 
hypotheses are supported for this indicator.  Table 5.3 summarizes the analysis results for 
each of the real options decision patterns individually.  These results are discussed below 
for each of the real options decision patterns in turn. 
 
 
Table 5.2 
 
 Performance Analysis Summary of Model Results 
 
 Model 1 
P Value 
Model 2 
P Value 
Model 3 
P Value 
Model 3 
∆ R2 
P Value 
∆ R2 
      
ROA – Perceived .314 .619 .576 .038 .374 
             Objective .205 .126 .068 .055 .122 
Growth – Perceived .065 .149 .000 .155 .000 
                Objective .053 .344 .427 .028 .576 
MTB – Perceived  .092 .109 .021 .078 .025 
            Objective .089 .000 .000 .048 .105 
 
 
     
 
 
 
Table 5.3 
 
Performance Analysis Summary of Results by Real Options Decision 
Pattern (Three-Way Interaction P Values) 
 
 
 Growth 
(Perceived) 
MTB  
(Perceived) 
   
Deferral .021 -- 
Acceleration .047 .015 
Staging -- .011 
Operating Flexibility -- .048 
Partial Commitment -- -- 
Platform .000 -- 
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5.2.1  Timing 
 As before, separate analyses were conducted for the deferral and acceleration 
dimensions of timing.  For deferral, Hypotheses 6a and 6b are based on the expectation 
that the value of deferral is high when market uncertainty is great, but that this value is 
offset by the threat of preemption associated with competitive uncertainty.  Based on that 
theory I hypothesized that under conditions of low competitive uncertainty, a positive 
relationship will exist between deferral and performance as market uncertainty increases 
(H6a), but that under conditions of high competitive uncertainty, the same relationship 
would be negatively associated with performance (H6b).  The analysis revealed a 
significant three-way deferral interaction (b = -3.100, p =.021) for the growth 
performance measure, based on perceived uncertainty data.  To facilitate interpretation of 
this and subsequent three-way interactions, I have adopted the procedure recommended 
by Aiken & West (1991) for interpretation of three-way interactions, which allows for 
two-dimensional display of the interaction by employing separate graphs for high and 
low conditions for one of the interaction terms.  On this basis the deferral interaction was 
graphed separately for high and low competitive uncertainty (Figures 5.4a and 5.4b 
respectively).  The results are consistent with the deferral hypotheses.  When competitive 
uncertainty is low (Figure 5.4a) deferral shows a positive relationship to growth at both 
high and low market uncertainty conditions, but more so when market uncertainty is 
high.  Thus H6a is supported for the growth metric, based on perceived uncertainty.  
When competitive uncertainty is high (Figure 5.4b), the hypothesized negative 
relationship between deferral, performance and market uncertainty is strongly in 
evidence.  Hence, H6b is also supported. 
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Figure 5.4a: Deferral/Growth, LCU (Perceived)
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Figure 5.4b: Deferral/Growth, HCU (Perceived)
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No comparable significant relationships were detected for deferral and growth 
using objective uncertainty measures, and no significant relationships were found 
between deferral and the market-to-book performance metric.  
As regards acceleration, the theoretical basis for the hypothesized performance 
effects (H6c and H6d) is conceptually the reverse of that for deferral.  When there is little 
market uncertainty, acceleration is a valuable response to competitive uncertainty.  Hence 
I hypothesized that when market uncertainty is low, a positive relationship will exist 
between acceleration and performance as competitive uncertainty increases (H6c).  When 
market uncertainty is high, however, acceleration has negative performance value, such 
that a negative relationship between acceleration and performance should be in evidence 
as competitive uncertainty increases (H6d).  
Significant three-way interactions were detected for the acceleration/performance 
relationship for both MTB (b = -.061, p =.015) and growth (b = -1.892, p =.047), in both 
cases based on perceived uncertainty data.  Graphing these interactions indicated support 
for the acceleration hypotheses.  Figures 5.5a and 5.5b display the interactions for MTB, 
which support the hypothesized relationships.  When market uncertainty is low (Figure 
5.5a), acceleration is positively related to performance when competitive uncertainty is 
high, but negatively related when competitive uncertainty is low, as predicted by H6c.  
When market uncertainty is high, these relationships are reversed, as anticipated by H6d.  
Hence, H6C and H6d are supported for the MTB metric using perceived uncertainty. 
In the case of the growth metric, the interaction graphs (Figures 5.6a and 5.6b) 
show consistent relationships.  In the high market uncertainty case (Figure 5.6b), the  
  
107
 
Figure 5.5a: Acceleration/Market-to-Book, LMU (Perceived)
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Figure 5.5b: Acceleration/Market-to-Book, HMU (Perceived)
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predicted relationships are strongly evident, supporting H6d.  In the low market 
uncertainty case, the expected disordinal interaction is not present.  Acceleration is 
positively related to growth for both high and low competitive uncertainty conditions, 
albeit slightly more so when competitive uncertainty is high.  This is consistent with 
theory, since, in the absence of market uncertainty, acceleration may well be a growth-
producing strategy at all levels of competitive uncertainty.  Hence H6c and H6d are 
supported for the growth metric using perceived uncertainty data.  
In summary, the analysis provides support for H6c and H6d for both growth and 
MTB performance metrics, based on perceived data.  No comparable significant 
relationships were detected using objective uncertainty data. 
5.2.2  Staging 
The theoretical foundation for developing hypotheses regarding the relationship 
between staging and performance is comparable to that for deferral.  Staging is a valuable 
and therefore performance-enhancing strategy for responding to market uncertainty, but 
its value is reduced by competitive uncertainty.  On this basis, H7a anticipates that when 
competitive uncertainty is low, a positive relationship will exist between staging and 
performance as market uncertainty increases, while H7b anticipates a negative 
staging/performance/market uncertainty relationship when competitive uncertainty is 
high.  A significant (b = -.088, p =.011) staging interaction was found for the MTB 
performance indicator, using perceived uncertainty data.  Graphical analysis of this 
interaction (Figures 5.7a and 5.7b) indicates support for both staging hypotheses.  When 
competitive uncertainty is high (Figure 5.7b), staging is negatively related to performance 
when market uncertainty is high, but not so when it is low, as predicted.  When  
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Figure 5.6a: Acceleration/Growth, LMU (Perceived)
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Figure 5.6b: Acceleration/Growth, HMU  (Perceived)
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Figure 5.7a: Staging/Market-to-Book, LCU (Perceived)
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
Staging
M
T
B
LMU
HMU
 
 
Figure 5.7b: Staging/Market-to-Book, HCU (Perceived)
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
Staging
M
T
B
LMU
HMU
 
  
111
 
competitive uncertainty is low (Figure 5.7a), staging is positively associated with 
performance at all levels of market uncertainty, but again slightly more so when market 
uncertainty is high than when it is low.  This is consistent with theory, which suggests 
that, absent competitive uncertainty, staging is a performance-improving response to 
market uncertainty generally.  Thus, H7a and H7b are supported for the MTB metric, 
based on perceived uncertainty data.  No significant staging/performance relationships 
were found using objective data, and none for the growth performance metric. 
5.2.3  Operating Flexibility 
The hypothesized relationships between operating flexibility and performance are 
based on the theoretical foundation that such flexibility is a valuable strategy for 
accommodating to market uncertainty, but that its value is reduced or eliminated with 
increasing competitive uncertainty.  On this basis I hypothesized that when competitive 
uncertainty is low, a positive relationship will exist between operating flexibility and 
performance as market uncertainty increases (H8a), but the reverse would obtain when 
competitive uncertainty is high (H8b). 
 A significant three-way interaction (b = .074, p=.048) was found in the MTB 
analysis using perceived uncertainty data.  A graph of the interaction (Figure 5.8a and 
5.8b) does not, however, support the hypothesized relationships.  When competitive 
uncertainty is low (Figure 5.8a), the relationship between operating flexibility and 
performance is negative when market uncertainty is high and positive when it is low, 
contrary to H8a.  Further, when competitive uncertainty is high (Figure 5.8b), operating 
flexibility is positively related to performance when market uncertainty is high and  
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Figure 5.8a: Operating Flexibility/Market-to-Book, LCU 
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Figure 5.8b: Operating Flexibility/Market-to-Book, HCU 
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negatively when it is low, again in direct contradiction to the hypothesized relationship.  
Thus neither H8a nor H8b is supported.  I consider explanations for this unexpected 
finding in the discussion section below.  No significant relationship was found between 
operating flexibility and growth using perceived uncertainty data, and no significant 
relationship with any of the performance indicators using objective uncertainty data.  
5.2.4  Partial Commitment 
 Theory for partial commitment is similar to that for deferral and staging.  I 
hypothesized that making limited scale commitments was a performance-enhancing 
response to market uncertainty, but that its value is reduced when competitive uncertainty 
is high.  No significant three-way interactions were found for the partial commitment real  
options decision pattern and performance.  Hence, H9a and H9b received no support for 
any of the performance metrics, either on the basis of perceived or objective data. 
5.2.5  Platform Investments 
 Theory development for platform investments suggests that market uncertainty 
alone does not make such investments a valuable strategy from a real options perspective.  
Only when market uncertainty is accompanied by competitive uncertainty does the 
platform decision pattern become valuable, in that it establishes resource positions which 
can provide competitive advantage in responding to market uncertainty.  On this basis, I 
hypothesized that when competitive uncertainty is low, platform would display a negative 
relationship to performance as market uncertainty increases (H10a), but that the reverse 
would be true when competitive uncertainty is high (H10b). 
The highly significant three-way platform interaction (b = -.4.089, p ≤ .000) 
detected for the growth metric using perceived data was graphed to determine if it  
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Figure 5.9a: Platform/Growth, LCU (Perceived)
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Figure 5.9b: Platform/Growth, HCU (Perceived)
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supported the hypothesized relationships (Figures 5.9a and 5.9b).  The results are 
contrary to those expected.  When competitive uncertainty is low, platform is positively 
related to performance at high market uncertainty, contrary to H10a.  When competitive 
uncertainty is high, platform is negatively related to performance at high market 
uncertainty, contradicting H10b.  Hence, H10a and H10b are not supported.  I consider 
the possible explanations for these contrary findings in the subsequent discussion of 
results.  
No significant relationships were found for the impact of platform investments on 
growth using objective uncertainty data, or on the MTB performance metric on any basis. 
5.3   Discussion – Relationships between Uncertainty and Real Options Decision 
Patterns 
 In the first stage of the research, I hypothesized that uncertainty regarding demand 
factors (market uncertainty) and uncertainty regarding competitor actions (competitive 
uncertainty) would separately and differentially affect the incidence of six specific types 
of real options-theoretic decision patterns.  Regression analysis found strong support for 
some of the hypothesized relationships and no support for others.  In what follows, I 
discuss and interpret these findings. 
 Two hypotheses (H1a and H1b) addressed real options decision patterns affecting 
the timing of resource commitments – deferral (delay) and acceleration.  As regards 
deferral, I theorized that companies would tend to delay resource commitments in order 
to await clarification of market uncertainty, but that competitive uncertainty would 
introduce a countervailing disincentive to defer lest delay lead to competitive preemption.  
H1a therefore anticipated that competitive uncertainty would negatively moderate the 
relationship between market uncertainty and deferral.  No support was found for this 
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hypothesis, using either perceived or objective measures of uncertainty.  Given the 
extensive theoretical support for H1a from the real options literature, this finding is 
surprising and bears further consideration.  
 Two explanations for this result are possible.  First, the factors that drive deferral 
behavior may be different from those identified in this study, perhaps factors outside the 
domain of real options theory.  Companies, for example, may defer resource 
commitments as a result of capital constraints or as a function of strategy, a possibility 
discussed in greater detail subsequently.  This explanation does not, however, resolve the 
fundamental theoretical dilemma that deferral is one of the earliest and most-discussed 
real options behaviors in the literature, and that the weight of that literature supports the 
hypothesized relationship. 
 The second and more likely explanation is that competitive uncertainty as a 
disincentive to defer greatly outweighs market uncertainty as an incentive to do so.  In 
this interpretation, the presence of even modest levels of competitive uncertainty 
undermines deferral as a resource allocation strategy.  If this is so, only in an 
environment in which there is no little or no competitive uncertainty (that is, oligopoly or 
monopoly) would deferral emerge in response to market uncertainty.  In analytical terms, 
this interpretation suggests a step or threshold function in the relationship, where the step 
function occurs at relatively low levels of competitive uncertainty.  Such a function 
would not necessarily be detectable by the linear regression techniques used in this study.   
 There is theoretical support for this interpretation.  Grenadier’s (2002) previously-
cited game-theoretic modeling of the deferral decision found that the presence of 
relatively few competitors was sufficient to discourage deferral.  Further, some of the 
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findings in this research provide directional support for this interpretation.  In the deferral 
analysis, for example, no main effect relationship between market uncertainty and 
deferral was found, but a significant negative main effect relationship (b = -.213, p = 
.011) was detected between competitive uncertainty and deferral.  This finding is 
consistent with the interpretation that a little competitive uncertainty can undo a lot of 
market uncertainty as a determinant for decisions to delay, and suggests the following 
proposition: 
P1:   Market uncertainty will be correlated with deferral only in the total or near- 
total absence of competitive uncertainty. 
Given the prominence of deferral as a real options-theoretic response to market 
uncertainty in the literature, further study of the construct is warranted, particularly in 
settings where there is little or no competitive uncertainty.  A particularly fruitful 
approach would be to study timing decisions for “proprietary” options, that is, options 
available only to the focal company and therefore not exposed to competitive threat.  
Studies of specific industries rich in proprietary options may be the best approach for 
isolating the effects of market uncertainty on deferral.  Industries in which patents, 
copyrights and long-term leases are common may be especially fruitful for this purpose, 
including, for example, pharmaceuticals, publishing and the exploration and production 
sector of the petroleum industry.  
Results for the second timing dimension examined in the study – acceleration – 
also directionally lend support to the preeminence of competitive uncertainty in timing 
decisions.  The theoretical relationships here are the direct inverse of deferral.  Faced 
with market uncertainty alone, companies would have no incentive to accelerate resource 
commitments, but competitive uncertainty creates a countervailing incentive to move 
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quickly in order to gain the benefits of preemption.  Thus H1b anticipates that 
competitive uncertainty will positively moderate the relationship between market 
uncertainty and acceleration.  H1b was supported on the basis of perceived data.  No 
main effects were found for either market or competitive uncertainty, but the predicted 
interaction was present.  
Notable in the interaction is the strength of the moderating relationship (Figure 
5.1).  When competitive uncertainty is low, acceleration is sharply reduced as market 
uncertainty increases.  This result is intuitive; companies have little incentive to rush 
when they face no competitive threat.  But a high level of competitive uncertainty does 
not simply dampen the negative effect of market uncertainty.  It appears to eliminate it 
completely.  Put in other terms, when competitive uncertainty is high, the relationship 
between market uncertainty and acceleration is positive.  
There is both theoretical and empirical foundation for this result.  As discussed by 
Folta & O’Brien (2004) in their analysis of timing, when market uncertainty is high, the 
value of deferral is high but there is also a growth option associated with future market 
uncertainty.  The value of that growth option also increases with market uncertainty, thus 
creating a “duel” between simultaneous deferral and growth options.  In their empirical 
analysis, Folta & O’Brien found that market uncertainty did indeed induce deferral, but 
only up to a point, beyond which the relationship reversed, as the value of the growth 
option increases relative to that of the deferral option.   
The results of the present research regarding market uncertainty, competitive 
uncertainty and acceleration are consistent with Folta & O’Brien's findings regarding 
deferral.  A re-examination of Figure 5.1 in light of their work suggests a more nuanced 
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interpretation.  When market uncertainty is high, the value of the associated growth 
option is also high.  As long as competitive uncertainty is low, that growth option is not 
at risk, such that there is little incentive to accelerate.  In that case, the downside of 
market uncertainty increasingly discourages acceleration. When competitive uncertainty 
is high, however, the incentive to accelerate increases with market uncertainty, since the 
value of the underlying growth option and therefore the potential loss due to possible 
preemption increase with market uncertainty.  This interpretation supports Folta & 
O’Brien’s finding, and clarifies it by isolating the influence of competitive uncertainty in 
the market uncertainty/timing relationship.  Specifically, the interaction found here 
suggests that the “duel” detected by Folta & O’Brien exists only in the presence of 
competitive uncertainty.  
Taken together, the research results for the two timing sub-constructs studied 
suggest that competitive uncertainty has a more potent role than market uncertainty in 
resource allocation timing decisions.  Put in other terms, companies may on average be 
more determined to avoid preemption (or to seek its benefits for themselves) than to 
protect themselves against uncertain demand evolutions.  If this is so, it has implications 
for both real options research and for management practice.  As regards research, it 
argues for a greater emphasis on the study of real options under competitive conditions.  
For example, there is a substantial theoretical and methodological literature on the 
economic attractiveness of deferral which may not reflect the competitive consequences 
of delaying resource commitments and which may not square with what companies 
actually do, as the present research implies.   
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There is an additional interpretive perspective on the research findings regarding 
investment timing that is related to cognition and decision psychology.  It may be that 
timing decisions are especially susceptible to decision biases and information processing 
defects.  Houghton et al. (2000), for example, studied the presence of such biases in the 
context of a notional first mover decision.  They found significant bias in favor of first 
mover decisions, resulting from salience (undue reliance on a small sample of success 
stories in comparable decisions), illusion of control (overestimation of the role of skill 
versus chance in determining outcomes), and overconfidence (underestimation of risk).  
They found further that these effects were if anything more prevalent in group decisions 
than decisions by individuals.  Their findings suggest that there may be a general bias in 
favor of action versus deferral in timing decisions.   
These observations raise broader questions regarding the interplay between real 
options theory and the cognitive and social psychology of decision-making.  Although 
there has been extensive growth in our understanding of decision-making patterns at both 
the individual and group levels, there has relatively little study of how real options 
decisions are affected by them, making research in this area an important future priority.  
From the perspective of practice, the timing of resource commitments appears to 
contain an inherent dilemma.  One either exercises due caution by delaying action until 
market uncertainties become clear, at the risk of losing competitive position, or acts 
immediately to maximize competitive position at the risk of making bad commitments.  It 
is a management challenge to find ways to balance these competing incentives. 
The third real options construct examined – staging – may in fact represent such a 
balancing decision pattern.  Theory suggests that breaking projects into individual 
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sequential components and establishing multiple decision points along the way provides a 
basis for adapting to market conditions as they become clearer and “learning as you go.”  
By this reasoning, staging is likely to be positively related to market uncertainty.  At the 
same time, staging, like deferral, risks competitive preemption to the extent that it 
introduces multiple decision points and serial versus concurrent action.  It was therefore 
hypothesized in H2 that competitive uncertainty would negatively moderate the 
relationship between market uncertainty and staging.  This expectation was strongly 
supported using both perceived and objective measures of uncertainty.  In addition, a 
significant positive main effect relationship (b = .203, p =.015) was found between 
perceived market uncertainty and staging. 
The analysis results for staging are especially notable in relation to those 
discussed above for deferral.  Although separate constructs, the underlying theory for 
both staging and deferral is essentially the same, as are the expected relationships to 
market and competitive uncertainty.  Yet the regression results indicate that company 
behavior is quite different for the two constructs.  The analysis for deferral suggests that 
market uncertainty does not drive deferral, and that whatever does drive it is heavily 
offset by competitive uncertainty.  For staging, by contrast, market uncertainty appears as 
predicted to be an influential factor, although moderated as also predicted by competitive 
uncertainty.  
This difference between two related constructs suggests the possibility that 
staging is the preferred of the two behavior patterns for responding to the presence of 
both market and competitive uncertainty.  Deferral is a binary choice: one either waits or 
does not.  In other terms, the decision to defer or not is a choice between protecting 
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against market uncertainty or competitive uncertainty, but not both.  Staging, by contrast, 
may be viewed as a middle ground, a way of not deferring which offers some protection 
against both market and competitive uncertainty.  Staging means getting started, but 
doing so cautiously and in incremental steps.  It allows learning and adaptation, and 
therefore does in part what deferral does.  But it also moves forward and thus reduces the 
risk of competitive preemption.  In short, staging may be a directionally optimal timing 
response to task environments characterized by both market and competitive uncertainty.  
This interpretation is consistent with the analysis results for the two constructs.  
For the remaining real options constructs evaluated – operating flexibility, partial 
commitment and platform – the analysis provided no support for the hypothesized 
relationships, using either perceived or objective data.  Further, the analysis revealed no 
significant main effect relationships between these decision patterns and either market or 
competitive uncertainty which were directionally supportive.  Since all three of the 
constructs have substantial theoretical support as responses to uncertainty in the real 
options and strategy literatures, this lack of empirical confirmation needs to be 
understood. 
In the case of operational flexibility, I hypothesized (H3) that competitive 
uncertainty would negatively moderate the relationship between market uncertainty and 
investment in maximizing the flexibility of producing assets.  H3 was not supported in 
either the perceived or objective analyses.  Further, no main effect relationships between 
the construct and either market or competitive uncertainty were found.  A significant or 
near-significant negative main effect relationship (b = -.839, p =.047 based on perceived 
data and b = -.753, p =.073 based on objective data) between operating flexibility and the 
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capital intensity control variable was however found.  This result is counter-intuitive and 
can only be explained by the greater difficulty and cost of maintaining operating 
flexibility encountered by fixed-asset intensive firms in general.  
I interpret the absence of a significant relationship between competitive 
uncertainty and operational flexibility as stemming in part from the operating flexibility 
scale, which as originally designed intended to capture two aspects of the operating 
flexibility construct: (1) the pattern of capacity additions and, (2) the flexibility of 
producing facilities to alter operating parameters such as feedstock, product mix and 
production level.  The items related to the pattern of capacity additions did not, however, 
survive factor analysis and reliability testing, and were eliminated in the final scale.  At 
the same time, the theoretical basis for expecting that competitive uncertainty would 
moderate a firm’s tendency to invest in flexibility is based heavily on the deleted capacity 
addition aspect of the construct.  Hence I regard the test of competitive uncertainty’s 
effect on operating flexibility as inconclusive.  
More perplexing is the lack of any significant main effect relationship between 
operating flexibility and market uncertainty.  The theoretical basis for expecting a 
positive relationship is compelling: operating flexibility makes sense only if one is not 
sure about the level or product composition of demand, and its attractiveness should 
increase with that uncertainty.  I offer two explanations for the absence of empirical 
support for this expectation.  First is the possibility that very little market uncertainty is 
required to justify investments in operational flexibility.  As in the case of deferral and 
competitive uncertainty, there may be a threshold effect in the market 
uncertainty/operating flexibility relationship that makes the linear relationship assumed in 
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the regression analysis an inadequate basis for testing.  In short, it may take very little 
market uncertainty to induce operating flexibility.  
Second, the operating flexibility decision pattern may be heavily influenced by 
strategic factors rather than uncertainty.  This possibility is supported by a very 
significant main effect relationship between operating flexibility and the strategic 
orientation control variable (b = .212, p =.006 based on perceived data and b = .204, p = 
.009 based on objective data).  Since similar relationships were found for other real 
options decision patterns, this interpretation is discussed in more detail later in this 
section. 
In the case of partial commitment, H4 anticipated that pursuit of joint ventures, 
minority interests and alliances would be positively related to market uncertainty, since 
such investments provide the opportunity to clarify and adapt to market uncertainty, but 
that the relationship would be negatively moderated by competitive uncertainty, which 
encourages full and immediate commitment.  This expectation has strong support in the 
literature.  The absence of support for H4 suggests that factors other than market and 
competitive uncertainty account for why companies undertake joint ventures, minority 
investments and strategic alliances.  For example, the analysis revealed a significant 
positive main effect relationship between partial commitments and capital intensity  
(b = 1.372, p = .026 using perceived uncertainty measures and b = 1.364, p =.023 using 
objective measures).  This suggests that minimizing capital requirements may be a more 
important explanatory factor than uncertainty in decisions to enter into alliances and joint 
ventures.  Other explanatory factors – such as the desire to access the knowledge and 
capabilities of partners/allies – have been advanced to explain the strategic appeal of such 
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investments, and may also have more explanatory value than the uncertainty variables 
examined here.  
Also, as noted earlier, the partial commitment construct as operationalized in this 
research emphasizes specific investment vehicles such as joint ventures, minority 
interests and alliances, and does not fully reflect the boundaries of the construct as 
originally conceived.  The factor analysis suggests the existence of a construct which may 
better tap the intended real options decision pattern of taking actions to create small 
initial positions that may later be expanded or divested/discontinued, depending on 
market evolution.  Research into a “toe in the water” or “reversibility” construct may 
better establish the role of market and competitive uncertainty in such action patterns. 
Finally, as regards platform investments, theory indicates that committing 
resources to developing platforms is a real options-theoretic response to market and 
competitive uncertainty in combination.  Accordingly, I hypothesized that competitive 
uncertainty positively moderates the relationship between market uncertainty and 
platform.  H5 received no support in the regression analysis.  The only notable analysis 
result detected was a marginally significant negative main effect relationship (b = -.155,  
p =.089) between platform and competitive uncertainty in the perceived data analysis, 
further casting doubt on platform as a response to competitive uncertainty.  As for partial 
commitments, the absence of any significant positive relationships between the platform 
decision pattern and either market or competitive uncertainty, individually or in concert, 
runs counter to a substantial and persuasive theoretical literature which interprets 
positioning investments which offer no direct financial reward – such as investments in 
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R&D, knowledge and capabilities – as options to gain access to future opportunities in 
the face of uncertainty about market and competitive developments.  
There are several potential explanations for this counter-intuitive outcome.  First, 
the relationship between platform and uncertainty may be different from that 
hypothesized in this research.  For example, platform investments may be more heavily 
influenced by technology uncertainty, a variable not included in the present research, than 
market and competitive uncertainty.  Much of the theoretical literature regarding platform 
investments is technology-oriented, making this interpretation plausible.  Alternately, 
platform may be related to the aggregate level of uncertainty rather than to specific 
sources of uncertainty, as hypothesized in the present research.  There is general 
recognition in the literature that platform investing is especially applicable in highly 
turbulent environments in which specific sources of uncertainty are less relevant than a 
broad lack of predictability generally resulting from the combined effect of multiple 
sources of uncertainty acting jointly.  Additional empirical study of platform-type 
resource commitments in the context of real options theory is needed to clarify these 
possibilities, focusing on other formulations of uncertainty which incorporate technology 
uncertainty and total uncertainty as possibly having more explanatory value than the 
concepts of market and competitive uncertainty as operationalized in the present research.  
Finally, the highly significant main effect relationship found in the regressions between 
strategic orientation and platform (b = .388, p < .000 using perceived data and b = .403,  
p < .000 using objective data) indicates that strategy plays a substantial role in decisions 
to invest in platforms. 
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In fact, a striking result of the regression analysis generally is the prominence of 
strategic considerations as an explanatory factor in real options decision patterns.  Four of 
the six real options constructs examined demonstrated a significant positive relationship 
to the strategic orientation control variable, as shown in Table 5.4.  
 
Table 5.4 
Significant Regression Analysis Results for Strategic Orientation 
and Real Options Decision Patterns (P Value) 
 Perceived 
Uncertainty 
Measures 
Objective 
Uncertainty 
Measures 
   
Deferral .035 .024 
Staging .000 .000 
Operating Flexibility .006 .009 
Platform .000 .000 
 
Two aspects of these results are notable.  First is the high degree of significance of the 
relationships, indicating that strategic orientation is strongly correlated with real options 
behavior in general.  Comparing these results to those for the environmental uncertainty 
variables which are the principal focus of this research suggests that strategic response to 
uncertainty is as much or more influential in determining real options behavior than 
uncertainty itself.   
 Second is the specific nature of the relationships revealed.  Some are readily 
interpretable.  For example, the close relationship between strategic orientation and 
platform investing is unsurprising, given that the strategic orientation variable reflects the 
characteristics of the Miles & Snow (1978) prospector strategic type.  Companies 
oriented toward innovation, responsiveness to change, product/market leadership and 
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expansion of their business domain are arguably likely to pursue platform-creating 
resource commitments.  Similarly, the strong relationship between strategic orientation 
and operating flexibility makes sense, since maintaining such flexibility would arguably 
be attractive for companies oriented toward new products and markets and that 
emphasize the ability to adapt to change.  
 Less intuitive are the relationships between strategic orientation and the deferral 
and staging real options decision patterns.  Both these decision patterns are “protective” 
in character in that companies employ them in order to learn more and adapt before 
committing (in the case of deferral) or committing wholly (in the case of staging).  It is 
not immediately apparent that such patterns would be common among companies 
oriented to growth, expansion and product/market leadership.  Yet this research strongly 
suggests that they are.  Prominent by its absence is the lack of any significant relationship 
between strategic orientation and acceleration.  These results seem to indicate that 
companies oriented to growth and leadership do invest aggressively in growth (platform) 
and flexibility (operating flexibility), but that they also rely on cautious timing (deferral 
and staging) in pursuing growth, and are not prone to rushing ahead by accelerating.  In 
short, prospector-like firms appear to employ a wide range of real options decision 
patterns, suggesting that one of the implicit characteristics of prospectors is that they are 
active users of real options decision principles generally.   
5.4    Discussion – Relationships between Uncertainty, Real Options Decision 
Patterns and Performance 
 
In the second stage of the research, I explored empirically the relationships 
between uncertainty, real options decision patterns and performance.  The finding of 
significant support for the hypothesized performance relationships for three of the six real 
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options decision patterns (deferral, acceleration and staging) lends empirical evidence to 
three basic contentions of this research: (1) that real options decision-making is 
systematically related to firm performance, (2) that there is no inherently or universally 
optimal decision pattern but instead (3) that the relationship between decision patterns 
and performance is mediated by the relative presence of market and competitive 
uncertainty.  The impact of each decision pattern on performance depends on its 
appropriateness to the uncertainty characteristics of the environment in which it is 
undertaken, where different types of uncertainty often represent competing incentives and 
disincentives for the same action.  
 Market uncertainty, for example, constitutes an incentive to defer and to stage, 
since both provide opportunity to clarify and adapt to that uncertainty.  In both cases, 
however, competitive uncertainty creates an offsetting disincentive to do so since delay 
and serial progress expose the focal firm to partial or total preemption.  Similarly, 
competitive uncertainty provides an incentive to accelerate resource commitments in 
order to “get out in front” of competitors, but market uncertainty provides a competing 
disincentive to do so since acceleration creates the risk of premature commitment when 
the magnitude and composition of demand are not clear.  Only when these decision 
patterns are aligned with the relative weight of the two dimensions of uncertainty do they 
contribute to performance.  
 The performance analysis did not however support the hypothesized relationships 
for three of the real options decision patterns.  In the case of operating flexibility, for 
example, the analysis did find a significant three-way interaction relationship, but one 
contrary to that expected.  I hypothesized that operating flexibility in response to market 
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uncertainty would enhance performance, while the analysis suggests it in fact detracts 
from performance (Figure 5.8a).  Conversely, I hypothesized that operating flexibility in 
conditions of high competitive uncertainty would detract from performance, while the 
analysis indicates that it is positively associated with performance in that case (Figure 
5.8b).  These results warrant a reconsideration of theory associated with operating 
flexibility.  Closer examination of the results suggests that operating flexibility does not 
respond to market and competitive uncertainty in the same way as the other real options 
decision patterns.  Specifically, it appears that a combination of market and competitive 
uncertainty rather than market uncertainty alone makes operating flexibility a 
performance-enhancing strategy. 
A matrix summary of the four MU/CU conditions drawn from Figures 5.8a and 
5.8b highlights this interpretation (Figure 5.10).  When both MU and CU are low, 
operating flexibility has a slightly negative relationship to performance (quadrant I).  This 
finding is plausible, indicating that the value of operating flexibility is low when there is 
little uncertainty generally.  The same is true when MU is low but CU is high (quadrant 
II), confirming that operating flexibility does not improve performance in the absence of 
market uncertainty.   However, when CU is low but MU is high (quadrant III), the effect 
of operating flexibility on performance is strongly negative, suggesting that market 
uncertainty alone does not make operating flexibility a performance-enhancing strategy.  
It is only when both MU and CU are high (quadrant IV) that operating flexibility has a 
positive performance effect.  
 Although contrary to the hypothesized relationships, this result is theoretically 
plausible.  The ability to change operating levels, inputs and product mix easily and at 
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low cost is arguably valuable in responding to unpredictable competitor actions as well as 
to demand-related uncertainties.  These considerations suggest the following proposition: 
P2: Operating flexibility will be positively correlated with performance when 
aggregate environmental uncertainty is high, and negatively correlated when 
aggregate uncertainty is low.  
 
Figure 5.10 
Operating Flexibility Interaction Summary 
(Relationship to Performance) 
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In the case of partial commitment, it alone among the six real options decision 
patterns showed no significant performance-related interactive relationships with market 
or competitive uncertainty.  Further, it is the only decision pattern for which a main effect 
relationship to performance was found.  The analysis revealed a significant (b = 1.846,  
p =.038) positive main effect relationship between partial commitment and growth, based 
on perceived uncertainty data.   
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I interpret these results as due in large measure to the narrowness of the partial 
commitment scale.  As noted earlier, the scale was considerably reduced in scope as a 
result of the factor analysis to include specific deal structures (joint ventures, minority 
investments and alliances), rather than the broader concept of reversible, toehold resource 
commitments originally intended.  That such  specific transaction types appear directly 
related to growth is plausible, but may be more a reflection of strategy than uncertainty, 
to the extent that companies pursuing growth strategies are arguably more likely to 
engage in them than other firms.  Based on these considerations, I conclude that the 
analysis has produced no conclusive result as regards those resource commitments 
designed to establish limited, reversible or expandable positions in areas of interest. 
 Finally, as regards platform investments, the unexpected analysis results merit 
closer examination, particularly given the high significance level of the three-way 
interaction found for the growth performance metric (b = -4.089, p ≤ .000) and the 
prominence of the platform construct in the literature regarding real options and strategy.  
I hypothesized that market uncertainty would not make platform a performance-
enhancing real options strategy in the absence of competitive uncertainty, since without 
competitive uncertainty there would be no incentive to “get a jump on” the future and 
that therefore the costs associated with creating platforms would reduce performance.  
Firms could instead simply wait and adapt to the future as it emerged.  The presence of 
competitive uncertainty, however, makes platform desirable by creating competitive 
advantage and/or avoiding preemption.  By this reasoning too, absent market uncertainty, 
there would be little value in platform investments, regardless of the level of competitive 
uncertainty, since platform makes little sense when future market evolution is clear.  
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Accordingly H10a and 10b predict that platform would be positively associated with 
performance only when both market and competitive uncertainty are high. 
 The contrary analysis results suggest a different dynamic underlying the 
relationship between platform and performance.  A matrix summary drawn from Figures 
5.9a and 5.9b assists in explaining these results (Figure 5.11).  When both MU and CU 
are low (quadrant I), platform is negatively associated with performance, in this case 
growth, consistent with H10a.  In other terms, when there is low uncertainty generally, 
there is little rationale to invest in platforms.  However, when MU is high and CU low 
(quadrant III), platform is positively related to the growth metric.  While contrary to 
H10a, this result is not entirely counter-intuitive, suggesting that when market uncertainty 
is high, platform produces growth even when competitive uncertainty is low.  Put in other 
words, being prepared for unknown future market conditions contributes to growth, and 
that contribution increases with market uncertainty. 
 When MU is low and CU high (quadrant II), platform is positively associated 
with performance. Though contrary to expectation, this result is, again, theoretically 
plausible.  It suggests that even when market uncertainty is low, platform investments can 
create preferential access to opportunities, resulting in growth.  In this respect, platform is 
analogous to acceleration, which is also positively associated with performance when 
MU is low and CU high (Figure 5.6a).  In effect, platform may be viewed as akin to 
acceleration, with the key differences that (1) platform is not just early action but very 
early action and (2) the specific future opportunities to which platform creates access are 
not known when the investment is made, as they are in the case of acceleration.  
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Figure 5.11 
Platform Interaction Summary 
(Relationship to Performance) 
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More troublesome are the results when both market and competitive uncertainty 
are high (quadrant IV).  In this case, platform is negatively associated with performance, 
and strongly so.  Contrary to my expectation that platform would be positively related to 
performance only when both CU and MU are high, quadrants II and III indicate in effect 
that platform is a growth-enhancing real options strategy when either market or 
competitive uncertainty is high, but not both.  
In short, the results indicate that platform is a poor real options strategy in exactly 
those uncertainty conditions – both high CU and MU – where theory suggests it is most 
valuable.  There are several possible explanations for this finding.  The first relates to 
technology uncertainty.  Since, as noted earlier, platform is closely associated with 
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technology investments, inclusion of technology uncertainty in the analysis may be 
necessary to fully understand its performance impact.  Since the present study does 
not include technology uncertainty as a variable, the results arguably represent an 
incomplete examination of the construct.  
A second interpretation is that, while investment in knowledge, technology or 
capability platforms may be a theoretically appropriate response to very high uncertainty 
environments, it is not effective in practice, for one or both of two possible reasons.  The 
first is that platform investments may be a zero-sum game in environments characterized 
by both high MU and CU.  If all firms facing high competitive and market uncertainty 
invest in creating platforms for capitalizing on future opportunities, some may succeed, 
but not all can, and the effort in the aggregate may reduce performance for all 
competitors as a group.  This would explain the differences between quadrants III and IV 
in Figure 5.11.  If true, this reading has worrisome implications for the substantial 
literature that gives prominence to platform as a productive competitive strategy. 
The second reason is that firms may not on the whole employ the platform 
strategy effectively.  Platform investing by definition entails substantial resource 
commitments which do not yield identifiable performance rewards.  Inappropriate or 
excessive commitments of this type can therefore hurt performance.  This interpretation 
is not without foundation in both the academic and practitioner domains.  For example, 
the dangers of overinvestment in R&D, coupled with the difficulty of assessing the 
productivity of R&D efforts, have been a persistent concern among senior managers.  
Further, platform investing is especially vulnerable to ineffectiveness in abandonment 
decisions, resulting from such effects as escalation of commitment and sunk cost bias 
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(Staw, 1981).  The emphasis placed by some authors the importance of abandonment in 
real options decision-making (Adner & Levinthal, 2004a) provides foundation for the 
possibility that platform investing as actually implemented by firms is susceptible to the 
performance-reducing effects of overinvestment and undue persistence in the 
management of real options. 
A final consideration in interpreting these results is the long lead times which may 
obtain between investment and positive performance outcomes.  Platform investments 
especially are long-term in nature. They are undertaken with the knowledge that they are 
unlikely to produce positive performance effects in the short term – in fact they may have 
negative short-term performance consequences to the extent that they incur costs – but 
will do so over the long haul.  Their ultimate performance impacts may therefore elude 
detection in a cross-sectional study such as the present one.  I note, however, that this 
interpretation implies an aggregate change over time among companies in their 
investment in platforms.  Absent such a change, performance in the time frame analyzed 
would reflect the benefits of platform investments made in the past.  There is no 
foundation for believing that there has been such a change. 
None of these interpretations is in my view conclusive.  Nevertheless, the absence 
of a finding in this research that platform investment is positively associated with growth 
or any other performance metric in high uncertainty environments runs contrary to a 
substantial theoretical literature and raises questions about the value of platform as a 
performance-enhancing strategy.  More focused empirical analysis of platform investing 
in relation to performance therefore seems an important future research priority, as 
discussed further in Chapter 6. 
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Apart from the specific regression results, an additional aspect of the performance 
analysis merits discussion, namely the absence of any significant relationships between 
real options decision patterns and the return on assets performance indicator (see Table 
5.2).  All the significant relationships found relate to the growth and MTB performance 
metrics.  I propose as an explanation for this outcome the fact that return on assets, like 
other profitability indicators, is heavily conditioned by asset choices and resource 
commitments from the past.  To the extent that the real options decision patterns as a 
group relate to incremental asset choices, their effect on profit performance may be 
masked by the effect of legacy assets.  The other performance metrics used, by contrast, 
are more direct measures of current/recent resource allocation choices.  Growth, for 
example, is inherently incremental, relating directly to such action patterns as 
acceleration, partial commitment and platform investments.  The market-to-book metric 
conceptually incorporates the impact of profitability on firm value, but also encompasses 
investor expectations regarding future performance as a function of the asset choices the 
firm has made recently or is making currently.  Such outcomes may not be reflected in 
profit measures for some time into the future.  
 This interpretation has implications for future research into real options theory 
and performance.  As described in Chapter 2, there has been virtually no research into the 
relationship between real options theory and firm performance, and work in this area is 
an important direction for future research.  The performance results of this study argue 
that such future research efforts should emphasize those performance indicators most 
suitable conceptually to real options theory.  Specifically, the results presented here 
suggest performance metrics that isolate to the maximum extent possible performance 
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outcomes from recent/current resource allocation decisions in relation to real options 
theory in preference to metrics which aggregate such outcomes with those deriving from 
historical assets and positions.  Further, to the extent that real options theory is heavily 
oriented toward creating growth and value rather than maximizing near-term profitability, 
it would appear that metrics which directly address those dimensions of performance are 
more suitable than historical profitability for measuring the performance impacts of real 
options management of the firm. 
5.5  General Discussion 
In this section I discuss two notable aspects of the research which relate to both 
stages of the project.  First, why support was found for the hypothesized relationships for 
only some of the real options decision patterns and not others is an important point for 
discussion.  Table 5.5 summarizes by decision pattern the hypothesized relationships that 
received support and those that did not.  In both stages of the analysis significant 
relationships were found only for the first three decision patterns (deferral, acceleration 
and staging). 
 
Table 5.5 
Summary of Supported Relationships 
 Stage 1 Analysis 
(Uncertainty and RODP) 
 
Stage 2 Analysis 
(RODP and Performance) 
Deferral Not Supported Supported 
Acceleration Supported Supported 
Staging Supported Supported 
Operating Flexibility Not Supported Not Supported 
Partial Commitment Not Supported Not Supported 
Platform Not Supported Not Supported 
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I believe that this result can be cogently explained with reference to the nature of the 
individual real options constructs themselves.  There is a conceptual distinction among 
them that corresponds to the pattern of analysis results as shown in the table.  The first 
three decision patterns – deferral, acceleration and staging – address the temporal aspects 
of resource commitments, that is, when things are done.  The remaining three – operating 
flexibility, partial commitment and platform – relate to what kind of resource 
commitments are made, independent of timing considerations.  The hypotheses supported 
in both stages of the study relate exclusively to the “when” real options constructs.  None 
of the hypotheses regarding the “what” constructs received support. 
 This explanation directs attention to timing decisions as the most central aspect of 
real options theory as a response to environmental uncertainty.  Such a re-focusing 
represents a return to the earliest research interest in real options, which emphasized 
timing decisions as the primary application of real options thinking in resource allocation.  
There is a substantial literature dating from the 1980’s and early 1990’s, largely in the 
finance and management science domains, that addresses deferral and staging in 
particular as responses to environmental uncertainty.  By contrast, the present study 
suggests that other real options decision patterns affecting the kinds of resource 
commitments made do not appear significantly influenced by the level of market and 
competitive uncertainty, but are driven by other factors, including capital constraints, 
strategy and possibly technological uncertainty.  
That both stages of the analysis reflect the same clear difference in results 
between the timing and non-timing decision patterns makes this interpretation especially 
compelling. 
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 A further notable feature of this research has been the parallel use of both 
perceived and objective data for the main independent variables – market and competitive 
uncertainty.  This aspect of the project has provided a rare opportunity to examine the 
relationship between two approaches, both of which have substantial support in the fields 
of organization and strategy, and whose relative merits, as described in Chapter 4, have 
been extensively debated.  Although not the principal focus of the research, this dual 
approach yielded analysis results and insights which merit discussion.  Three issues in 
particular deserve comment. 
 First, the perceived and objective data developed to represent market and 
competitive uncertainty are not convergent.  Table 5.6 displays the Pearson correlations 
for all measures of the uncertainty variables developed in the study.  For market 
uncertainty, the table shows the perceived measure based on survey data (PMU) and four 
alternate objective measures (COV5, COV10, SE/M5 and SE/M10).  All are based on the 
same underlying data on the value of shipments by industry drawn from the Annual 
Survey of Manufacturers.  The four variations represent two time periods (five and ten 
years) and two commonly-used metrics for measuring the variability in the year-to-year 
data (the coefficient of variation of first differences and the standard error of the 
regression coefficient divided by the mean of the data).  As described in Chapter 4, all 
four variations have support in the literature as appropriate for research projects such as 
this one.  Also shown are both perceived and objective measures of competitive 
uncertainty (PCU and OCU respectively).  The table shows that there is no significant 
relationship between (1) perceived and objective competitive uncertainty, or (2) 
perceived market uncertainty and any of the four variants for objective market 
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Table 5.6 
 
Pearson Correlations for Perceived and Objective Uncertainty Measures 
 
 PMU COV5 COV10 SE/M5 SE/M10 PCU 
       
PMU       
COV-5 Yrs -.001      
COV-10 Yrs .069 .514**     
SE/Mean-5 Yrs .068 .222** .362**    
SE/Mean – 10 Yrs .001   .139 .492** .731**   
PCU .088   .072   .028   .142 .110  
OCU -.020  -.104  -.190*  -.292**    -.249** .051 
 
** Significant at the .01 level 
*Significant at the .05 level 
 
 
uncertainty.  In effect, the perceived and objective operationalizations of environmental 
uncertainty do not appear to be related. 
 Second, the four variants for objective market uncertainty are only imperfectly 
correlated to each other.  While in most cases there is a significant correlation among 
them, that is not true in all cases, and the degree of correlation is uniformly well below 
1.0, surprising given that all are based on the same underlying data series.  That these 
differences between alternate ways of measuring the variability in the same times series 
is analytically important is demonstrated by the regression analysis results.  Table 5.7 
displays the results of the uncertainty/real options decision pattern regression analysis 
using each of the four variants for objective market uncertainty.  The table notes all main 
effects and interactions significant to the level of P ≤ .10.  Each of the four variants 
produced substantially different results, with numerous instances when using one variant 
detected relationships that did not emerge using the others.  
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Table 5.7 
 
 
Summary of Regression Results for Objective Measures of Uncertainty – Main Effects and Interactions (P Value) 
 
 
 
 C of Var – 5 Years  C of Var – 10 Years  SE/Mean – 5 Years  SE/Mean - 10 Years 
 
MU CU MxC  MU CU MxC  MU CU MxC  MU CU MxC 
                
Deferral -- -- .087  -- -- --  -- .100 --  .090 .063 -- 
Acceleration -- -- --  -- -- --  -- -- --  -- -- -- 
Staging -- --   -- -- --  -- -- .049  -- -- .077 
Operating Flexibility -- -- .052  .069 -- .071  -- -- --  .059 -- -- 
Partial Commitment -- -- --  .064 -- --  .034 -- --  -- -- -- 
Platform -- .088 --  -- .073 --  -- .103 --  -- .058 -- 
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effects and interactions significant to the level of P ≤ .10.  Each of the four variants 
produced substantially different results, with numerous instances when using one variant 
detected relationships that did not emerge using the others.  
 Third, there was only limited consistency in the regression analysis results 
between the perceived and objective data.  In the analysis of the relationship between 
uncertainty and real options decision patterns, only one of the two significant interactions 
detected (staging) was present using both perceived and objective measures.  The other 
(acceleration) was found only with perceived data.  In the performance regressions, none 
of the six significant interactions revealed using perceived uncertainty data were 
replicated using objective data.  These results are consistent with the divergence in 
perceived and objective uncertainty measures noted earlier, and dramatize the impact of 
that divergence on the regression analysis.  Finally, it is notable that perceived 
uncertainty measures proved much more fertile overall than objective measures in 
generating significant results in both stages of the analysis. 
 In short, at least in this project, the fundamental research findings proved highly 
sensitive to both the selection of basic method (perceived versus objective data) and, 
within objective data, to alternate procedures for using the same underlying time series.  
It was not the purpose of this research to draw conclusions about the relative merits of 
perceived and objective data.  However, the project did reveal several aspects about the 
use of objective data which may contribute to that discussion.  First, I found that alternate 
protocols for measuring the variability of the same data – neither demonstrably superior 
to the other – produced substantially different results.  The use of two different time 
horizons, again neither of which is inherently the better choice, also produced material 
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differences in results.  Here the researcher is faced with an irresolvable tradeoff.  The 
shorter of the two horizons has the benefit of greater contemporaneity, while the longer 
has the benefit of more stable measurement results.  Neither is conceptually superior to 
the other, nor is there a definitive basis for concluding that one is inherently a better 
measure of the relevant uncertainty for decision-making.  
 As described in Chapter 4, the literature regarding the relative merits of perceived 
and objective uncertainty measures focuses principally on the theoretical suitability of the 
two approaches.  In this research, I found that more mundane procedural issues 
associated with objective data have a significant bearing on the relative usefulness of the 
two approaches.  Despite the aura of precision and factuality that surrounds objective 
data, the high sensitivity of measurements to alternate methods for selecting and utilizing 
it gives to the resulting metrics an indeterminate quality for which there is no clear basis 
for resolution.  Based on the present research, it is the conclusion of this author that 
perceived measurements represent the more appropriate choice for operationalizing the 
uncertainty construct in empirical analysis of real options theory. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
 This project has established, for certain classes of real options-theoretic decision 
patterns, that two central premises regarding real options as strategic theory are 
empirically justified.  First, there is no inherently or universally optimal real options 
decision pattern.  The appropriateness of any decision pattern depends on the relative 
presence of different sources of uncertainty, and those different sources of uncertainty 
frequently comprise countervailing incentives and disincentives for the same decision 
pattern.  Second, the project represents the first empirical confirmation that real options 
principles are positively associated with firm performance, and has further clarified that 
those performance impacts are also mediated by the relative presence of different sources 
of uncertainty.  These results have significant implications for both practice and research, 
which I examine here.  I conclude with a discussion of the limitations of this investigation 
and suggestions for future research. 
6.1  Implications for Practice 
 This research has several implications for management practice.  First and most 
prominently, the finding that real options decision patterns have a measurable and 
systematic influence on performance indicates that real options theory is in fact relevant 
to practice.  In this respect, the research provides empirical justification for decisions that 
depart from the traditional decision rule that firms should act on opportunities when and 
only when the expected net present value of doing so is equal to or greater than zero.  The 
study suggests that making decisions consistent with real options principles can 
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contribute to company performance, and warrants efforts by companies to align their 
decision-making with those principles.  In short, real options are real world. 
 The research also indicates, however, that achieving such alignment is not easy or 
straightforward.  In demonstrating that no decision pattern is inherently superior, it lays 
the foundation for a contingent view of real options decision-making:  firms need to 
carefully and realistically assess the suitability of specific decision patterns in light of the 
level of market and competitive uncertainty surrounding those decisions.  That task is 
complicated by the fact that different sources of uncertainty frequently create competing 
incentives and disincentives to act in certain ways.  In the case of deferral, for example, 
market uncertainty makes it a valuable strategy but competitive uncertainty argues 
against it.  How to act is clear in the absence of one or the other source of uncertainty.  
However, circumstances in which there is some degree of both are arguably more 
representative of the conditions under which most decisions are actually made.  In such 
cases, there is no clear normative basis for assessing the net effect of the contest between 
market and competitive uncertainty.  Hence considerable management judgment is 
required to employ real options principles effectively in practice.  
 These considerations suggest that, from the perspective of practice, real options 
decision-making may best be thought of as a firm capability rather than a decision 
strategy.  Real options principles are relatively easy to understand; it is implementing 
them well that is hard.  Realistic appraisal of uncertainty and balancing competing 
sources of uncertainty in making decisions is one dimension of this capability directly 
highlighted by this research.  Others touched on less directly include the ability to learn 
from and reshape resource commitments as they proceed (staging) and effectiveness in 
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recognizing when resource commitments no longer justify pursuit and abandoning them 
in a timely manner in that circumstance.  In summary, enhancing performance through 
real options reasoning is more a function of creating organizational processes, practices 
and skills that make the firm effective at managing real options than adopting a specific 
decision pattern.  
 A final managerial implication is that firms in general may be systematically 
underutilizing deferral as a decision strategy for responding to market uncertainty.  In this 
respect the results of this research hearken back to a number of early real options authors 
who maintained that firms do not optimally time resource commitments and that the 
performance loss associated with such mis-timing can be substantial (McDonald & 
Siegel, 1986; Tiesberg, 1994).  Firms, Kester said, routinely commit before they need to 
(1984).   
 Comparison of the research results for deferral in the two analysis stages of the 
present research lends credence to this view.  The analysis of uncertainty and real options 
decision patterns failed to establish any significant relationships, either as a main effect or 
interaction, between deferral and market uncertainty, but did reveal a negative main 
effect relationship between deferral and competitive uncertainty.  As discussed in Chapter 
5, this result suggests that competitive uncertainty overwhelms market uncertainty as a 
determinant of deferral behavior.  The performance analysis, however, suggests that this 
heavy emphasis on competitive uncertainty in deferral decisions has negative 
performance consequences.  There I found that a positive relationship between deferral 
and market uncertainty was associated with better performance (as measured by growth) 
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when competitive uncertainty is low, indicating that deferral is a performance-enhancing 
decision strategy under those conditions. 
 Taken together, these results imply a general bias against deferral.  Put in other 
terms, companies appear to overweight competitive uncertainty and underweight market 
uncertainty in evaluating deferral decisions.  As noted in Chapter 5, there is evidence 
from the domain of decision psychology that such a bias may exist.  From the perspective 
of practice, these considerations suggest that firms should more carefully and objectively 
appraise the merits of deferral as a decision strategy when there is material market 
uncertainty to avoid the negative performance consequences of premature commitment.  
6.2  Implications for Research 
 The idea of real options as a corporate capability also has implications for the 
study of real options in the strategy field.  Much of the real options-related strategy 
literature has focused on real options as a broad reasoning pattern or heuristic that 
explains why firms make certain kinds of resource commitments.  Framed in this way, 
real options provides theoretical foundation for a range of strategic actions, and has been 
used primarily as an explanatory framework for certain strategic behaviors.  The present 
research suggests that a richer understanding of real options and strategy may be derived 
from closer study of real options as a competence that makes some firms more effective 
than others as managers of real options.   
 Reframing research efforts around real options as a capability opens the door to 
connecting real options theory with a number of other strands in strategy research, 
including the resource-based and knowledge-based views of the firm, both of which have 
so far been only peripherally visible in the real options literature.  Several specific areas 
  
149
 
of investigation suggest themselves here.  Are some firms, for example, better at creating 
value through a real options-based approach to strategic management?  If so, what are the 
elements that contribute to differences in real options effectiveness?  How can real 
options effectiveness be measured in the first place?  How do the components of real 
options effectiveness relate to other conceptually affiliated strategic constructs such as 
organizational learning and knowledge management?    
 An additional implication of this study is that real options research would benefit 
from a more articulated view of uncertainty in relation to real options.  It is non-
controversial that real options theory is explicitly a framework for making decisions 
under conditions of uncertainty.  However, the real options literature has for the most part 
assumed that uncertainty is uniform and omnipresent, implicitly making real options 
theory relevant in the same way for all firms under all conditions.  The present study has 
demonstrated, by contrast, that both real options behavior and its performance 
consequences vary with the magnitude and source of uncertainty.  The findings presented 
here open the door to research efforts aimed at achieving a better understanding of the 
relationships between uncertainty, real options-theoretic decisions and performance.  The 
concepts of market and competitive uncertainty that have been examined here do not 
exhaust the opportunities to connect the real options and uncertainty literatures.  Other 
uncertainty sources of interest in this regard include technological uncertainty (about 
which I will say more below), uncertainty in turbulent and emergent environments, and 
macroeconomic uncertainty (such as interest rates, inflation and economic cycles). 
 Differentiating by source of uncertainty, however, is not the only opportunity to 
link the study of real options to a multidimensional conceptualization of uncertainty.  
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There is, for example, an important stream in the uncertainty literature that examines 
different types of uncertainty.  Milliken (1987) distinguished between three types of 
uncertainty: (1) state uncertainty (uncertainty about the state of the environment and/or 
the interrelationships among elements within it); (2) effect uncertainty (uncertainty about 
the impact that the environment will have on the organization); and (3) response 
uncertainty (uncertainty regarding the range of available responses and their outcomes).  
Conant (1967) proposed a similar taxonomy, but added the further conceptual distinction 
between bounded uncertainty (uncertainty about specific variables with clear metrics and 
a definable range of outcomes) and unbounded uncertainty (where neither all relevant 
variables nor their range of possible outcomes can be defined).  Other authors have 
differentiated between uncertainties that are subject to resolution with time (such as the 
cost of producing a new product) versus those which are continuous (such as changes in 
customer tastes).  
 These variations in the type of uncertainty encountered are evocative from the 
perspective of real options, but have not yet been explored in that context.  Specifically, 
real options decision making patterns are likely to vary systematically based on the type 
of uncertainty encountered.  Real options theory, for example, suggests that deferral is a 
directionally optimal decision strategy in response to uncertainties that are state and 
effect related, bounded and resolvable.  For such uncertainties, waiting can yield a high 
degree of uncertainty resolution, and therefore has a high option value.  When, however, 
uncertainties are unbounded and/or continuous, deferral yields limited benefits, making it 
directionally an inferior strategy.  Waiting in this case can become paralysis.  Similarly, 
deferral is arguably not the optimal strategy for dealing with response uncertainty, since 
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simply waiting does little to identify and test action possibilities and consequences.  In 
these cases, alternative real options decision patterns seem appropriate.  Investment in 
platforms and operating flexibility, for example, appear better strategies for unbounded 
and continuous uncertainty.  Similarly, partial commitment and platform are likely to 
prove more productive decision strategies when response uncertainty predominates, since 
they entail exploration of alternate courses of action.  These considerations suggest the 
following propositions: 
 
P3:   Different types of uncertainty (state/effect/response, bounded/unbounded, 
resolvable/continuous) are associated with different real options decision 
patterns. 
 
P4:   Consistency between the type of uncertainty and real options decision 
patterns are positively associated with performance.  
 
 
An additional uncertainty dimension that has the potential to shed light on real 
options behavior is controllability.  A number of authors have observed that some 
uncertainties are more amenable to control or influence by the firm than others (Buchko, 
1994; Sutcliffe & Huber, 1998).  Companies, for example, can have some degree of 
control over demand uncertainty through advertising, promotion and pricing.  They may 
directly influence technology uncertainty through R&D.  Large companies in particular 
may enjoy the resources needed to exert such influence.  But no firms exert control over 
uncertainties associated, for example, with the economy as a whole, or with geopolitical 
developments.  
The controllability dimension of uncertainty is especially relevant to the study of 
real options since real options theory rests explicitly on the insight that management 
action has the effect of partially endogenizing uncertainty.  As described in Chapter 2, the 
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theory ascribes value to management’s ability to maximize value by acting flexibly and 
wisely in response to unforeseen events.  Consistent with this aspect of the theory, it is 
plausible to expect that firms will employ different real options decision patterns 
depending on the degree of influence they have (or perceive that they have) over future 
events.  High levels of control/influence suggest acceleration and investment in 
platforms, while deferral and staging appear more suitable in the face of uncertainties 
which are entirely beyond the firm’s control.  I suggest therefore the following 
proposition: 
P5:    Real options decision patterns will vary systematically with the degree of 
control (perceived or actual) that the firm has over uncertainty.  
 
In summary, in the author’s opinion, more concerted effort to connect the study of 
real options with the large literature on uncertainty represents one of the most prominent 
and potentially fruitful avenues for future real options research. 
 Finally, the very different findings in this research for the timing and non-timing 
real options decision patterns have implications for future research.  As described earlier, 
this project failed to find any significant relationships between uncertainty and behavior 
in the case of operating flexibility, partial commitments and platform investments, or 
between those decision patterns and performance.  This outcome does not square well 
with the substantial theoretical literature that interprets these types of resource 
commitments in real options terms and that implies that they are performance-enhancing 
decision strategies for dealing with uncertainty.  This study does not so much disprove 
these interpretations as suggest that more concerted empirical study is required to connect 
the non-timing real options decision patterns more conclusively to real options theory. 
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 The issue is most pressing in the case of platform investments, which include a 
broad range of resource commitments – including technology, knowledge, and 
capabilities – that are closely connected to other influential strategy theory such as the 
resource-based and knowledge-based views of the firm, but for which the present study 
has failed to find any confirmatory empirical relationships to either uncertainty or 
performance.  Given the prominence of the platform construct in strategy theory, 
empirical research is needed to test whether platform investments in fact contribute to 
firm performance and if so, what kinds of platforms and under what circumstances. 
6.3  Limitations and Future Directions 
 One limitation of the present study is its exclusive focus on manufacturing 
companies.  The manufacturing sector represents a large portion of the economy and 
includes a broad spectrum of industries, making the results of the study highly 
generalizable.  The research leaves unanswered, however, what role real options decision 
patterns play in other sectors of the economy, for example services and natural resources.  
The service sector seems especially ripe for real options research attention.  Given the 
structural and strategic differences between services and manufacturing, the relationships 
examined here may prove different for service companies (Heskett, 1986; Mills & 
Moburg, 1982).  The present research, for example, has identified capital intensity as an 
important determinant of some real options decision patterns.  Service firms may be 
characterized by lower and less irreversible capital requirements, and may not therefore 
show comparable relationships.  At the same time, however, real options theory is not 
sector specific, and it is reasonable to anticipate that companies in other sectors would 
demonstrate similar relationships between market and competitive uncertainty and real 
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options decision patterns to those found here.  Empirical study of real options in other 
industrial sectors than manufacturing is therefore warranted, and constitutes an important 
opportunity for future research.  Specific questions of interest include:  What constitutes 
real options-theoretic decision patterns in service industries?  Are they different from 
those applicable to manufacturing?  Are there systematic relationships between market 
and competitive uncertainty and those decision patterns?  Are they different from 
manufacturing?  
 As noted earlier, a further limitation of the present research is that it does not 
incorporate an analysis of technological uncertainty in relation to real options resource 
allocation practices.  In the interest of analytical tractability, I have focused on two 
important sources of uncertainty with clear theoretical linkages to real options.  
Unpredictable future technological developments and costs, however, arguably constitute 
a third source of uncertainty which in theory should induce real options-theoretic 
resource allocation decisions.  Technology investments were one of the earliest domains 
to attract research attention in the real options literature, and there is a considerable body 
of both theoretical and normative research that elaborates on option-like practices in 
technology development.  Platform investments and staging represent two such behavior 
patterns.  I am , however, aware of no empirical literature that examines the relationship 
between technological uncertainty and real options decision patterns, making this an 
especially fertile area for future research.  Specific research questions that appear of 
particular interest include the following:  How can technological uncertainty be 
measured?  What technology development and management practices represent real 
options-theoretic ways of responding to that uncertainty?  How does technology 
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uncertainty interact with other sources of uncertainty to condition real options decision 
patterns?  Finally, does the management of technology development along real options 
lines contribute to firm performance? 
A further limitation is that the present research has not included all the 
dimensions of the real options construct that are of research interest.  This study 
represents a first attempt to draw together the many strands of the real options literature 
and translate them into measurable behaviors/decision patterns.  It does not, however, 
pretend to have exhausted the boundaries of what is a large and multifaceted construct.  A 
more comprehensive specification of the dimensions of the real options construct in terms 
amenable to empirical analysis should have high priority on the research agenda.  
Several specific dimensions of the construct not included in the present research 
appear especially worthy of attention.  One is the concept of reversibility.  Real options 
theory suggests that companies would, in the face of uncertainty, seek to maximize their 
ability to undo resource commitments.  At the same time, commitment theory 
(Ghemawat, 1991) argues contrarily that only irreversible commitments can produce 
lasting competitive advantage.  Empirical research aimed at operationalizing the 
reversibility construct and examining its relationship to uncertainty and performance 
would be of considerable interest both in the real options and broader strategy literatures. 
 Similarly, the present research does not directly address the concept of 
abandonment in relation to real options.  Discontinuation of projects (in real options 
terms, letting options expire) is implicit in real options theory (Adner & Levinthal, 2004a 
& 2004b).  Knowing when real options no longer have value and acting promptly to 
cease investing in those that do not is arguably a crucial aspect of effective management 
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of real options.  Yet there has been little theoretical work on the abandonment dimension 
of the real options construct and no empirical research.  The literature on real options as a 
strategic framework is asymmetrical in that it addresses almost exclusively the creation 
and preservation of options as a factor in strategy.  Research into the abandonment 
dimension of the real options construct is overdue.  Questions of interest include the 
following:  Do companies differ in their willingness/ability to divest or abandon 
“expired” options at the appropriate time?   If so, what factors make for those 
differences?  Do the differences have any relationship to performance?  Such research 
will be methodologically challenging.  It will require appropriate metrics for 
operationalizing abandonment, and some methodology for determining what constitutes 
timely versus premature or overdue abandonment.  Nevertheless, I believe that having a 
better understanding of option abandonment is critical to fully understanding the 
relationships between real options theory, strategy and performance.  
 A final limitation of the present study is that the entire analysis has been 
conducted at the level of the firm.  In this study, real options decision patterns have been 
operationalized by survey data reflecting typical or customary practice at each respondent 
company.  Correspondingly, both perceived and objective measures of market and 
competitive uncertainty have been developed at the level of the firm, in effect assuming 
that all resource allocation decisions within the firm share in the same level of 
uncertainty.  This analysis basis was selected to permit a large sample cross-sectional 
study, with the associated benefit of good external validity.  It nevertheless masks 
considerable potential variation in decision patterns within firms.  It is entirely plausible 
that individual companies employ different decision patterns for different kinds of 
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decisions, based, for example, on variations in products, markets or businesses.  
Companies may be more prone to specific decision patterns in their existing core 
business than in entering into new ones.  Different decision patterns are likely to be 
employed for proprietary options not exposed to competitive preemption than for non-
proprietary ones.  In effect, to the extent that market and competitive uncertainty can vary 
widely across resource allocation decisions within any firm, even largely undiversified 
ones, it follows from the central premises of this research as a whole that the decision 
patterns pursued will also vary.  Accordingly, the conceptually appropriate unit of 
analysis may be the decision rather than the collection of decisions comprising the firm. 
 Similarly, the cross-sectional character of the study masks variation over time in 
both market and competitive uncertainty and presumably therefore real options decision 
patterns.  Product technology, customer preferences, unit demand and product mix, and 
the number and behavior of competitors are subject to continuous change, and should, 
given the conceptual premises of the project, produce corresponding changes in decision 
pattern, once again arguing for the individual decision as a relevant unit of analysis. 
 While I believe that the company basis of analysis is an appropriate choice for an 
initial examination of uncertainty/real options/performance relationships, study of real 
options will ultimately need to progress to the level of the individual decision in order to 
fully understand whether and how well companies employ real options principles.  In 
addition to large-sample cross-sectional research, which has been the staple of real 
options research in the strategy field, more focused study of multiple decisions over time 
will be required.  A model for such research is Bower’s (1972) study of capital budgeting 
practices within a single large firm over a multi-year period, which broke ground in 
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demonstrating that the processes and dynamics actually surrounding capital commitment 
decisions depart dramatically from idealized normative capital budgeting standards.  A 
similar small-sample study, conducted from a real options perspective, would provide a 
deeper and more fine-grained understanding of how companies use or do not use real 
options principles across multiple decisions over time. 
Beyond these specific limitations, the present study suggests two additional 
priorities for future real options research.  One is the study of real options behavior in 
relation to strategy variables.  As described in Chapter 2, real options theory has been 
applied generically to a number of strategic phenomena.  However, there has been little 
study of real options in relation to strategic variation.  The significant relationships found 
in the present research between strategic orientation and real options decision patterns 
invite a series of research questions.  Do certain kinds of strategies require or typically 
entail specific kinds of real options decision-making?  Are some strategies inherently 
more option-like than others?  Do variations in strategic type correlate with variations in 
real options decision patterns?  This research has incorporated as a control variable a 
strategic profile similar to the Miles & Snow (1978) prospector type.  Study of other 
strategic types would reveal if there are systematic relationships between them and real 
options decision patterns as well.  Such study would advance the field beyond the 
concept of real options as a broad strategic heuristic toward a more articulated 
understanding of the role of real options in strategy. 
 Research along these lines would also shed light on the relative prominence of 
environmental and strategic variables in determining real options decision patterns.  The 
present research has been based on the premise that variations in the level and source of 
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task environment uncertainty induce consistent real options decision patterns, 
independent of strategy.  That premise has been borne out by the analysis in those 
decision patterns relating to the timing of resource allocations, but notably not as regards 
those affecting the kind of resource allocations made.  In the latter case, this research 
indicates that strategy is clearly more influential than uncertainty as a predictor of 
behavior. 
 A second broad research opportunity is the study of organizational factors as they 
relate to real options decision making.  As discussed earlier, the absence of significant 
relationships between uncertainty, real options decision behavior and performance for 
certain real options decision patterns suggests that the performance consequences of real 
options decision-making may have as much or more to do with how effectively firms 
implement real options principles than with the specific decision patterns they follow.  If 
this is so, inquiry into the organizational characteristics that make for real options 
effectiveness is appropriate.  There has been little research attention paid to the 
intersection of real options and organization.  Some authors have commented broadly on 
organizational factors in the context of real options, including organization structure, 
decision processes, control and incentive systems, knowledge management practices and 
communications.  There has however, been no empirical analysis linking these 
organizational factors to real options.  More broadly, real options theory has direct 
relationships to major streams in the organizational literature in a number of areas, each 
of which suggests research opportunities.  For example, real options theory is explicitly 
about learning and acquiring uncertainty-clarifying information.  What is known about 
organizational learning and knowledge management that is relevant to the study of real 
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options?  Is there, for example, a relationship between “absorptive capacity” and real 
options effectiveness?  Similarly, the real options literature recognizes that options 
management is potentially vulnerable to cognitive imperfections and biases such as 
escalation of commitment, illusion of control and systematic mis-estimation of 
probabilities.  How do companies deal with these effects?  Do they differ in their ability 
to do so, and do those differences affect how well they manage their portfolio of real 
options?  
 In conclusion, McGrath et al. (2004) observed that real options theory is in a 
preparadigmatic stage of development, “poised to occupy a central conceptual position” 
in the strategy field, but still preoccupied with the need to clearly establish its first 
principles (86). The questions they posed nearly five years ago regarding the 
fundamentals of the theory are still open today.  Full exploitation of the potential of real 
options as a strategic framework will require more empirically rigorous and fine-grained 
study.  It is hoped that the present research will contribute to that future body of work. 
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Purpose of the Survey and General Instructions 
 
 
 
This survey is part of a research project that examines company strategic 
investment decisions in relation to features of the external environment. The 
survey focuses on strategically important investments and projects, such as 
new plant investments, R&D, development of new products and services, 
acquisitions and related diversifications.  
 
The survey asks for information regarding typical or usual decision-patterns, 
recognizing that not all decisions will necessarily follow the same pattern. 
Please note that the data of interest is what your company typically does, 
rather than its stated principles for making capital investment decisions. 
 
If your company has more than one line of business, please answer the 
survey questions in the context of your principal business.  
 
This survey is intended to be completed by the CEO, President or other 
senior general executive conversant with the company’s practices in making 
strategic investment and project commitments. It should take approximately 
10-15 minutes to complete. Please return the completed survey within two 
weeks in the enclosed postage paid reply envelope. 
 
We guarantee complete confidentiality to all participating firms. We will use 
only aggregated results, and will under no circumstances reveal the identity of 
the respondents or their companies. 
 
We believe that the results of the study will be of direct interest to executives. 
In recognition of your contribution to the research, we will provide you with 
executive summary of our findings, and will happy to discuss them with you.  
 
If you have any questions about the survey or the study of which it is a part, 
please contact either of the two co-investigators on this project: Mr. Al Boccia 
at (978) 857-0325 (aboccia@som.umass.edu) or Dr. Bruce Skaggs at (413) 
545-5684 (bskaggs@som.umass.edu). 
 
We very much appreciate your help in making this research a success. 
THANK YOU! 
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Survey of Capital Investment Decision-Making Patterns 
 
I. Capital Investment Decision Patterns: This section of the survey assesses specific aspects of your 
company’s decisions regarding strategic investments and projects. In each section, please indicate by 
circling the appropriate number the extent to which you agree or disagree with the statements regarding 
your company’s typical way of making such decisions. 
  
 
A. The following items address how timing considerations typically affect your company’s 
decisions regarding strategic investments and projects.  
 
                      Strongly                             Strongly 
                                 Disagree                               Agree 
 
1. Our investment decisions take into account whether delaying a project 
may improve its attractiveness.  
  
 
 1   
  
 2  
 
 3  
 
4  
 
5  
 
6 
 
7 
2.  We postpone projects which meet our standard investment criteria in 
order to further monitor market developments. 
  
 
 1   
  
 2  
 
 3  
 
4  
 
5  
 
 6 
 
 7 
3. If a project looks sound, we proceed with it rather than invest time and 
money to gather further information regarding its potential success. 
 
 
 1   
  
 2  
 
 3  
 
4  
 
5  
 
 6 
 
 7 
4.  In executing strategic investment projects, getting them done quickly is 
the consideration most important to us. 
 
 
 1   
  
 2  
 
 3  
 
4  
 
5  
 
 6 
 
 7 
5.  We frequently move ahead with projects even when we are not sure of 
their ultimate success. 
 
 1   
  
 2  
 
 3  
 
4  
 
5  
 
 6 
 
 7 
 
 
B. The following items assess the extent to which your company typically takes a staged approach to 
strategic investments and projects.  
 
                     Strongly                              Strongly 
                                Disagree                                Agree 
 
1.  We break investment projects down into stages and evaluate whether or 
not to proceed at the end of each stage. 
 
 
 1   
  
 2  
 
 3  
 
4  
 
5  
 
6 
 
7 
2.  We revise project features (for example, capacity level or technology   
used) throughout the project. 
 
 
 1   
  
 2  
 
 3  
 
4  
 
5  
 
 6 
 
 7 
3.  We revise project schedules and implementation timing throughout the 
project. 
 
 
 1   
  
 2  
 
 3  
 
4  
 
5  
 
 6 
 
 7 
4. We set project milestones and continuously evaluate progress toward 
them. 
 
 
 1   
  
 2  
 
 3  
 
4  
 
5  
 
 6 
 
 7 
5.  We discontinue projects that do not meet expectations once we begin to   
implement them. 
 
 
 1   
  
 2  
 
 3  
 
4  
 
5  
 
 6 
 
 7 
6. Our decisions about whether or not to continue projects are heavily 
influenced by how much we have already invested in them. 
 
 1   
  
 2  
 
 3  
 
4  
 
5  
 
 6 
 
 7 
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C. The following items address how interdependencies among projects are typically 
incorporated in your firm’s strategic investment decisions.  
 
                     Strongly                              Strongly 
                                Disagree                                Agree 
 
1.  Our decisions to invest in projects take into account the benefits that 
these investments create for other projects. 
 
 
 1   
  
 2  
 
 3  
 
4  
 
5  
 
6 
 
7 
2.  When choosing among related projects, we give greatest priority to those 
projects from which we can learn the most.  
 
 
 1   
  
 2  
 
 3  
 
4  
 
5  
 
 6 
 
 7 
3.  When choosing among related projects, we give greatest priority to those 
projects which offer the highest immediate financial rewards.  
 
 
 1   
  
 2  
 
 3  
 
4  
 
5  
 
 6 
 
 7 
4.  When there are several different approaches to the same product/service 
opportunity, we pursue several approaches until the best one becomes 
clear. 
 
 
 1   
  
 2  
 
 3  
 
4  
 
5  
 
 6 
 
 7 
5.  In choosing among related projects, we favor those with a wide range of 
potential outcomes.  
 
 
 1   
  
 2  
 
 3  
 
4  
 
5  
 
 6 
 
 7 
6.  In choosing among related projects, we favor those with a narrow range 
of potential outcomes.  
 
 
 1   
  
 2  
 
 3  
 
4  
 
5  
 
 6 
 
 7 
 
 
 
D. The following items relate to the emphasis your firm places on the ability to make future 
operational changes.  
         
 
                     Strongly                              Strongly 
                                Disagree                               Agree 
 
      When making investments in productive capacity, our company  
      typically: 
 
1. adds capacity in continuous increments rather than large periodic 
additions. 
  
 1    2   3  4  5  6 7 
2.  invests in facilities that allow for easy changes in production levels. 
 
 1    2   3  4  5   6  7 
3.  invests in facilities that allow for easy changes in product/service mix.  
 
 1    2   3  4  5   6  7 
4.  invests in facilities that allow for easy changes in feedstock or raw 
materials.  
 
  
1   
 
 2  
  
3  
 
4  
 
5  
 
 6 
  
7 
5.  invests in capacity in response to demand growth rather than ahead of it.  
 
 1    2   3  4  5   6  7 
6.  places primary emphasis on the ability to easily change operating 
parameters. 
 
 
 1   
  
 2  
 
 3  
 
4  
 
5  
 
 6 
 
 7 
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E. The following items assess how your company typically approaches investing in new 
activities, such as new products/services, new markets for existing products/services, and 
related diversifications.  
 
                     Strongly                              Strongly 
                                Disagree                                Agree 
 
In making investments in new activities, our company typically: 
 
1.  makes modest initial investments that can later be expanded. 
  
 1    2   3  4  5  6 7 
2.  acquires companies smaller than itself as a foothold in the target 
product/service/market. 
 
 
 1   
  
 2  
 
 3  
 
4  
 
5  
 
 6 
 
 7 
3.  acquires minority equity positions in other companies in the target   
product/service/market which can later lead to full acquisition. 
  
 
 1   
  
 2  
 
 3  
 
4  
 
5  
 
 6 
 
 7 
4.  establishes joint ventures, partnerships or alliances. 
 
 1    2   3  4  5   6  7 
5.  seeks out entry options which have a clear exit strategy in case they don’t 
work out. 
 
 
 1   
  
2  
 
 3  
 
4  
 
5  
  
6 
  
7 
6. makes acquisitions that are significant with respect to its own size in order to 
gain a large early position in the target product/service/market. 
 
 
 1   
  
 2  
 
 3  
 
4  
 
5  
 
 6 
 
 7 
 
 
 
F. The following statements assess the extent to which your firm makes investments that do 
not meet its usual standards of financial performance and in what circumstances it 
typically does so.  
 
                     Strongly                              Strongly 
                                Disagree                                Agree 
 
 Our company invests in projects that do not meet our standard 
 financial criteria when they: 
 
1.  offer future growth opportunities not captured in the project 
     financial projections. 
  
 
 1   
 
 2  
 
3  
 
4  
 
5  
 
6 
 
7 
2.  generate important knowledge or experience. 
 
 1    2   3  4  5   6  7 
3.  contribute to important competencies and capabilities. 
 
 1    2   3  4  5   6  7 
4.  establish an early position in an attractive product or market. 
 
 1    2   3  4  5   6  7 
5.  have the potential to yield multiple products/services rather than a single 
product/service. 
 
 1    2   3  4  5   6  7 
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II. External Environment: This section assesses your perceptions of your company’s external 
environment as well as the degree of influence or control the company has over external 
environment factors. 
 
 
 
A. Please rate the predictability of the following dimensions of your company’s business 
environment. 
                                          Unpredictable                       Predictable 
 
1.   Customer demand for existing products/services is.... 
  
1   2  3  4 5  6 7 
2.   Customer demand for new products/services is.... 
 
1    2   3  4  5   6  7 
3.   Customer needs and desires are... 
 
1    2   3  4  5   6  7 
4.   Competitor price actions are....... 
 
1    2   3  4  5   6  7 
5.   Competitor changes in product/service quality are..... 
 
1    2   3  4  5   6  7 
6.   Competitor changes in product/service technology are.... 
 
1    2   3  4  5   6 7 
7.   Competitor introductions of new products/services are.... 
 
1    2   3  4  5   6  7 
8.   The entry of new competitors is... 
 
1    2   3  4  5   6  7 
9.   Changes in product/service technology are... 
 
1    2   3  4  5   6  7 
10. Changes in production process technology are... 
 
1    2   3  4  5   6  7 
11. Changes in materials and component technology are... 
 
1    2   3  4  5   6  7 
 
 
B. The following items assess how much control your company generally has over 
unexpected or exceptional situations affecting its strategic investments. Please indicate 
how strongly you agree or disagree with the following statements. 
 
                     Strongly                              Strongly 
                                Disagree                                Agree 
 
1.   The firm has the resources to resolve most situations. 
  
 1    2  3  4  5  6 7 
2.   The firm has the competencies to address most situations. 
 
 1   2   3  4  5   6  7 
3.   Most situations can be contained. 
 
 1    2   3  4  5   6  7 
4.   The firm manages situations instead of situations managing it. 
 
 1    2   3  4  5   6  7 
5.   The firm’s responses to situations are heavily constrained by other 
organizations, groups or individuals. 
 
 1   
  
 2  
 
 3  
 
4  
 
5  
 
 6 
 
 7 
  
168
 
 
 
 
III. Firm Strategy: This section assesses your firm’s overall strategic orientation. Please rate how 
strongly you agree or disagree with the following statements. 
 
 
 
                     Strongly                              Strongly 
                                Disagree                                Agree 
 
 
 
 
 
Thank you for your participation in this research! 
 
1.   The firm tries to maintain a safe niche in a relatively stable products domain. 
  
1   2  3  4 5  6 7 
2.   The firm tries to protect the domain in which it operates by stressing higher 
quality than its competitors. 
 
 
1   
  
2  
  
3  
 
4  
 
5  
  
6 
 
 7 
3.   The firm tries to protect the domain in which it operates by stressing lower 
prices than its competitors. 
 
 
1   
  
2  
  
3  
 
4  
 
5  
  
6 
 
 7 
4.   The firm concentrates on trying to achieve the best performance in a 
relatively narrow product market domain. 
 
 
1   
  
2  
  
3  
 
4  
 
5  
  
6 
  
7 
5.   The firm places less stress on the examination of changes in the industry 
that are not directly relevant to the firm. 
 
 
1   
  
2  
  
3  
 
4  
 
5  
  
6 
  
7 
6.   The firm leads in innovation in its industry. 
 
1    2   3  4  5   6 7 
7.   The firm operates in a broad product domain. 
 
1    2   3  4  5   6  7 
8.   The firm’s product domain is periodically redefined. 
  
1    2   3  4  5   6  7 
9.   The firm believes in being “first-in” in the industry in the development of new 
products. 
 
 
1   
  
2  
  
3  
 
4  
 
5  
  
6 
  
7 
10.  The firm responds rapidly to early signals of opportunities in the 
environment. 
 
 
1   
 
 2  
  
3  
 
4  
 
5  
  
6 
 
 7 
11.  The firm quickly adopts promising innovations in the industry. 
 
1    2   3  4  5   6  7 
12.  The innovations which are chosen by the firm are carefully examined. 
 
1    2   3  4  5   6  7 
13.  The firm often reacts to innovations in the industry by offering similar, lower-
cost products. 
 
 
1   
  
2  
  
3  
 
4  
 
5  
  
6 
 
 7 
14.  The firm carefully monitors competitors’ actions in the industry. 
 
1    2   3  4  5   6  7 
15.  The firm seldom leads in developing new products in the industry. 
 
1    2   3  4  5   6  7 
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Factor Analysis: Real Options Decision Patterns 
 
Rotated Component Matrixa
-.098 .295 .047 .066 .712 -.051 -.030 .151 .032 .119 -.188 -.187
.057 .006 -.016 -.080 .770 .085 -.137 -.120 -.117 -.148 .133 .075
.161 -.363 .094 .247 -.206 .002 .403 -.052 .410 .153 -.195 -.092
-.085 -.160 .215 .114 -.177 .156 .627 .050 .298 .083 -.103 .143
.103 .205 .001 .009 -.052 -.028 .752 .093 -.147 -.105 .080 -.176
.052 .730 .023 .083 -.053 .095 -.040 -.019 -.076 .010 -.082 .252
-.003 .793 -.005 .115 .020 .054 .175 -.080 -.056 .049 .031 -.056
.031 .746 .040 -.028 .275 -.091 .110 -.070 .073 .021 .047 -.154
-.028 .655 .137 -.054 .029 .050 -.265 .184 -.009 .186 -.115 .001
-.044 .247 .176 -.131 .048 .490 .228 -.220 -.119 -.148 -.069 .075
.084 .086 -.110 -.049 .048 -.240 .057 .036 .728 -.272 .349 .019
.247 .029 .093 .120 .552 .025 -.016 -.043 .076 .274 -.056 .143
.347 -.114 .043 .344 .195 .266 .302 .001 -.136 .000 .121 .180
-.181 -.097 .107 -.041 -.027 .181 -.056 -.108 .719 .209 .013 .051
.015 .013 .016 .186 .103 .683 .126 -.003 .054 .028 .207 .083
.077 .051 .100 .843 -.005 .175 .089 -.042 .088 -.151 .097 -.023
.143 -.084 .143 -.813 -.043 .132 -.017 .050 .095 -.014 .021 -.056
.028 .104 .274 .122 -.082 -.120 .010 -.124 -.137 .506 .447 .079
.068 .099 .780 .023 .025 -.009 .093 -.066 -.026 .081 -.190 .058
.135 -.016 .761 -.036 .147 .059 .120 -.069 .111 .138 -.061 -.040
.058 .043 .680 -.055 .149 .022 -.018 .106 .006 -.117 .151 .076
-.189 -.111 -.040 .054 -.034 .030 -.002 .038 .189 .063 .775 -.090
.051 .014 .656 .051 -.315 .062 -.052 -.020 -.028 -.023 .093 .041
.094 .254 -.142 -.085 .099 .217 -.106 -.006 .124 .656 .161 -.154
.097 .003 .094 -.183 .085 -.247 .053 .139 .020 .609 -.126 .282
.245 -.036 -.015 .011 -.019 -.124 .043 .756 .026 -.018 .027 .283
-.065 .008 -.030 -.087 -.016 .191 .062 .806 -.101 .041 -.008 -.121
.086 .005 .023 -.063 -.080 .681 -.154 .213 .039 .000 -.195 -.052
.059 .036 .099 .039 .024 .063 -.065 .063 .043 .066 -.049 .833
.712 .008 -.044 -.093 .011 -.049 .044 -.083 .118 -.006 -.227 .036
.799 -.019 .005 -.123 .169 .023 .122 .043 -.046 -.047 .026 .017
.811 -.018 .172 -.036 .118 .081 .091 .020 -.131 .056 .089 .160
.835 .090 .115 .094 -.091 -.004 -.089 .095 -.020 .134 -.104 -.068
.642 -.010 .237 .377 -.165 .051 -.229 .208 -.041 .089 .001 -.085
IA1
IA2
IA3
IA4
IA5
IB1
IB2
IB3
IB4
IB5
IB6
IC1
IC2
IC3
IC4
IC5
IC6
ID1
ID2
ID3
ID4
ID5
ID6
IE1
IE2
IE3
IE4
IE5
IE6
IF1
IF2
IF3
IF4
IF5
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Component
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.
Rotation converged in 25 iterations.a. 
 
Shadings indicate items included in final scales 
 
Item orientations are as follows:   IA – Timing 
          IB – Staging 
          IC – Project Interdependence (Not Used) 
           ID – Operating Flexibility 
          IE – Partial Commitment 
          IF – Platform 
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Scale Reliability: Staging 
 
 
Case Processing Summary
172 99.4
1 .6
173 100.0
Valid
Excludeda
Total
Cases
N %
Listwise deletion based on all
variables in the procedure.
a. 
 
 
Reliability Statistics
.742 .747 4
Cronbach's
Alpha
Cronbach's
Alpha Based
on
Standardized
Items N of Items
 
 
Inter-Item Correlation Matrix
1.000 .471 .358 .411
.471 1.000 .561 .381
.358 .561 1.000 .366
.411 .381 .366 1.000
IB1
IB2
IB3
IB4
IB1 IB2 IB3 IB4
 
 
Item-Total Statistics
15.95 10.728 .518 .289 .700
15.70 10.891 .624 .408 .632
15.42 11.146 .546 .346 .678
14.59 13.706 .484 .237 .717
IB1
IB2
IB3
IB4
Scale Mean if
Item Deleted
Scale
Variance if
Item Deleted
Corrected
Item-Total
Correlation
Squared
Multiple
Correlation
Cronbach's
Alpha if Item
Deleted
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Scale Reliability: Operating Flexibility 
 
 
Case Processing Summary
167 96.5
6 3.5
173 100.0
Valid
Excludeda
Total
Cases
N %
Listwise deletion based on all
variables in the procedure.
a. 
 
 
Reliability Statistics
.721 .724 4
Cronbach's
Alpha
Cronbach's
Alpha Based
on
Standardized
Items N of Items
 
 
Inter-Item Correlation Matrix
1.000 .610 .357 .377
.610 1.000 .449 .285
.357 .449 1.000 .296
.377 .285 .296 1.000
ID2
ID3
ID4
ID6
ID2 ID3 ID4 ID6
 
 
Item-Total Statistics
12.86 10.003 .590 .420 .611
12.95 10.034 .599 .434 .607
13.86 9.951 .468 .236 .689
13.90 11.478 .397 .172 .721
ID2
ID3
ID4
ID6
Scale Mean if
Item Deleted
Scale
Variance if
Item Deleted
Corrected
Item-Total
Correlation
Squared
Multiple
Correlation
Cronbach's
Alpha if Item
Deleted
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Scale Reliability: Platform 
 
 
Case Processing Summary
172 99.4
1 .6
173 100.0
Valid
Excludeda
Total
Cases
N %
Listwise deletion based on all
variables in the procedure.
a. 
 
 
Reliability Statistics
.839 .840 5
Cronbach's
Alpha
Cronbach's
Alpha Based
on
Standardized
Items N of Items
 
 
Inter-Item Correlation Matrix
1.000 .500 .445 .534 .275
.500 1.000 .689 .520 .364
.445 .689 1.000 .657 .480
.534 .520 .657 1.000 .658
.275 .364 .480 .658 1.000
IF1
IF2
IF3
IF4
IF5
IF1 IF2 IF3 IF4 IF5
 
 
Item-Total Statistics
16.64 27.051 .536 .365 .836
17.04 26.472 .650 .521 .804
16.53 25.724 .726 .599 .784
16.20 23.937 .769 .642 .769
16.45 27.618 .544 .447 .832
IF1
IF2
IF3
IF4
IF5
Scale Mean if
Item Deleted
Scale
Variance if
Item Deleted
Corrected
Item-Total
Correlation
Squared
Multiple
Correlation
Cronbach's
Alpha if Item
Deleted
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Scale Reliability: Deferral 
 
 
Case Processing Summary
172 99.4
1 .6
173 100.0
Valid
Excludeda
Total
Cases
N %
Listwise deletion based on all
variables in the procedure.
a. 
 
 
Reliability Statistics
.584 .585 2
Cronbach's
Alpha
Cronbach's
Alpha Based
on
Standardized
Items N of Items
 
 
Inter-Item Correlation Matrix
1.000 .413
.413 1.000
IA1
IA2
IA1 IA2
 
 
Item-Total Statistics
4.30 2.561 .413 .171 .
4.97 2.356 .413 .171 .
IA1
IA2
Scale Mean if
Item Deleted
Scale
Variance if
Item Deleted
Corrected
Item-Total
Correlation
Squared
Multiple
Correlation
Cronbach's
Alpha if Item
Deleted
 
 
 
 
 
  
175
 
Scale Reliability: Acceleration 
 
 
 
Case Processing Summary
172 99.4
1 .6
173 100.0
Valid
Excludeda
Total
Cases
N %
Listwise deletion based on all
variables in the procedure.
a. 
 
 
Reliability Statistics
.621 .621 2
Cronbach's
Alpha
Cronbach's
Alpha Based
on
Standardized
Items N of Items
 
 
Inter-Item Correlation Matrix
1.000 .451
.451 1.000
IA3
IA4
IA3 IA4
 
 
Item-Total Statistics
3.41 2.899 .451 .203 .
3.75 2.855 .451 .203 .
IA3
IA4
Scale Mean if
Item Deleted
Scale
Variance if
Item Deleted
Corrected
Item-Total
Correlation
Squared
Multiple
Correlation
Cronbach's
Alpha if Item
Deleted
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Scale Reliability: Partial Commitment 
 
 
Case Processing Summary
172 99.4
1 .6
173 100.0
Valid
Excludeda
Total
Cases
N %
Listwise deletion based on all
variables in the procedure.
a. 
 
 
Reliability Statistics
.540 .542 2
Cronbach's
Alpha
Cronbach's
Alpha Based
on
Standardized
Items N of Items
 
 
Inter-Item Correlation Matrix
1.000 .371
.371 1.000
IE3
IE4
IE3 IE4
 
 
Item-Total Statistics
4.12 2.786 .371 .138 .
3.08 3.228 .371 .138 .
IE3
IE4
Scale Mean if
Item Deleted
Scale
Variance if
Item Deleted
Corrected
Item-Total
Correlation
Squared
Multiple
Correlation
Cronbach's
Alpha if Item
Deleted
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Factor Analysis: Perceived Uncertainty 
 
 
 
Rotated Component Matrixa
.038 .823
.088 .747
-.029 .693
.539 .040
.829 -.004
.762 .141
.805 -.039
.635 .008
IIA1
IIA2
IIA3
IIA4
IIA5
IIA6
IIA7
IIA8
1 2
Component
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.
Rotation converged in 3 iterations.a. 
 
 
 
Shadings indicate items included in final scales 
 
 
Item orientations are as follows:   
 
IIA1-IIA3 – Perceived Market Uncertainty 
  
IIA14-IIA8 – Perceived Competitive Uncertainty 
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Scale Reliability: Perceived Market Uncertainty 
 
 
Case Processing Summary
173 100.0
0 .0
173 100.0
Valid
Excludeda
Total
Cases
N %
Listwise deletion based on all
variables in the procedure.
a. 
 
 
Reliability Statistics
.630 .627 3
Cronbach's
Alpha
Cronbach's
Alpha Based
on
Standardized
Items N of Items
 
 
 
 
Inter-Item Correlation Matrix
1.000 .463 .363
.463 1.000 .250
.363 .250 1.000
IIA1
IIA2
IIA3
IIA1 IIA2 IIA3
 
 
Item-Total Statistics
7.39 3.948 .525 .279 .399
6.31 4.528 .440 .222 .529
7.38 5.295 .360 .140 .632
IIA1
IIA2
IIA3
Scale Mean if
Item Deleted
Scale
Variance if
Item Deleted
Corrected
Item-Total
Correlation
Squared
Multiple
Correlation
Cronbach's
Alpha if Item
Deleted
 
 
 
 
  
179
 
Scale Reliability: Perceived Competitive Uncertainty 
 
 
Case Processing Summary
170 98.3
3 1.7
173 100.0
Valid
Excludeda
Total
Cases
N %
Listwise deletion based on all
variables in the procedure.
a. 
 
 
Reliability Statistics
.756 .765 5
Cronbach's
Alpha
Cronbach's
Alpha Based
on
Standardized
Items N of Items
 
 
Inter-Item Correlation Matrix
1.000 .413 .234 .324 .151
.413 1.000 .651 .489 .361
.234 .651 1.000 .498 .298
.324 .489 .498 1.000 .523
.151 .361 .298 .523 1.000
IIA4
IIA5
IIA6
IIA7
IIA8
IIA4 IIA5 IIA6 IIA7 IIA8
 
 
Item-Total Statistics
15.28 19.186 .352 .202 .771
15.38 16.841 .668 .524 .665
15.19 17.270 .563 .472 .699
14.99 16.615 .647 .440 .669
15.20 17.072 .437 .292 .751
IIA4
IIA5
IIA6
IIA7
IIA8
Scale Mean if
Item Deleted
Scale
Variance if
Item Deleted
Corrected
Item-Total
Correlation
Squared
Multiple
Correlation
Cronbach's
Alpha if Item
Deleted
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Factor Analysis: Strategic Orientation 
 
 
 
Rotated Component Matrixa
-.132 .027 -.101 -.072 .771
.162 -.182 .250 .022 .718
-.093 .773 .037 -.041 -.281
.180 .152 -.069 -.789 .178
-.043 .222 -.623 -.151 .215
.737 -.370 .095 -.067 .082
.309 .108 .031 .782 .096
.473 .055 -.051 .377 .011
.687 -.350 .098 -.080 -.069
.716 .034 .218 .158 .119
.802 .103 .094 .098 -.010
.265 .075 .566 -.142 .288
-.075 .718 -.052 -.012 .072
.120 .045 .771 .038 .097
-.559 .392 -.257 .134 .203
III1
III2
III3
III4
III5
III6
III7
III8
III9
III10
III11
III12
III13
III14
III15
1 2 3 4 5
Component
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.
Rotation converged in 10 iterations.a. 
 
 
Shadings indicate items included in final scale 
 
 
Item orientations are as follows:   
 
III1-III5 – Defender strategic type 
  
III6-III11 – Prospector strategic type 
 
III12-III15 – Analyzer strategic type 
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Scale Reliability: Strategic Orientation 
 
 
Case Processing Summary
170 98.3
3 1.7
173 100.0
Valid
Excludeda
Total
Cases
N %
Listwise deletion based on all
variables in the procedure.
a. 
 
 
Reliability Statistics
.759 .764 5
Cronbach's
Alpha
Cronbach's
Alpha Based
on
Standardized
Items N of Items
 
 
Inter-Item Correlation Matrix
1.000 .185 .618 .438 .508
.185 1.000 .191 .293 .266
.618 .191 1.000 .405 .412
.438 .293 .405 1.000 .620
.508 .266 .412 .620 1.000
III6
III8
III9
III10
III11
III6 III8 III9 III10 III11
 
 
Item-Total Statistics
18.77 17.267 .608 .463 .685
19.65 20.536 .292 .101 .798
19.26 17.057 .555 .408 .706
19.25 18.317 .601 .429 .692
19.33 17.855 .619 .459 .685
III6
III8
III9
III10
III11
Scale Mean if
Item Deleted
Scale
Variance if
Item Deleted
Corrected
Item-Total
Correlation
Squared
Multiple
Correlation
Cronbach's
Alpha if Item
Deleted
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APPENDIX C 
 
REGRESSION ANALYSES – UNCERTAINTY AND REAL OPTIONS DECISION 
PATTERNS 
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Deferral - Perceived Uncertainty 
 
 
 
Model Summary
.263a .069 .042 1.07952 .069 2.491 5 167 .033
.264b .070 .036 1.08268 .000 .027 1 166 .871
Model
1
2
R
R
Square
Adjusted
R
Square
Std.
Error of
the
Estimate
R
Square
Change
F
Change df1 df2
Sig. F
Change
Change Statistics
Predictors: (Constant), RStratOrient, CPerCU, CPerMU, CIIndex, LOGTAa. 
Predictors: (Constant), RStratOrient, CPerCU, CPerMU, CIIndex, LOGTA, PerMxCIntb. 
 
 
Coefficientsa
-.849 .481 -1.764 .080
-.049 .086 -.044 -.574 .567
-.213 .083 -.194 -2.564 .011
.001 .050 .001 .012 .990
.027 .461 .005 .060 .953
.178 .084 .161 2.122 .035
-.849 .483 -1.759 .080
-.050 .087 -.045 -.580 .562
-.215 .084 -.195 -2.555 .012
.002 .051 .003 .030 .976
.022 .463 .004 .048 .962
.177 .084 .160 2.101 .037
-.014 .084 -.012 -.163 .871
(Constant)
CPerMU
CPerCU
LOGTA
CIIndex
RStratOrient
(Constant)
CPerMU
CPerCU
LOGTA
CIIndex
RStratOrient
PerMxCInt
Model
1
2
B Std. Error
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Beta
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Dependent Variable: CDefera. 
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Deferral - Objective Uncertainty 
 
 
 
Model Summary
.212a .045 .016 1.09359 .045 1.573 5 167 .170
.213b .045 .011 1.09666 .000 .065 1 166 .799
Model
1
2
R
R
Square
Adjusted
R
Square
Std.
Error of
the
Estimate
R
Square
Change
F
Change df1 df2
Sig. F
Change
Change Statistics
Predictors: (Constant), ZRHINDEX, RStratOrient, CIIndex, ZSEMean5, LOGTAa. 
Predictors: (Constant), ZRHINDEX, RStratOrient, CIIndex, ZSEMean5, LOGTA, SMUxCU5
b. 
 
 
Coefficientsa
-.853 .485 -1.760 .080
-.011 .051 -.019 -.221 .826
.100 .462 .018 .216 .830
.194 .085 .175 2.276 .024
-.061 .089 -.054 -.686 .494
-.151 .092 -.135 -1.653 .100
-.862 .487 -1.769 .079
-.009 .052 -.016 -.182 .856
.071 .477 .013 .149 .882
.193 .086 .175 2.258 .025
-.069 .094 -.061 -.730 .467
-.149 .092 -.133 -1.611 .109
-.019 .074 -.021 -.255 .799
(Constant)
LOGTA
CIIndex
RStratOrient
ZSEMean5
ZRHINDEX
(Constant)
LOGTA
CIIndex
RStratOrient
ZSEMean5
ZRHINDEX
SMUxCU5
Model
1
2
B Std. Error
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Beta
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Dependent Variable: CDefera. 
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Acceleration - Perceived Uncertainty 
 
 
 
Model Summary
.218a .047 .019 1.42668 .047 1.665 5 167 .146
.263b .069 .036 1.41446 .022 3.898 1 166 .050
Model
1
2
R
R
Square
Adjusted
R
Square
Std.
Error of
the
Estimate
R
Square
Change
F
Change df1 df2
Sig. F
Change
Change Statistics
Predictors: (Constant), RStratOrient, CPerCU, CPerMU, CIIndex, LOGTAa. 
Predictors: (Constant), RStratOrient, CPerCU, CPerMU, CIIndex, LOGTA, PerMxCIntb. 
 
 
Coefficientsa
.900 .636 1.414 .159
-.071 .114 -.049 -.626 .532
-.080 .110 -.056 -.730 .466
-.156 .066 -.199 -2.356 .020
-.302 .609 -.041 -.496 .621
.059 .111 .041 .529 .597
.900 .631 1.426 .156
-.059 .113 -.040 -.522 .602
-.051 .110 -.035 -.461 .646
-.171 .066 -.218 -2.584 .011
-.216 .605 -.029 -.357 .721
.073 .110 .051 .662 .509
.217 .110 .151 1.974 .050
(Constant)
CPerMU
CPerCU
LOGTA
CIIndex
RStratOrient
(Constant)
CPerMU
CPerCU
LOGTA
CIIndex
RStratOrient
PerMxCInt
Model
1
2
B Std. Error
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Beta
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Dependent Variable: CAccela. 
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Acceleration - Objective Uncertainty 
 
 
 
Model Summary
.215a .046 .018 1.42768 .046 1.616 5 167 .158
.215b .046 .012 1.43190 .000 .017 1 166 .897
Model
1
2
R
R
Square
Adjusted
R
Square
Std.
Error of
the
Estimate
R
Square
Change
F
Chang
e df1 df2
Sig. F
Change
Change Statistics
Predictors: (Constant), ZRHINDEX, RStratOrient, CIIndex, ZSEMean5, LOGTAa. 
Predictors: (Constant), ZRHINDEX, RStratOrient, CIIndex, ZSEMean5, LOGTA, SMUxCU5b. 
 
 
Coefficientsa
.850 .633 1.344 .181
-.151 .067 -.192 -2.262 .025
-.332 .604 -.045 -.550 .583
.062 .111 .043 .560 .576
.091 .116 .062 .787 .432
-.019 .120 -.013 -.159 .874
.844 .636 1.328 .186
-.150 .068 -.190 -2.215 .028
-.351 .623 -.048 -.563 .574
.062 .112 .043 .553 .581
.086 .123 .059 .705 .482
-.017 .121 -.012 -.144 .886
-.013 .097 -.011 -.130 .897
(Constant)
LOGTA
CIIndex
RStratOrient
ZSEMean5
ZRHINDEX
(Constant)
LOGTA
CIIndex
RStratOrient
ZSEMean5
ZRHINDEX
SMUxCU5
Model
1
2
B Std. Error
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Beta
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Dependent Variable: CAccela. 
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Staging - Perceived Uncertainty 
 
 
 
Model Summary
.351a .123 .097 1.03318 .123 4.687 5 167 .000
.398b .158 .128 1.01537 .035 6.910 1 166 .009
Model
1
2
R
R
Square
Adjusted
R
Square
Std.
Error of
the
Estimate
R
Square
Change
F
Change df1 df2
Sig. F
Chang
e
Change Statistics
Predictors: (Constant), RStratOrient, CPerCU, CPerMU, CIIndex, LOGTAa. 
Predictors: (Constant), RStratOrient, CPerCU, CPerMU, CIIndex, LOGTA, PerMxCIntb. 
 
 
Coefficientsa
-1.842 .461 -3.998 .000
.203 .082 .184 2.460 .015
.019 .079 .017 .235 .815
.044 .048 .075 .924 .357
.534 .441 .096 1.210 .228
.301 .080 .276 3.740 .000
-1.842 .453 -4.068 .000
.191 .081 .173 2.355 .020
-.010 .079 -.009 -.121 .904
.059 .048 .099 1.231 .220
.452 .434 .081 1.040 .300
.287 .079 .263 3.626 .000
-.208 .079 -.191 -2.629 .009
(Constant)
CPerMU
CPerCU
LOGTA
CIIndex
RStratOrient
(Constant)
CPerMU
CPerCU
LOGTA
CIIndex
RStratOrient
PerMxCInt
Model
1
2
B Std. Error
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Beta
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Dependent Variable: CStaginga. 
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Staging - Objective Uncertainty 
 
 
 
Model Summary
.307a .094 .067 1.05012 .094 3.468 5 167 .005
.339b .115 .083 1.04098 .021 3.948 1 166 .049
Model
1
2
R
R
Square
Adjusted
R
Square
Std.
Error of
the
Estimate
R
Square
Change
F
Change df1 df2
Sig. F
Change
Change Statistics
Predictors: (Constant), ZRHINDEX, RStratOrient, CIIndex, ZSEMean5, LOGTAa. 
Predictors: (Constant), ZRHINDEX, RStratOrient, CIIndex, ZSEMean5, LOGTA, SMUxCU5
b. 
 
 
Coefficientsa
-1.604 .465 -3.448 .001
.011 .049 .019 .225 .823
.621 .444 .112 1.397 .164
.297 .082 .272 3.624 .000
-.036 .085 -.032 -.416 .678
-.073 .088 -.066 -.825 .411
-1.669 .462 -3.609 .000
.025 .049 .042 .504 .615
.409 .453 .074 .904 .367
.291 .081 .267 3.579 .000
-.091 .089 -.082 -1.021 .309
-.054 .088 -.049 -.612 .542
-.140 .070 -.161 -1.987 .049
(Constant)
LOGTA
CIIndex
RStratOrient
ZSEMean5
ZRHINDEX
(Constant)
LOGTA
CIIndex
RStratOrient
ZSEMean5
ZRHINDEX
SMUxCU5
Model
1
2
B Std. Error
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Beta
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Dependent Variable: CStaginga. 
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Operating Flexibility - Perceived Uncertainty 
 
 
 
Model Summary
.279a .078 .050 .98271 .078 2.823 5 167 .018
.281b .079 .045 .98525 .001 .140 1 166 .709
Model
1
2
R
R
Square
Adjusted
R
Square
Std.
Error of
the
Estimat
e
R
Square
Change
F
Change df1 df2
Sig. F
Chang
e
Change Statistics
Predictors: (Constant), RStratOrient, CPerCU, CPerMU, CIIndex, LOGTAa. 
Predictors: (Constant), RStratOrient, CPerCU, CPerMU, CIIndex, LOGTA, PerMxCIntb. 
 
 
Coefficientsa
-1.173 .438 -2.677 .008
.104 .078 .101 1.326 .187
-.052 .076 -.052 -.685 .494
.050 .046 .092 1.103 .272
-.839 .419 -.163 -2.001 .047
.212 .077 .209 2.765 .006
-1.173 .439 -2.670 .008
.102 .079 .100 1.300 .195
-.056 .076 -.055 -.728 .467
.052 .046 .095 1.135 .258
-.850 .421 -.165 -2.018 .045
.210 .077 .207 2.727 .007
-.029 .077 -.028 -.374 .709
(Constant)
CPerMU
CPerCU
LOGTA
CIIndex
RStratOrient
(Constant)
CPerMU
CPerCU
LOGTA
CIIndex
RStratOrient
PerMxCInt
Model
1
2
B Std. Error
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Beta
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Dependent Variable: COpflexa. 
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Operating Flexibility - Objective Uncertainty 
 
 
 
Model Summary
.264a .070 .042 .98715 .070 2.498 5 167 .033
.267b .071 .038 .98928 .002 .282 1 166 .596
Model
1
2
R
R
Square
Adjusted
R
Square
Std.
Error of
the
Estimate
R
Square
Change
F
Change df1 df2
Sig. F
Change
Change Statistics
Predictors: (Constant), ZRHINDEX, RStratOrient, CIIndex, ZSEMean5, LOGTAa. 
Predictors: (Constant), ZRHINDEX, RStratOrient, CIIndex, ZSEMean5, LOGTA,
SMUxCU5
b. 
 
 
Coefficientsa
-1.109 .437 -2.535 .012
.044 .046 .079 .948 .345
-.753 .417 -.146 -1.804 .073
.204 .077 .202 2.653 .009
.050 .080 .048 .617 .538
.048 .083 .047 .585 .559
-1.126 .439 -2.561 .011
.047 .047 .086 1.011 .313
-.807 .430 -.156 -1.874 .063
.203 .077 .200 2.626 .009
.035 .085 .035 .419 .676
.053 .083 .052 .638 .524
-.035 .067 -.044 -.531 .596
(Constant)
LOGTA
CIIndex
RStratOrient
ZSEMean5
ZRHINDEX
(Constant)
LOGTA
CIIndex
RStratOrient
ZSEMean5
ZRHINDEX
SMUxCU5
Model
1
2
B Std. Error
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Beta
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Dependent Variable: COpflexa. 
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Partial Commitment - Perceived Uncertainty 
 
 
 
Model Summary
.184a .034 .005 1.42766 .034 1.171 5 167 .325
.203b .041 .007 1.42654 .007 1.262 1 166 .263
Model
1
2
R
R
Square
Adjusted
R
Square
Std.
Error of
the
Estimat
e
R
Square
Chang
e
F
Chang
e df1 df2
Sig. F
Change
Change Statistics
Predictors: (Constant), RStratOrient, CPerCU, CPerMU, CIIndex, LOGTAa. 
Predictors: (Constant), RStratOrient, CPerCU, CPerMU, CIIndex, LOGTA, PerMxCIntb. 
 
 
Coefficientsa
-.272 .637 -.428 .669
-.021 .114 -.015 -.186 .853
.085 .110 .059 .770 .442
-.069 .066 -.088 -1.033 .303
1.372 .609 .187 2.253 .026
.099 .111 .069 .895 .372
-.273 .636 -.428 .669
-.014 .114 -.010 -.124 .901
.101 .111 .071 .917 .361
-.077 .067 -.099 -1.154 .250
1.421 .610 .194 2.329 .021
.108 .111 .075 .967 .335
.125 .111 .087 1.124 .263
(Constant)
CPerMU
CPerCU
LOGTA
CIIndex
RStratOrient
(Constant)
CPerMU
CPerCU
LOGTA
CIIndex
RStratOrient
PerMxCInt
Model
1
2
B Std. Error
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Beta
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Dependent Variable: CPartComa. 
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Partial Commitment - Objective Uncertainty 
 
 
 
Model Summary
.238a .057 .028 1.41083 .057 2.001 5 167 .081
.247b .061 .027 1.41156 .005 .827 1 166 .365
Model
1
2
R
R
Square
Adjusted
R
Square
Std.
Error of
the
Estimate
R
Square
Change
F
Change df1 df2
Sig. F
Change
Change Statistics
Predictors: (Constant), ZRHINDEX, RStratOrient, CIIndex, ZSEMean5, LOGTAa. 
Predictors: (Constant), ZRHINDEX, RStratOrient, CIIndex, ZSEMean5, LOGTA, SMUxCU5b. 
 
 
Coefficientsa
-.262 .625 -.419 .676
-.077 .066 -.098 -1.165 .246
1.364 .597 .186 2.287 .023
.110 .110 .077 .999 .319
-.245 .115 -.168 -2.137 .034
-.101 .118 -.070 -.855 .394
-.302 .627 -.482 .630
-.068 .067 -.087 -1.025 .307
1.233 .614 .168 2.008 .046
.106 .110 .074 .964 .336
-.280 .121 -.192 -2.313 .022
-.089 .119 -.061 -.751 .454
-.087 .095 -.076 -.909 .365
(Constant)
LOGTA
CIIndex
RStratOrient
ZSEMean5
ZRHINDEX
(Constant)
LOGTA
CIIndex
RStratOrient
ZSEMean5
ZRHINDEX
SMUxCU5
Model
1
2
B Std. Error
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Beta
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Dependent Variable: CPartComa. 
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Platform - Perceived Uncertainty 
 
 
 
Model Summary
.372a .138 .113 1.17751 .138 5.368 5 167 .000
.379b .143 .112 1.17762 .005 .968 1 166 .327
Model
1
2
R
R
Square
Adjusted
R
Square
Std.
Error of
the
Estimate
R
Square
Change
F
Change df1 df2
Sig. F
Change
Change Statistics
Predictors: (Constant), RStratOrient, CPerCU, CPerMU, CIIndex, LOGTAa. 
Predictors: (Constant), RStratOrient, CPerCU, CPerMU, CIIndex, LOGTA, PerMxCIntb. 
 
 
Coefficientsa
-1.667 .525 -3.175 .002
-.057 .094 -.045 -.604 .547
-.155 .091 -.124 -1.709 .089
.007 .055 .011 .131 .896
-.971 .502 -.152 -1.933 .055
.388 .092 .309 4.231 .000
-1.668 .525 -3.175 .002
-.052 .094 -.041 -.549 .584
-.142 .091 -.114 -1.559 .121
.001 .055 .002 .019 .985
-.935 .504 -.146 -1.857 .065
.394 .092 .314 4.285 .000
.090 .092 .072 .984 .327
(Constant)
CPerMU
CPerCU
LOGTA
CIIndex
RStratOrient
(Constant)
CPerMU
CPerCU
LOGTA
CIIndex
RStratOrient
PerMxCInt
Model
1
2
B Std. Error
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Beta
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Dependent Variable: CPlata. 
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Platform - Objective Uncertainty 
 
 
 
Model Summary
.367a .134 .108 1.18032 .134 5.183 5 167 .000
.379b .144 .113 1.17732 .010 1.850 1 166 .176
Model
1
2
R
R
Square
Adjusted
R
Square
Std.
Error of
the
Estimate
R
Square
Change
F
Change df1 df2
Sig. F
Change
Change Statistics
Predictors: (Constant), ZRHINDEX, RStratOrient, CIIndex, ZSEMean5, LOGTAa. 
Predictors: (Constant), ZRHINDEX, RStratOrient, CIIndex, ZSEMean5, LOGTA, SMUxCU5b. 
 
 
Coefficientsa
-1.656 .523 -3.166 .002
-.005 .055 -.008 -.097 .923
-.943 .499 -.148 -1.890 .060
.403 .092 .322 4.382 .000
-.055 .096 -.044 -.577 .565
-.162 .099 -.128 -1.637 .103
-1.706 .523 -3.262 .001
.005 .056 .008 .094 .925
-1.107 .512 -.173 -2.161 .032
.399 .092 .318 4.340 .000
-.098 .101 -.077 -.975 .331
-.147 .099 -.116 -1.484 .140
-.108 .080 -.108 -1.360 .176
(Constant)
LOGTA
CIIndex
RStratOrient
ZSEMean5
ZRHINDEX
(Constant)
LOGTA
CIIndex
RStratOrient
ZSEMean5
ZRHINDEX
SMUxCU5
Model
1
2
B Std. Error
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Beta
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Dependent Variable: CPlata. 
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REGRESSION ANALYSES – PERFORMANCE 
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Growth - Perceived Uncertainty 
 
 
 
 
Model Summary
.316a .100 .044 16.168 .100 1.798 10 162 .065
.415b .172 .044 16.171 .072 .996 13 149 .458
.572c .327 .190 14.880 .155 5.494 6 143 .000
Model
1
2
3
R
R
Square
Adjusted
R
Square
Std.
Error of
the
Estimate
R
Square
Change
F
Change df1 df2
Sig. F
Change
Change Statistics
Predictors: (Constant), ConGr5, CAccel, CPerMU, CPartCom, CPerCU, COpflex, LOGTA,
CDefer, CPlat, CStaging
a. 
Predictors: (Constant), ConGr5, CAccel, CPerMU, CPartCom, CPerCU, COpflex, LOGTA,
CDefer, CPlat, CStaging, PMUxOpFl, PMUxPartC, PMUxAcc, PMUxDef, PCUxPartC,
PCUxDef, PMUxPlat, PCUxOpFl, PCUxAcc, PCUxStag, PMUxStag, PMUxPCU, PCUxPlat
b. 
Predictors: (Constant), ConGr5, CAccel, CPerMU, CPartCom, CPerCU, COpflex, LOGTA,
CDefer, CPlat, CStaging, PMUxOpFl, PMUxPartC, PMUxAcc, PMUxDef, PCUxPartC,
PCUxDef, PMUxPlat, PCUxOpFl, PCUxAcc, PCUxStag, PMUxStag, PMUxPCU, PCUxPlat,
PMUxPCUxPlat, PMUxPCUxStag, PMUxPCUxPartC, PMUxPCUxOpFl, PMUxPCUxAcc,
PMUxPCUxDef
c. 
 
 
  
 ANOVA (d) 
  
d  Dependent Variable: Growth5Yr 
 
 
 
Model   
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 4698.733 10 469.873 1.798 .065 
Residual 42346.500 162 261.398     
Total 47045.234 172       
2 Regression 8083.143 23 351.441 1.344 .149 
Residual 38962.091 149 261.491     
Total 47045.234 172       
3 Regression 15381.965 29 530.413 2.395 .000 
Residual 31663.269 143 221.421     
Total 47045.234 172       
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Coefficientsa
-1.226 6.259 -.196 .845
.619 1.215 .041 .509 .611
.748 .943 .065 .794 .429
.663 1.248 .044 .531 .596
-.471 1.300 -.029 -.362 .717
1.846 .883 .160 2.090 .038
.840 1.059 .064 .794 .428
-.705 1.322 -.042 -.534 .594
.406 1.273 .025 .319 .750
.299 .709 .033 .421 .674
.898 .300 .230 2.994 .003
-2.461 6.645 -.370 .712
-.012 1.281 -.001 -.009 .993
.651 .977 .057 .667 .506
1.205 1.335 .079 .902 .368
-.587 1.394 -.036 -.421 .674
1.664 .908 .144 1.834 .069
.793 1.110 .060 .714 .476
-.844 1.406 -.050 -.600 .549
.803 1.384 .049 .581 .562
.241 .751 .027 .320 .749
.944 .311 .242 3.030 .003
-2.081 1.188 -.148 -1.752 .082
-.536 .882 -.053 -.608 .544
-1.132 1.349 -.081 -.839 .403
-1.086 1.339 -.074 -.811 .419
.798 1.059 .065 .754 .452
-.748 1.128 -.062 -.663 .509
-.504 1.323 -.033 -.381 .704
-.911 .992 -.076 -.918 .360
1.607 1.381 .106 1.164 .246
.107 1.386 .007 .077 .938
1.156 .944 .103 1.224 .223
.282 1.167 .021 .242 .809
1.233 1.548 .074 .796 .427
-.441 6.267 -.070 .944
.809 1.242 .054 .652 .516
1.127 .934 .098 1.207 .229
1.104 1.314 .073 .840 .402
-.545 1.322 -.033 -.412 .681
1.571 .876 .136 1.793 .075
1.226 1.044 .093 1.174 .242
-1.186 1.412 -.071 -.840 .403
.636 1.397 .039 .456 .649
.538 .712 .060 .756 .451
.632 .293 .162 2.159 .033
-4.355 1.253 -.309 -3.476 .001
-1.689 .887 -.166 -1.903 .059
-.009 1.291 -.001 -.007 .995
-.913 1.307 -.062 -.698 .486
.565 1.017 .046 .555 .580
-.873 1.043 -.073 -.837 .404
-.390 1.306 -.025 -.299 .765
.083 .946 .007 .087 .930
.474 1.321 .031 .359 .720
1.249 1.410 .077 .886 .377
.930 .876 .083 1.062 .290
-.960 1.102 -.070 -.871 .385
.016 1.497 .001 .011 .991
-3.100 1.329 -.218 -2.332 .021
-1.892 .946 -.181 -2.000 .047
.325 1.310 .022 .248 .805
1.226 1.421 .080 .863 .389
.778 1.029 .067 .756 .451
-4.089 1.115 -.329 -3.666 .000
(Constant)
CDefer
CAccel
CStaging
COpflex
CPartCom
CPlat
CPerMU
CPerCU
LOGTA
ConGr5
(Constant)
CDefer
CAccel
CStaging
COpflex
CPartCom
CPlat
CPerMU
CPerCU
LOGTA
ConGr5
PCUxDef
PCUxAcc
PCUxStag
PCUxOpFl
PCUxPartC
PCUxPlat
PMUxDef
PMUxAcc
PMUxStag
PMUxOpFl
PMUxPartC
PMUxPlat
PMUxPCU
(Constant)
CDefer
CAccel
CStaging
COpflex
CPartCom
CPlat
CPerMU
CPerCU
LOGTA
ConGr5
PCUxDef
PCUxAcc
PCUxStag
PCUxOpFl
PCUxPartC
PCUxPlat
PMUxDef
PMUxAcc
PMUxStag
PMUxOpFl
PMUxPartC
PMUxPlat
PMUxPCU
PMUxPCUxDef
PMUxPCUxAcc
PMUxPCUxStag
PMUxPCUxOpFl
PMUxPCUxPartC
PMUxPCUxPlat
Model
1
2
3
B Std. Error
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Beta
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Dependent Variable: Growth5Yra. 
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Growth - Objective Uncertainty 
 
 
 
 
Model Summary
.322a .104 .048 16.135 .104 1.871 10 162 .053
.382b .146 .014 16.421 .042 .570 13 149 .875
.417c .174 .006 16.489 .028 .794 6 143 .576
Model
1
2
3
R
R
Square
Adjusted
R
Square
Std.
Error of
the
Estimate
R
Square
Change
F
Change df1 df2
Sig. F
Change
Change Statistics
Predictors: (Constant), ConGr5, CAccel, CPartCom, CRHINDEX, COpflex, CDefer,
LOGTA, CPlat, CStaging, CSEMean5
a. 
Predictors: (Constant), ConGr5, CAccel, CPartCom, CRHINDEX, COpflex, CDefer,
LOGTA, CPlat, CStaging, CSEMean5, OMUxAcc, OCUxOpFl, OMUxPartC, OMUxPlat,
OMUxOpFl, OCUxStag, OMUxDef, OCUxAcc, OCUxPartC, OCUxDef, OMUxStag,
OCUxPlat, OMUxOCU
b. 
Predictors: (Constant), ConGr5, CAccel, CPartCom, CRHINDEX, COpflex, CDefer,
LOGTA, CPlat, CStaging, CSEMean5, OMUxAcc, OCUxOpFl, OMUxPartC, OMUxPlat,
OMUxOpFl, OCUxStag, OMUxDef, OCUxAcc, OCUxPartC, OCUxDef, OMUxStag,
OCUxPlat, OMUxOCU, OMUxOCUxDef, OMUxOCUxOpFl, OMUxOCUxAcc,
OMUxOCUxPartC, OMUxOCUxPlat, OMUxOCUxStag
c. 
 
 
 
 ANOVA (d) 
 
Model   
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 4871.133 10 487.113 1.871 .053 
Residual 42174.100 162 260.334     
Total 47045.234 172       
2 Regression 6868.123 23 298.614 1.107 .344 
Residual 40177.110 149 269.645     
Total 47045.234 172       
3 Regression 8163.947 29 281.515 1.035 .427 
Residual 38881.286 143 271.897     
Total 47045.234 172       
d  Dependent Variable: Growth5Yr 
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Coefficientsa
-2.913 6.228 -.468 .641
.731 1.186 .049 .616 .539
.814 .940 .071 .866 .388
.617 1.224 .041 .504 .615
-.639 1.297 -.039 -.493 .623
1.858 .894 .161 2.079 .039
.937 1.049 .071 .893 .373
.553 .714 .061 .775 .439
21.406 22.542 .079 .950 .344
-3.300 123.837 -.002 -.027 .979
.888 .313 .227 2.838 .005
-5.744 6.615 -.868 .387
.947 1.266 .063 .748 .456
.846 .986 .074 .858 .392
.683 1.387 .045 .493 .623
-.562 1.373 -.034 -.410 .683
1.690 .936 .146 1.806 .073
.878 1.131 .066 .776 .439
.864 .758 .096 1.140 .256
23.461 26.867 .086 .873 .384
-58.808 134.096 -.039 -.439 .662
.910 .327 .233 2.779 .006
6.895 26.481 .024 .260 .795
-.348 18.982 -.002 -.018 .985
-13.627 25.748 -.050 -.529 .597
6.452 25.978 .021 .248 .804
-18.116 17.517 -.093 -1.034 .303
17.855 23.644 .071 .755 .451
235.114 137.523 .152 1.710 .089
75.736 92.347 .074 .820 .413
-148.444 143.484 -.102 -1.035 .303
55.010 150.665 .031 .365 .716
-14.790 97.718 -.013 -.151 .880
133.709 106.135 .108 1.260 .210
-1693.865 1953.754 -.089 -.867 .387
-5.180 6.866 -.755 .452
.688 1.321 .046 .521 .603
1.005 1.009 .087 .996 .321
.556 1.454 .037 .382 .703
-1.112 1.427 -.068 -.779 .437
1.730 1.033 .150 1.676 .096
1.065 1.183 .081 .900 .370
.837 .783 .093 1.069 .287
35.356 29.095 .130 1.215 .226
-62.851 147.077 -.042 -.427 .670
.878 .341 .225 2.577 .011
12.660 27.397 .045 .462 .645
-1.356 19.629 -.006 -.069 .945
-18.668 26.955 -.069 -.693 .490
2.546 30.183 .008 .084 .933
-5.818 19.423 -.030 -.300 .765
-1.318 27.440 -.005 -.048 .962
217.435 146.016 .141 1.489 .139
100.691 95.625 .098 1.053 .294
-164.711 168.082 -.113 -.980 .329
-3.547 162.143 -.002 -.022 .983
5.143 105.209 .005 .049 .961
139.602 112.495 .112 1.241 .217
117.178 3326.313 .006 .035 .972
629.506 3319.760 .022 .190 .850
1155.262 1731.368 .067 .667 .506
-2481.411 2746.150 -.138 -.904 .368
-4563.691 3019.995 -.161 -1.511 .133
256.234 1988.785 .017 .129 .898
337.922 2356.571 .020 .143 .886
(Constant)
CDefer
CAccel
CStaging
COpflex
CPartCom
CPlat
LOGTA
CRHINDEX
CSEMean5
ConGr5
(Constant)
CDefer
CAccel
CStaging
COpflex
CPartCom
CPlat
LOGTA
CRHINDEX
CSEMean5
ConGr5
OCUxDef
OCUxAcc
OCUxStag
OCUxOpFl
OCUxPartC
OCUxPlat
OMUxDef
OMUxAcc
OMUxStag
OMUxOpFl
OMUxPartC
OMUxPlat
OMUxOCU
(Constant)
CDefer
CAccel
CStaging
COpflex
CPartCom
CPlat
LOGTA
CRHINDEX
CSEMean5
ConGr5
OCUxDef
OCUxAcc
OCUxStag
OCUxOpFl
OCUxPartC
OCUxPlat
OMUxDef
OMUxAcc
OMUxStag
OMUxOpFl
OMUxPartC
OMUxPlat
OMUxOCU
OMUxOCUxDef
OMUxOCUxAcc
OMUxOCUxStag
OMUxOCUxOpFl
OMUxOCUxPartC
OMUxOCUxPlat
Model
1
2
3
B Std. Error
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Beta
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Dependent Variable: Growth5Yra. 
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Market-to-Book - Perceived Uncertainty 
 
 
 
 
Model Summary
.306a .094 .038 .40164 .094 1.671 10 162 .092
.424b .180 .053 .39833 .086 1.208 13 149 .279
.508c .258 .107 .38681 .078 2.501 6 143 .025
Model
1
2
3
R
R
Square
Adjusted
R
Square
Std.
Error of
the
Estimate
R
Square
Change
F
Change df1 df2
Sig. F
Change
Change Statistics
Predictors: (Constant), ConMTB, CPerCU, COpflex, CPartCom, LOGTA, CStaging,
CPerMU, CPlat, CDefer, CAccel
a. 
Predictors: (Constant), ConMTB, CPerCU, COpflex, CPartCom, LOGTA, CStaging,
CPerMU, CPlat, CDefer, CAccel, PMUxOpFl, PMUxPlat, PMUxAcc, PCUxPartC, PCUxDef,
PMUxPartC, PCUxOpFl, PMUxDef, PCUxAcc, PMUxPCU, PMUxStag, PCUxPlat, PCUxStag
b. 
Predictors: (Constant), ConMTB, CPerCU, COpflex, CPartCom, LOGTA, CStaging,
CPerMU, CPlat, CDefer, CAccel, PMUxOpFl, PMUxPlat, PMUxAcc, PCUxPartC, PCUxDef,
PMUxPartC, PCUxOpFl, PMUxDef, PCUxAcc, PMUxPCU, PMUxStag, PCUxPlat, PCUxStag,
PMUxPCUxPlat, PMUxPCUxStag, PMUxPCUxPartC, PMUxPCUxOpFl, PMUxPCUxAcc,
PMUxPCUxDef
c. 
 
 
 
 ANOVA (d) 
 
Model   
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 2.696 10 .270 1.671 .092 
Residual 26.133 162 .161     
Total 28.829 172       
2 Regression 5.188 23 .226 1.422 .109 
Residual 23.641 149 .159     
Total 28.829 172       
3 Regression 7.434 29 .256 1.713 .021 
Residual 21.396 143 .150     
Total 28.829 172       
d  Dependent Variable: MktToBk 
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Coefficientsa
.019 .150 .125 .901
.010 .030 .027 .332 .740
-.015 .023 -.052 -.631 .529
-.038 .031 -.100 -1.225 .222
.027 .032 .067 .847 .398
.005 .022 .018 .235 .815
.003 .026 .011 .134 .893
.025 .033 .059 .752 .453
.004 .032 .009 .119 .905
.060 .018 .268 3.396 .001
.242 .172 .106 1.407 .161
.139 .158 .880 .380
.023 .032 .062 .724 .470
-.013 .024 -.046 -.541 .589
-.042 .033 -.111 -1.272 .205
.039 .034 .095 1.123 .263
.005 .022 .017 .219 .827
-.013 .027 -.041 -.499 .619
.015 .035 .036 .434 .665
-.015 .034 -.036 -.426 .671
.049 .019 .220 2.662 .009
.177 .174 .078 1.021 .309
.004 .029 .010 .124 .902
.006 .022 .022 .258 .797
-.023 .033 -.067 -.691 .491
.049 .033 .134 1.475 .142
.032 .026 .107 1.240 .217
.006 .028 .019 .201 .841
.018 .033 .047 .543 .588
-.024 .024 -.081 -.984 .327
-.077 .034 -.206 -2.274 .024
.027 .034 .068 .802 .424
.016 .023 .058 .700 .485
.025 .028 .072 .862 .390
.012 .038 .029 .308 .759
.104 .157 .660 .511
.011 .032 .030 .341 .734
-.008 .024 -.028 -.332 .741
-.021 .034 -.057 -.628 .531
.031 .034 .077 .912 .363
-.007 .023 -.026 -.322 .748
-.004 .027 -.013 -.163 .871
.017 .037 .040 .452 .652
.029 .036 .071 .793 .429
.054 .019 .240 2.899 .004
.174 .170 .077 1.025 .307
.025 .033 .072 .768 .444
-.009 .023 -.035 -.381 .704
-.038 .034 -.109 -1.115 .267
.071 .034 .196 2.089 .038
.018 .026 .060 .683 .496
.009 .027 .030 .327 .744
.007 .034 .018 .206 .837
-.019 .025 -.063 -.761 .448
-.083 .034 -.222 -2.418 .017
.038 .037 .094 1.029 .305
.013 .023 .048 .587 .558
.029 .028 .085 1.020 .309
.038 .039 .093 .979 .329
.024 .034 .069 .708 .480
-.061 .025 -.235 -2.470 .015
-.088 .034 -.245 -2.591 .011
.074 .037 .195 1.996 .048
.027 .027 .093 1.012 .313
.009 .029 .030 .319 .751
(Constant)
CDefer
CAccel
CStaging
COpflex
CPartCom
CPlat
CPerMU
CPerCU
LOGTA
ConMTB
(Constant)
CDefer
CAccel
CStaging
COpflex
CPartCom
CPlat
CPerMU
CPerCU
LOGTA
ConMTB
PCUxDef
PCUxAcc
PCUxStag
PCUxOpFl
PCUxPartC
PCUxPlat
PMUxDef
PMUxAcc
PMUxStag
PMUxOpFl
PMUxPartC
PMUxPlat
PMUxPCU
(Constant)
CDefer
CAccel
CStaging
COpflex
CPartCom
CPlat
CPerMU
CPerCU
LOGTA
ConMTB
PCUxDef
PCUxAcc
PCUxStag
PCUxOpFl
PCUxPartC
PCUxPlat
PMUxDef
PMUxAcc
PMUxStag
PMUxOpFl
PMUxPartC
PMUxPlat
PMUxPCU
PMUxPCUxDef
PMUxPCUxAcc
PMUxPCUxStag
PMUxPCUxOpFl
PMUxPCUxPartC
PMUxPCUxPlat
Model
1
2
3
B Std. Error
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Beta
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Dependent Variable: MktToBka. 
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Market-to-Book - Objective Uncertainty 
 
 
 
 
Model Summary
.307a .094 .038 .40151 .094 1.683 10 162 .089
.557b .310 .204 .36527 .216 3.596 13 149 .000
.599c .359 .229 .35959 .048 1.790 6 143 .105
Model
1
2
3
R
R
Square
Adjusted
R
Square
Std.
Error of
the
Estimate
R
Square
Change
F
Change df1 df2
Sig. F
Change
Change Statistics
Predictors: (Constant), ConMTB, CRHINDEX, CAccel, CPartCom, COpflex, CDefer,
CPlat, LOGTA, CSEMean5, CStaging
a. 
Predictors: (Constant), ConMTB, CRHINDEX, CAccel, CPartCom, COpflex, CDefer,
CPlat, LOGTA, CSEMean5, CStaging, OMUxAcc, OCUxOpFl, OMUxPartC, OMUxPlat,
OMUxOpFl, OCUxStag, OMUxDef, OCUxAcc, OCUxPartC, OCUxDef, OMUxStag,
OCUxPlat, OMUxOCU
b. 
Predictors: (Constant), ConMTB, CRHINDEX, CAccel, CPartCom, COpflex, CDefer,
CPlat, LOGTA, CSEMean5, CStaging, OMUxAcc, OCUxOpFl, OMUxPartC, OMUxPlat,
OMUxOpFl, OCUxStag, OMUxDef, OCUxAcc, OCUxPartC, OCUxDef, OMUxStag,
OCUxPlat, OMUxOCU, OMUxOCUxDef, OMUxOCUxOpFl, OMUxOCUxAcc,
OMUxOCUxPartC, OMUxOCUxPlat, OMUxOCUxStag
c. 
 
 
 
 ANOVA (d) 
 
Model   
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 2.713 10 .271 1.683 .089 
Residual 26.116 162 .161     
Total 28.829 172       
2 Regression 8.950 23 .389 2.916 .000 
Residual 19.879 149 .133     
Total 28.829 172       
3 Regression 10.338 29 .356 2.757 .000 
Residual 18.491 143 .129     
Total 28.829 172       
d  Dependent Variable: MktToBk 
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Coefficientsa
.071 .150 .472 .638
.004 .030 .011 .142 .887
-.017 .023 -.059 -.715 .476
-.034 .030 -.090 -1.127 .261
.032 .032 .079 .993 .322
.005 .022 .017 .216 .830
.000 .026 -.001 -.015 .988
.053 .018 .238 2.995 .003
-.460 .551 -.068 -.834 .406
-.758 2.959 -.020 -.256 .798
.232 .172 .102 1.351 .179
.167 .141 1.180 .240
.003 .028 .009 .113 .910
-.029 .022 -.103 -1.333 .185
-.039 .031 -.102 -1.262 .209
.044 .031 .107 1.426 .156
.006 .021 .020 .280 .780
.015 .025 .047 .620 .536
.039 .017 .177 2.339 .021
-.068 .589 -.010 -.116 .908
1.498 2.889 .040 .518 .605
.198 .159 .087 1.247 .214
-.426 .589 -.061 -.723 .471
.262 .422 .049 .620 .536
1.858 .572 .277 3.247 .001
-.545 .580 -.071 -.938 .350
-.977 .390 -.202 -2.507 .013
-1.577 .525 -.253 -3.006 .003
1.858 3.061 .049 .607 .545
3.981 2.054 .156 1.938 .054
.920 3.200 .026 .288 .774
2.628 3.344 .059 .786 .433
-3.556 2.178 -.126 -1.632 .105
-.815 2.338 -.027 -.349 .728
3.318 43.338 .007 .077 .939
.187 .144 1.299 .196
.005 .029 .014 .183 .855
-.026 .022 -.091 -1.173 .243
-.061 .031 -.163 -1.964 .051
.045 .031 .111 1.450 .149
.007 .022 .024 .312 .755
.006 .026 .020 .251 .802
.036 .017 .159 2.081 .039
-.003 .630 .000 -.005 .996
-.379 3.050 -.010 -.124 .901
.212 .158 .093 1.340 .183
-.550 .598 -.078 -.921 .359
.335 .428 .063 .784 .434
2.052 .584 .306 3.512 .001
-.952 .657 -.125 -1.449 .150
-.854 .424 -.176 -2.015 .046
-1.215 .596 -.195 -2.040 .043
-.542 3.179 -.014 -.170 .865
5.063 2.085 .199 2.428 .016
1.445 3.630 .040 .398 .691
-.238 3.508 -.005 -.068 .946
-2.258 2.283 -.080 -.989 .324
-1.636 2.429 -.053 -.673 .502
40.970 71.783 .087 .571 .569
-4.285 72.012 -.006 -.060 .953
54.208 37.756 .127 1.436 .153
-118.291 59.153 -.265 -2.000 .047
40.226 65.760 .057 .612 .542
28.608 43.122 .074 .663 .508
-.668 50.801 -.002 -.013 .990
(Constant)
CDefer
CAccel
CStaging
COpflex
CPartCom
CPlat
LOGTA
CRHINDEX
CSEMean5
ConMTB
(Constant)
CDefer
CAccel
CStaging
COpflex
CPartCom
CPlat
LOGTA
CRHINDEX
CSEMean5
ConMTB
OCUxDef
OCUxAcc
OCUxStag
OCUxOpFl
OCUxPartC
OCUxPlat
OMUxDef
OMUxAcc
OMUxStag
OMUxOpFl
OMUxPartC
OMUxPlat
OMUxOCU
(Constant)
CDefer
CAccel
CStaging
COpflex
CPartCom
CPlat
LOGTA
CRHINDEX
CSEMean5
ConMTB
OCUxDef
OCUxAcc
OCUxStag
OCUxOpFl
OCUxPartC
OCUxPlat
OMUxDef
OMUxAcc
OMUxStag
OMUxOpFl
OMUxPartC
OMUxPlat
OMUxOCU
OMUxOCUxDef
OMUxOCUxAcc
OMUxOCUxStag
OMUxOCUxOpFl
OMUxOCUxPartC
OMUxOCUxPlat
Model
1
2
3
B Std. Error
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Beta
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Dependent Variable: MktToBka. 
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Return on Assets - Perceived Uncertainty 
 
 
 
 
Model Summary
.260a .067 .010 9.0133 .067 1.171 10 162 .314
.347b .120 -.016 9.1290 .053 .686 13 149 .775
.398c .158 -.012 9.1134 .038 1.085 6 143 .374
Model
1
2
3
R
R
Square
Adjusted
R
Square
Std.
Error of
the
Estimat
e
R
Square
Change
F
Change df1 df2
Sig. F
Chang
e
Change Statistics
Predictors: (Constant), ConROA, CPlat, CAccel, CPerCU, CPerMU, CPartCom,
COpflex, CStaging, CDefer, LOGTA
a. 
Predictors: (Constant), ConROA, CPlat, CAccel, CPerCU, CPerMU, CPartCom,
COpflex, CStaging, CDefer, LOGTA, PMUxOpFl, PMUxPlat, PMUxAcc, PCUxPartC,
PCUxDef, PMUxPartC, PCUxOpFl, PMUxDef, PCUxAcc, PCUxStag, PMUxStag,
PMUxPCU, PCUxPlat
b. 
Predictors: (Constant), ConROA, CPlat, CAccel, CPerCU, CPerMU, CPartCom,
COpflex, CStaging, CDefer, LOGTA, PMUxOpFl, PMUxPlat, PMUxAcc, PCUxPartC,
PCUxDef, PMUxPartC, PCUxOpFl, PMUxDef, PCUxAcc, PCUxStag, PMUxStag,
PMUxPCU, PCUxPlat, PMUxPCUxPlat, PMUxPCUxStag, PMUxPCUxPartC,
PMUxPCUxOpFl, PMUxPCUxAcc, PMUxPCUxDef
c. 
 
 
 
 ANOVA (d) 
 
Model   
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 951.131 10 95.113 1.171 .314 
Residual 13160.699 162 81.239     
Total 14111.830 172       
2 Regression 1694.477 23 73.673 .884 .619 
Residual 12417.353 149 83.338     
Total 14111.830 172       
3 Regression 2235.083 29 77.072 .928 .576 
Residual 11876.747 143 83.054     
Total 14111.830 172       
d  Dependent Variable: AvgROA3 
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Coefficientsa
-.075 2.927 -.026 .980
.206 .680 .025 .303 .762
-.006 .528 -.001 -.012 .990
.234 .695 .028 .337 .736
.582 .724 .065 .804 .423
-.447 .491 -.071 -.910 .364
.086 .583 .012 .148 .882
-1.268 .735 -.138 -1.726 .086
.552 .710 .061 .778 .438
.510 .411 .103 1.241 .217
.402 .286 .114 1.407 .161
.365 3.114 .117 .907
.290 .725 .035 .400 .690
.036 .552 .006 .065 .948
.318 .760 .038 .418 .677
.570 .788 .063 .723 .471
-.428 .512 -.068 -.837 .404
-.102 .620 -.014 -.164 .870
-1.414 .792 -.154 -1.786 .076
.414 .783 .046 .529 .598
.394 .442 .080 .891 .374
.479 .296 .136 1.618 .108
-1.071 .671 -.139 -1.596 .113
.254 .493 .045 .514 .608
.013 .761 .002 .018 .986
-.386 .751 -.048 -.513 .609
-.370 .598 -.055 -.619 .537
.111 .638 .017 .173 .863
.611 .750 .073 .815 .416
.165 .562 .025 .295 .769
-.954 .781 -.115 -1.222 .224
.474 .783 .053 .605 .546
.916 .535 .149 1.714 .089
-.086 .653 -.011 -.132 .895
.068 .878 .008 .078 .938
-.436 3.189 -.137 .891
.272 .761 .033 .357 .722
.060 .572 .010 .105 .916
.493 .815 .059 .606 .546
.681 .810 .076 .841 .402
-.337 .537 -.053 -.627 .532
.039 .634 .005 .062 .951
-1.674 .861 -.182 -1.945 .054
.610 .861 .068 .709 .479
.469 .454 .095 1.035 .302
.515 .298 .146 1.728 .086
-1.253 .768 -.163 -1.633 .105
.147 .537 .026 .274 .784
-.053 .792 -.007 -.066 .947
-.717 .795 -.090 -.902 .369
-.361 .623 -.054 -.580 .563
.124 .639 .019 .194 .847
.302 .801 .036 .377 .707
.114 .580 .017 .197 .844
-.853 .811 -.103 -1.052 .295
.832 .864 .094 .963 .337
.963 .538 .156 1.788 .076
-.169 .666 -.022 -.254 .800
-.099 .920 -.011 -.108 .914
-.293 .811 -.038 -.362 .718
.017 .580 .003 .030 .976
-.591 .806 -.074 -.734 .464
-.322 .871 -.038 -.370 .712
-.568 .630 -.089 -.901 .369
-.915 .678 -.134 -1.350 .179
(Constant)
CDefer
CAccel
CStaging
COpflex
CPartCom
CPlat
CPerMU
CPerCU
LOGTA
ConROA
(Constant)
CDefer
CAccel
CStaging
COpflex
CPartCom
CPlat
CPerMU
CPerCU
LOGTA
ConROA
PCUxDef
PCUxAcc
PCUxStag
PCUxOpFl
PCUxPartC
PCUxPlat
PMUxDef
PMUxAcc
PMUxStag
PMUxOpFl
PMUxPartC
PMUxPlat
PMUxPCU
(Constant)
CDefer
CAccel
CStaging
COpflex
CPartCom
CPlat
CPerMU
CPerCU
LOGTA
ConROA
PCUxDef
PCUxAcc
PCUxStag
PCUxOpFl
PCUxPartC
PCUxPlat
PMUxDef
PMUxAcc
PMUxStag
PMUxOpFl
PMUxPartC
PMUxPlat
PMUxPCU
PMUxPCUxDef
PMUxPCUxAcc
PMUxPCUxStag
PMUxPCUxOpFl
PMUxPCUxPartC
PMUxPCUxPlat
Model
1
2
3
B Std. Error
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Beta
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Dependent Variable: AvgROA3a. 
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Return on Assets - Objective Uncertainty 
 
 
 
 
Model Summary
.278a .077 .020 8.9657 .077 1.356 10 162 .205
.420b .176 .049 8.8323 .099 1.379 13 149 .176
.481c .232 .076 8.7080 .055 1.714 6 143 .122
Model
1
2
3
R
R
Square
Adjusted
R
Square
Std.
Error of
the
Estimate
R
Square
Change
F
Change df1 df2
Sig. F
Change
Change Statistics
Predictors: (Constant), CSEMean5, CStaging, CPlat, LOGTA, CPartCom, COpflex,
CDefer, ConROA, CRHINDEX, CAccel
a. 
Predictors: (Constant), CSEMean5, CStaging, CPlat, LOGTA, CPartCom, COpflex,
CDefer, ConROA, CRHINDEX, CAccel, OMUxAcc, OMUxPartC, OMUxPlat, OCUxOpFl,
OMUxOpFl, OCUxStag, OMUxDef, OCUxAcc, OCUxPartC, OMUxStag, OCUxDef,
OCUxPlat, OMUxOCU
b. 
Predictors: (Constant), CSEMean5, CStaging, CPlat, LOGTA, CPartCom, COpflex,
CDefer, ConROA, CRHINDEX, CAccel, OMUxAcc, OMUxPartC, OMUxPlat, OCUxOpFl,
OMUxOpFl, OCUxStag, OMUxDef, OCUxAcc, OCUxPartC, OMUxStag, OCUxDef,
OCUxPlat, OMUxOCU, OMUxOCUxDef, OMUxOCUxOpFl, OMUxOCUxAcc,
OMUxOCUxPartC, OMUxOCUxPlat, OMUxOCUxStag
c. 
 
 
 
 ANOVA(d) 
 
Model   
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 1089.723 10 108.972 1.356 .205 
Residual 13022.107 162 80.383     
Total 14111.830 172       
2 Regression 2488.450 23 108.193 1.387 .126 
Residual 11623.381 149 78.009     
Total 14111.830 172       
3 Regression 3268.325 29 112.701 1.486 .068 
Residual 10843.505 143 75.829     
Total 14111.830 172       
  
     
d  Dependent Variable: AvgROA3 
 
  
207
 
Coefficientsa
-2.316 2.924 -.792 .430
.374 .661 .045 .566 .572
.028 .524 .004 .053 .958
.078 .680 .009 .115 .909
.326 .721 .036 .453 .651
-.334 .494 -.053 -.677 .499
.232 .576 .032 .402 .688
.853 .413 .173 2.064 .041
.357 .285 .102 1.254 .212
26.409 12.322 .178 2.143 .034
93.504 66.185 .114 1.413 .160
-2.461 3.027 -.813 .418
.261 .683 .032 .382 .703
.212 .531 .034 .400 .690
.142 .743 .017 .191 .849
.267 .738 .030 .362 .718
-.514 .500 -.081 -1.026 .306
.285 .604 .039 .471 .638
1.050 .426 .212 2.462 .015
.120 .300 .034 .399 .690
42.491 14.383 .286 2.954 .004
83.021 70.272 .101 1.181 .239
-4.627 14.330 -.030 -.323 .747
-30.255 10.448 -.257 -2.896 .004
-4.071 13.829 -.027 -.294 .769
21.038 14.394 .125 1.462 .146
-3.324 9.435 -.031 -.352 .725
11.317 12.717 .082 .890 .375
54.703 74.017 .065 .739 .461
-38.654 49.767 -.069 -.777 .439
25.823 77.196 .032 .335 .738
152.328 81.339 .154 1.873 .063
109.839 52.585 .176 2.089 .038
-11.708 56.605 -.017 -.207 .836
-219.817 1047.690 -.021 -.210 .834
-1.101 3.096 -.355 .723
.005 .700 .001 .008 .994
.075 .534 .012 .140 .889
.503 .757 .060 .665 .507
.070 .754 .008 .093 .926
-.089 .541 -.014 -.165 .869
.011 .624 .002 .018 .985
.963 .429 .195 2.245 .026
-.009 .299 -.003 -.031 .975
50.776 15.453 .341 3.286 .001
120.930 74.385 .147 1.626 .106
-1.405 14.538 -.009 -.097 .923
-33.105 10.596 -.281 -3.124 .002
-12.325 14.154 -.083 -.871 .385
8.955 16.152 .053 .554 .580
-8.979 10.277 -.084 -.874 .384
10.398 14.429 .075 .721 .472
48.300 77.049 .057 .627 .532
-46.568 50.609 -.083 -.920 .359
20.372 87.958 .026 .232 .817
208.044 85.542 .211 2.432 .016
124.076 55.277 .199 2.245 .026
-27.148 58.911 -.040 -.461 .646
1153.098 1733.804 .110 .665 .507
-1008.319 1740.206 -.065 -.579 .563
-1085.245 915.093 -.115 -1.186 .238
578.829 1427.680 .059 .405 .686
-4210.215 1604.960 -.271 -2.623 .010
590.001 1043.287 .069 .566 .573
-1929.753 1220.595 -.210 -1.581 .116
(Constant)
CDefer
CAccel
CStaging
COpflex
CPartCom
CPlat
LOGTA
ConROA
CRHINDEX
CSEMean5
(Constant)
CDefer
CAccel
CStaging
COpflex
CPartCom
CPlat
LOGTA
ConROA
CRHINDEX
CSEMean5
OCUxDef
OCUxAcc
OCUxStag
OCUxOpFl
OCUxPartC
OCUxPlat
OMUxDef
OMUxAcc
OMUxStag
OMUxOpFl
OMUxPartC
OMUxPlat
OMUxOCU
(Constant)
CDefer
CAccel
CStaging
COpflex
CPartCom
CPlat
LOGTA
ConROA
CRHINDEX
CSEMean5
OCUxDef
OCUxAcc
OCUxStag
OCUxOpFl
OCUxPartC
OCUxPlat
OMUxDef
OMUxAcc
OMUxStag
OMUxOpFl
OMUxPartC
OMUxPlat
OMUxOCU
OMUxOCUxDef
OMUxOCUxAcc
OMUxOCUxStag
OMUxOCUxOpFl
OMUxOCUxPartC
OMUxOCUxPlat
Model
1
2
3
B Std. Error
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Beta
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Dependent Variable: AvgROA3a. 
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